Form of Mimesis: Rethinking the Neglected Aspect of Mimesis Theory

Mimesis, as one of the fundamental views on the nature of art and literature, has always been a dominant theory in the philosophy of art from ancient Greece to the eighteenth century. In the contemporary period, thinkers such as Auerbach, Gerard, and followers of the Chicago School - each from a particular perspective - have given a new reading of it. However, mimesis is essentially an anti-formalist theory that focuses on the state of affairs in the real world due to its adherence to the principle of reference. Accordingly, the theory of imitation implies the examination of the truth and falsity of works of art based on the principle of conformity and attention to the referential function of language. This is why mimesis in Plato's system of thought leads to his anti-artistic stance. However, the present study has emerged from the heart of the tradition of imitation in the philosophy of art. Relying on the principles of the theory of mimesis, it has tried to examine the origins of this view and make arguments according to which mimesis, in case it addresses the form and not the subject of mimesis, has the potential to become, in a new reading, an introduction to formalist theory and not necessarily an alternative or competing theory. In this research, it becomes clear that mimesis in its specific meaning, in the first place, requires the abstraction of the form of affairs. In the second place, the abstracted form is reconfigured and takes on a new form based on the artistic matter (which, in verbal art, is language and its signs). In this way, the truth and falsity of the work of art in this case is possible not by referring the extra-text or the outside world but by examining the internal system of the work. This entails the self-sufficiency of the work of art, which is one of the fundamental traits of formalism.