Examining the Incorporated (Mutashabbaḥ) Equivocation of Existence from the Viewpoint of Ali Quli bin Qarachaghai Khan

The equivocation (ishtirāk-i lafẓī) and shared meaning (ishtirāk-i ma‘nawī) of existence in late Islamic philosophy (from the time of Mirdamad to the present era) has always been one of the most controversial philosophical issues. Some like Mulla Sadra and his disciples believed in shared meaning of existence and some others like Tabrizi and some of his disciples believed in equivocation of existence. Meanwhile, one of the unknown philosophers of the Safavid era, named Ali Quli bin Qarachaghai Khan - one of the disciples of Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi - has brought up a third assertion by the title incorporated (mutashabbaḥ) equivocation. He tries to prove this view by paying attention to the relationship between perceived and percipient and divine knowledge. The main issue in this article is the description and analysis of the theory of incorporated equivocation of existence as the third assertion in this issue; however, the analysis will not be free from critical aspects. The purpose of this article is to discuss and introduce this innovative theory to the academic community and thinkers. The research method in this article is descriptive-analytical. The summary result that the authors have achieved is that both arguments of Qarachaghai Khan to prove the incorporated equivocation of existence, due to ambiguity, lack of reasoning, incorrect presuppositions, and non-methodical presentation, do not attain the goal and the theory is vague and unjustified to a considerable extent.