The Denial of God Being an Essence and Its Consequences in Avicenna's Philosophy

Discussion about existence and essence are some of the most significant topics of debates in Islamic philosophy. In philosophical contexts the term essence is used in the two following meanings, namely ‘what is said as a reply to the question about what a thing is, is then the thing’ and ‘what a thing comprises’. Since its primary meaning is related to a thing’s limit, i.e. all existing things have a limit, philosophers’ claims in relating it to God are inconsistent. Avicenna is a scientist who clearly considers the relating of such a meaning of essence to God as impossible. In his opinion, relating this meaning to the Necessarily-Existing, which means exactly the same as the truth of the necessary being, is inconsistent.Along with probing into Avicenna’s reasoning based on the denial of the essence of the Necessarily-Existing, the present paper also aims at pointing out the negative consequences of relating the concept of essence to God. It also endeavors to shed more light on the issue on the basis of the viewpoints of two of his reliable and outstanding annotators, i.e. Imam Fakhr Razi and Khajeh Tusi.A correlative examination of their critical study and comments enables the reader to follow the discussion on the fact that the Necessarily-Existing can impossibly possess an essence, which is substantiated in secondary religious principles.Moreover, the present paper touches on the following philosophical concepts: the denial of substantiality, the denial of material and difference, the denial of limit, the denial of conceptual co-operation, and the denial of likeness and oppositeness among other things, as an additional evidence for the denial of God being an essence.