On Attributing the Confusion of Secondary Intelligibles to Suhrawardi
According to Some Ṣadrian researchers, Suhrawardī confuses philosophical secondary intelligibles with logical ones and rejects the idea that philosophical concepts are attributes of external objects. The main supporting evidence for this claim could be divided into two categories; A) Suhrawardī’s assertions that philosophical attributes are mental, and B) his assertions that the mind ascribes philosophical attributes to external beings. But first, the evidence is not sufficient to prove their claim, and second, there is clear evidence against it. Ṣadrā himself accuses Surawardī of confusing the two types of intelligibles in another way. He reads one of Surawardī’s statements as claiming that logical attributes like “particularity” are attributes of objective beings. This objection is also unfounded since Suhrawardī employs “particularity” in a different sense referring to a philosophical concept in that context. Therefore, Suhrawardī does not confuse the two types of secondary intelligibles, in either of the two mentioned senses.
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