Economics Analysis of Imposing Registration Fee on Mahr
This paper purports to analyze imposing registration fees on that part of Mahr higher than a certain level (Mahr Sunnah) from an economic perspective. The proponents of this plan believe that high Mahr is a main obstacle for young men’s marriage, and in the case occurring, it can lead to various kinds of social costs. So, it should be deterred by imposing a tax on it. This plan only considers the benefits of one part of marriage (men) and ignores the benefits of the other side (women). So, it can disturb the marriage market and leads to other kinds of social costs that might be even relatively higher. The incentive mechanism of this plan encourages the substitution of Mahr by other provisions in the marriage contract such as asking for divorce right by women, marital properties equal division, out-of-formal wedlock arrangements that are non-recognizable by the law as Mahr, and even leaving the marriage market for other counterparts such as cohabitation; all of them rise the transaction costs of marriage and might increase the average age at first marriage and decrease the likelihood of fertility.
- حق عضویت دریافتی صرف حمایت از نشریات عضو و نگهداری، تکمیل و توسعه مگیران میشود.
- پرداخت حق اشتراک و دانلود مقالات اجازه بازنشر آن در سایر رسانههای چاپی و دیجیتال را به کاربر نمیدهد.