A Critical Examination of the Hawking’s Arguments against Theism, On the Basis of His ‘No-Boundary’ Proposal

According to Hartle and Hawking’s ‘no-boundary proposal,’ at the beginning of the universe, the time dimension behaves like the spatial dimensions. This removes the initial singularity of the universe. Hawking argues that this model has important implications against theism, because in this model, (1) the universe did not have an initial creation point, (2) the appearance of the universe from ‘nothing’ is explained naturally, and (3) there is no need to appeal to God to set the initial conditions of the universe. Hence, the ‘no-boundary’ universe does not need a creator. In this paper, firstly, we review four classes of fundamental objections against the scientific reliability of the model and Hawking’s interpretation of it: (a) It is based on quantum gravity, for which there is no reliable theory yet. (b) There are several empirical and theoretical challenges against this proposal. (c) Considering the imaginary time and the Euclidean universe as objective facts about the universe (and not just mathematical tools) is not scientifically justified. And (d) theologically, the dependency of the universe on its creator is not confined to its initial instant, so removing it does not remove the need for the creator. Then, we show that even if ignore these sorts of objections and go along with Hawking on these issues, the model has no implications supporting his claims against the theism. Because (1) in this model, the universe still has a beginning; (2) this model does not describe the ‘appearance from absolute nothing’ in its precise meaning; and (3) the model itself is just a contingent proposal about the initial conditions of the universe and allows a variety of different possibilities about the energy-momentum contents of the universe. So, the model seems to have no important theological implications at all.