Being-for-itself in Sartre's Philosophy

Accepting the concept of “intentionality” in husserl’s philosophy, Sartre maintains that consciousness consists in consciousness of something. Consciousness has always an object and refers to something that is known. He does not believe that there is any reality, “noumenon”, lying behind the phenomena. On the other hand, he does not regard phenomenon as dependent on consciousness or the knowing subject. Phenomena are self-sustaining. Hence, we are confronted with two types of being: consciousness and the objects of consciousness or phenomena. Sartre calls the first type “being-in-itself” and the second type “being-for-itself”. Having dealt with Sartre’s phenomenological approach, this article examines some characteristics of “for-itself” such as nothingness and freedom. In addition, it deals with some structures of “for-itself” such as to be impersonal, to be non-substantial, lack and desire.