Investigation of decision strategies in JCPOA based on game theory mechanism

In this study, the strategies of internal and external decision makers in Borjam are examined using game theory.

The decisions made by three related personalities in JCPOA , including the leadership of Iran, the Government of Iran and the group (1 + 5) have been simulated using game theory and analyzed based on the game theory mechanism. In the problem statement section, principles are accepted and the game is designed based on that. The AHP method was used to evaluate the consequences of the game. The low incompatibility rate calculated for this method describes the evaluation results as acceptable. Entering the negotiations in the form of a static game is expressed with complete information and the process of mutual agreement is shown as a dynamic game.

The game is discussed from two aspects, in the pre-game section, the nature of entering or not entering the negotiations is examined. Examining the game process shows that entering into negotiations is a strategic behavior for Iran and the group (5 + 1). But in the main game where strategies for decision making are examined. Trust without guarantee has been shown to change the outcome of the game from win-win to win-lose.

Originality/Value:

 There are various attitudes about JCPOA. In this research, regardless of attitudes and factions, the work process is implemented in a scientific model with a strategic structure.