Studying Private Property Appearance and Constitutional Revolution in Iran Through the Social Orders Approach of Institutional Economics

The main objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the emergence of private property and the constitutional revolution in Iran by using the social order approach with qualitative research methods. The results show that the Iranian social order during this period was a fragile order with limited access. The authoritarian system distributed land rents among elites and deviated from the security of property rights by creating insecurity to secure its benefits. During the reign of Shah Nasereddin, drought shocks led to tax cuts and forced governments to sell off lands. On the other hand, the connection to international trade through the export of agricultural products led to the reallocation of capital to the land business. These events led to an expansion of private property in the form of large landholdings.According to the theory of double equilibrium, economic and political systems cannot differ in the long run. Thus, at the beginning of the constitutional revolution, private landowners joined the movement. The codification of principles (15), (16) and (17) in the constitutional amendment and the abolition of vassalage guaranteed their property rights. Therefore, in political terms, the social order changes to a basic order with limited access, and the dual equilibrium is restored