Examining Kant's view on the non-inference of "ought" from "is"Emphasizing the thought of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli

The ontology of ethics and the logic of ethics are some of the most important issues in meta-ethics. The most important argument in the ontology of morality is whether values ​​are real or not, and the most important argument in the logic of morality is the inference or non-inference of "ought" from "is." Given the deep connection between meta-ethical issues, the lack of inference of "ought" from "is" should be considered a prerequisite for moral unrealism. However, despite believing in the reality of values, Kant believes in the inference of "ought" from "is". This article first uses a descriptive and analytical method to express Kant's views on this issue and then examines his views by emphasizing the ideas of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli in the field of philosophy of ethics. The result of this research, which is also considered to be innovation, is that with a new look and new critiques we will show that Kant's view that "ought" not be inferred from "is" is not correct, and this is incorrect in his inaccuracy in his analysis of moral realism. How moral values ​​are referred to reality is rooted.