Market Responses to the Quality of Audit Partners Work

Agency problems result from the conflict of interests existing among managers and shareholders. Auditing is considered as an effective way to limit the power of managers in contractual relations.  This paper is aimed to investigate the market response to the quality of audit partners work. To test the hypothesis, data from firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period from 2009 to 2017 are collected and the regression model of cross-sectional data and panel data is used. The results of the first hypothesis of the research confirm that in firms with high quality work of audit partners, revenue has a higher reflection in stock prices. The high quality of the audit partner's work manages and controls information asymmetry and, therefore, the agency's problems related to the firm's management decisions. The second hypothesis that is changing the auditor and selecting a higher quality auditor leads to a positive market reaction, is also confirmed. If the market believes that using higher quality auditors increases the information content of profits and decreases abnormal returns, the audit market response when changing auditors and selecting a higher quality auditing partner is closer to reality (predicted levels). Also, the results confirms the third hypothesis that is auditing by high quality auditing partners has a significant impact on the amount of facilities received. Because the quality of the audit partners’ work has a significant impact on the creditors' view of the risk and timing of the repayment of receivables, therefore the amount of facilities granted increases. On the other hand, the stock price in these firms is a reflection of the real income of them. ‌