Strategic Needs of Countering Terrorism in Iraq

After 2003 and in a situation where the new political order based on democratic principles has replaced the previous political order in Iraq, this country has witnessed the emergence and expansion of terrorist groups with different approaches. In the early years after the fall of Saddam, the core of ISIS was formed as one of the most terrifying terrorist groups in history in Iraq, and after this group succeeded in capturing large parts of Iraq and Syria by announcing the formation of the Islamic caliphate, they chose Mosul as the capital of the caliphate. In 2018, with the loss of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, ISIS practically lost its quasi-state existence and became an underground terrorist organization, as it was in the years before 2012. However, the Iraqi society and government are still at risk of the resurgence of terrorist groups. This research seeks to answer the question, “What are the requirements for dealing with terrorism in Iraq?” by using the descriptive-analytical method in the analysis of findings and the library method in data collection. To answer this question, the causes of the origin and the rest of the terrorist groups in Iraq were investigated in order to identify the strategic needs of countering terrorism in Iraq. The findings of the research show that “social gaps”, “lack of formation of national identity”, “geo-political and geo-economic imbalance”, “weakness, inefficiency and degradation of the central government” and “totalitarian culture of Sunni Iraq”, the factors of emergence and growth (causes and the rest) are terrorist groups in this country. Therefore, in order to effectively deal with terrorism in Iraq, it is necessary to move in the direction of creating a comprehensive national identity through the creation of “socialized security” and appropriate response to the identity needs of Iraqi social groups, and while attracting the participation of Iraqis and the balanced distribution of resources, disabled the active social gaps.