The Saying/Showing Distinction in Early Wittgenstein and Its Implications

In this paper, I shall try to clarify the saying/showing distinction and to emphasize the role of this distinction in constructing a coherent picture of language and the world. In order to properly understand the differences between the sayable and the showable, I will throw light on the limits of language and the world. I will explain why it is impossible to say the showable and why it leads to non-sense. I will elucidate the relation between mysticism and the saying/showing distinction and show that both of them are better understood in light of Wittgenstein's solipsism. I will explain how Wittgenstein's transcendental solipsism is different from classical solipsism and how the former leads to pure realism. At several points, I will use the Kantian framework to explain Wittgenstein's view, especially when justifying Wittgenstein's realism. In reply to Russell's comments on the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote: "Now I am afraid you havent really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole business of logical propositions is only corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by proposition _ i.e. by language (and, what comes to the same, what can be thought) and what can not be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy…."