The effect of the division of propositions into actuality, mental and factual, on the conditions of some syllogisms (based on the opinion of contemporaries)

Throughout the texts of contemporary logicians, it has been explicitly or implicitly stated that the division of propositions into actuality, mental and factual, has no effect on logical syllogisms. In the following text, first, by analyzing the opinions of contemporaries on the division of propositions into actuality, mental and factual, the differences and similarities of the opinions in this regard have been identified. Then we examine the position of the conditional's quantifier and its effect on the conditions of conditional-categorical syllogisms (conjunctive or exceptive) in the opinions of contemporary logicians. In the final step and based on the conditions of conditional-categorical syllogisms (conjunctive or exceptive), we have shown that some of the moods that most contemporaries have declared to be valid have counter-examples, and only with the factual of the categorical premises in all situations and for all samples will result.