The Effects of Earnings Managements and Capital Structure on Earnings Conservatism
Author(s):
Abstract:
In this study we investigate the effects of earnings management (EM) and Capital Structure (CS) on Earnings Conservatism (EC). Conservatism is one of most important accounting information attributes and reported earnings must have a balanced magnitude of EC. Based on study hypotheses, it is predicted that EM affect equilibrium of EC. That is, EM results in over-conservatism or under-conservatism. Furthermore, tradeoff between equity and debt in CS of firms can affect EM incentives and thereby it can affect EC. In explicit word, it is predicted firms with more financed by equity have more conservative earnings. In order to test hypotheses, EC and discretionary accruals (as as proxies of EM) are measured for 303 firms during 2002-2009 period (totally 1530 firm-year observations). Results show that an increase in absolute values of discretionary accruals is accompanied by increase in magnitude of EC. Firms that engaged in downward EM have more conservative earnings (over-conservatism). In contrast, firms with upward EM have less conservative earnings (under-conservatism). Finally, firms with more financed by equity have more conservative earnings, than others.
Language:
Persian
Published:
Accounting Research, Volume:4 Issue: 13, 2012
Page:
112
magiran.com/p998796
دانلود و مطالعه متن این مقاله با یکی از روشهای زیر امکان پذیر است:
اشتراک شخصی
با عضویت و پرداخت آنلاین حق اشتراک یکساله به مبلغ 1,390,000ريال میتوانید 70 عنوان مطلب دانلود کنید!
اشتراک سازمانی
به کتابخانه دانشگاه یا محل کار خود پیشنهاد کنید تا اشتراک سازمانی این پایگاه را برای دسترسی نامحدود همه کاربران به متن مطالب تهیه نمایند!
توجه!
- حق عضویت دریافتی صرف حمایت از نشریات عضو و نگهداری، تکمیل و توسعه مگیران میشود.
- پرداخت حق اشتراک و دانلود مقالات اجازه بازنشر آن در سایر رسانههای چاپی و دیجیتال را به کاربر نمیدهد.
In order to view content subscription is required
Personal subscription
Subscribe magiran.com for 70 € euros via PayPal and download 70 articles during a year.
Organization subscription
Please contact us to subscribe your university or library for unlimited access!