An Analysis of Martyr Motahari’s Critique of Allameh Tabatabaei in the Concept of Divine Wisdom

In the meaning of divine wisdom, there are differences of opinion between Muslim theologians and philosophers. The purpose of this article is to explicate and examine Martyr Motahari’s criticism of Allameh Tabatabaei’s definition of Divine Wisdom. Allameh, in a precise statement, considers the essence of God’s action to be the same as wisdom and the criterion of all wisdoms, from which wisdom for others’ actions is deduced. The drawbacks to this perspective pointed out by Martyr Motahari include the invalidation of wisdom for God, the nullification of the Qur’anic arguments using wisdom, and the transference from wise wisdom to theologians’ wisdom, and then its negation. However, considering wisdom in the sense of the purposefulness of God’s actions, there is no distance between God’s action and its ultimate cause, or wisdom. According to Allameh’s view, God’s action is not subject to any laws. Wisdom is, therefore, provable for God. Furthermore, the ultimate cause of God’s action is in essence, the Essence of God, and bringing creatures to their perfection is the consequential purpose. Qur’anic arguments also take into account the assumption of purposelessness and then reject it. On several occasions, Allameh has elucidated the meaning of wisdom in God, in a different way from how the Mu’tazilite theologians define it, and his expression has embraced the removal of the alleged deficiency. The common point between the two views is that, fundamentally, any system other than the existing best system is not even a hypothesis.