Value of Philosophia Prima in Kant and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī

The present study investigates the scientific value of philosophia prima from the epistemological perspectives of Kant and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī. As a philosopher whose standpoints were under the influence of other sciences and, due to the conditions of his time, he sided with both empiricism and rationalism, Kant tried to solve the conflicts between these two schools relying on apriori synthetic propositions. Finally, he argued that, firstly, knowledge is acquired through sense perception and, secondly, it is limited to phenomena. Hence, he concluded that, while metaphysics cannot be denied, the existence of scientific propositions of philosophia prima are not epistemologically possible. Nevertheless, based on the ideas that, apart from sensible knowledge, pure rational knowledge can also be demonstrated, and that knowledge includes not only phenomenon but also essence, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī believed that philosophia prima enjoys epistemological value in terms of its demonstrative method, subject, and problems. He places it on the top of all human sciences and considers all of its propositions and achievement to be certain and scientific.