The Permissiblity of Punishment due to Right Forfeiture

The point of departure in the present article is distinguishing two fundamental philosophical-legal questions as follow: ‘Why are we allowed to punish’ and ‘Why do we punish’. Since the focus of traditional approaches has been mainly put on the latter question, jurists have failed to pay scant attention to the former one. Addressing the first question leads us to reflect on ‘the permissibility of applying coercive measure against human beings, not the goal pursued through such application’. This leads us further on to reflect on the four strictly deontological theories of punishment, the last of which (the right forfeiture theory of punishment) is discussed here. The right forfeiture theory of punishment which itself can be discussed in the light of two weak and strong versions has faced various challenges raised by its critics. I, defensively, address four challenges of ‘indeterminate authorization’, ‘status’, ‘suitability’, and ‘duration and breadth’ by an argumentative-critical method.