A Critical Examination of Legal Pluralism and Some of the Pluralistic Views in the Area of the Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law

Can monist theories that address tort law's philosophical foundations, such as corrective and distributive justice or optimal deterrence, manage the enormous diversity of circumstances that tort law now handles? The answer appears to be no. In the normative phase, monist theories seek to assure us that all laws must be designed to achieve a certain goal, while in the descriptive phase; they seek to demonstrate that all components of tort law are grounded on a single logic. This poses substantial obstacles for these theories, to the point that it appears we cannot accept monist theories philosophically or practically, suggesting that resorting to plural theories is the final option given the variety of circumstances that tort law must deal with today. In this study, we examined and analyzed four pluralistic theories in the realm of the philosophical foundations of tort law after assessing their explanations and premises. Each of these ideas has some beneficial traits that contributed to their success as a plural theory, but they also have some severe defects that render them insufficient when used as a coherent and effective theory. While embracing the plural approach, the authors of this essay suggest that present pluralistic approaches to the philosophical underpinnings of tort law have numerous severe shortcomings. A cohesive, effective plural theory could yet be created, in our opinion. Finally, we sketched out the outlines of such a theory and will go into further depth in another essay that will be published to our legal community in the near future.