Without Naskh: Interpreting the Qur’an with Maqāṣid

For centuries, naskh (abrogation) has played a critical role in Islamic legal philosophy as a unifying rubric through which Muslim scholars accepted the logic of divine law and their relationship to it. However, this paradigm has been challenged by new competing theories of abrogation. This paper has examined five of them: Non-abrogation theory (Muhammad al-Jabri), dialectic theory (Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid), didactic theory (Abdullah Saeed), punitive theory (Muhammad Mahmoud Taha), and maqāṣidic theory (Jasser Auda). It has been argued that although these theories have contributed to the overthrow of the classical paradigm, only the maqāṣidic theory has the persuasive power to replace it completely. The other theories fell into three basic pitfalls: 1) contradiction (non-abrogation theory); 2) anarchy (didactic and dialectic theory); 3) idealism (punitive theory). Maqāṣidic theorists, however, spurned linguistic arguments and focused instead on legal objectives, debating what God intended, not what He said. This allowed them to appeal to "reason" and "rationality" while maintaining a faithful connection to certain modes of classical legal theory. This enabled them to challenge naskh without appearing to undermine the epistemic foundations of the traditional exegetical worldview, of which naskh is merely one element.