The Problem of Life in Avicenna’s Philosophy: A Critical Assessment of Tawara’s Viewpoint

The concept of life is a contentious interdisciplinary issue that has intrigued scholars, with philosophers offering their perspectives. Avicenna is one of the first philosophers who delved into the fundamental problem of defining life in his works. Tawara as one of the few scholars who have paid attention to this matter in Avicenna’s philosophy, without considering the fundamental problem of the definition of life, has come to this conclusion that Avicenna initially defines life as nutrition and growth and as a result classifies plants as living beings. But, in the course of his intellectual evolution, by presenting another definition of life, identifying it with perception and voluntary movement, he deviates from this viewpoint and excludes plants from the living beings. Using conceptual and textual analysis, we critique Tawara's view on three fronts: an incomplete reading of Avicenna's texts, neglecting the fundamental problem of the definition of life, and the absence of historical evolution in Avicenna's perspective on life. Upon a broader examination of Avicenna's philosophical works, it becomes evident that Avicenna doesn’t propose just two definitions for life, as Tawara suggests. Instead, he presents five distinct definitions in his works. These definitions don't represent an evolutionary process but rather highlight the persistent challenge Avicenna faced throughout his intellectual journey in defining life.