A Comparison of the Immateriality of Sensory and Imaginal Perceptions with the Incremental Fourth Dimension

One of the important problems that has remained untouched in Sadrian philosophy is the incremental fourth dimension. The basis of the incremental view of time is the non-existent future, while the past and present have their fixed places. Muslim philosophers have not directly addressed this idea; however, it seems to be necessary for demonstrating some statements of Sadrian philosophers about the immateriality of sensory and imaginal perceptions and memory. When we perceive something using our senses or imagination, the perception remains in our mind exactly in the same way that it had appeared. This paper is intended to illustrate that this view is, in fact, unrelated to immateriality and, in the case of admissibility of its arguments, can only prove the incremental fourth dimension. In line with this approach, the author has critically examined the literature of this dimension in pre-Sadrian philosophers, particularly Suhrawardī’s claim as to attributing the idea of the incremental fourth dimension to some thinkers. Suhrawardī maintains that, as each of the motions has come into existence, all motions have come into existence, and they share the feature of being in existence with each other.