Natural Universal: a Comparison between Ibn Sina and Mullā Sadrā

The inquiry about the mode of the existence of natural universal, or quiddity, can be regarded as one of the complexities in the philosophies of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra. Natural universal has a different definition and consequences in the structure of each one of the two philosophies. To ignore such differences may cause numerous mistakes. Non-conditioned quiddity is nothing other itself, and this is while Ibn Sina claims that such a quiddity (natural universal) has objective existence. The question arises as to how it is possible for the non-conditioned reality to exist without losing its attribute as being non-conditioned.The authors in this article want to show that Ibn Sina has left some questions unanswered in his treatment of the issue of the mode of being natural universal enjoys, and Mulla Sadra has tried to find a justified answer to such problems without contradicting his most essential theory of the principality of existence. The article argues for the superiority of Mulla Sadra’s theory and the way it is congruent with the theory of the principality of existence.