فصلنامه پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی
سال بیست و سوم شماره 4 (پیاپی 90، زمستان 1400)

The point of this paper is to compare substitution from the perspective of Levinas and the replacement sympathy as two approaches in facing the other. Sympathy, as one of the moral issues, is a way of paying attention and understanding the anxiety, worry, or need of others, which occurs consciously and with the recognition and replacement of the other. The substitution from the perspective of Levinas is also in relation to the “other” and outlines the scope of the subject’s responsibility towards him. In the beginning, Levinas’ subject imperially reduces the other to himself, but in the face of the “other,” he pays attention to the irreducibility and dependence of the consistency of his nature on it. In this way, the infinite responsibility towards the “other” becomes apparent; a responsibility that is formed before any kind of consciousness and self-consciousness and in a more passive space than any passivity, and its scope extends to the substitution of the “other” and expiation of the “other.” In the shadow of this infinite responsibility, substitution is distinguished from sympathetic and empathetic replacement. Sympathy, which has been described as a virtue in many moral systems, is a form of altruism through which an actor, by entering into the worries and sufferings of others, replaces himself in a scene of their pain. This replacement is based on knowing the other and imagining his position and ultimately transforming the other into another me. Accordingly, some have introduced sympathy and benevolence as the basis of morality (see Hume, 2009, 499-500) and by emphasizing the essential role of compassion in human moral life, an argument is made on compassion as a pillar of morality. (Schopenhauer, 1903, 171). Levinas also speaks of substitution in several places in his work, which is defined as a replacement in sympathy in relation to another. In other words, replacement in sympathy is the product of the relation between the actor and the other, and substitution in Levinas is based on subjectivity, which is itself based on the relation between the subject and the “other.” This paper wants to provide a comparative analysis of the subject’s substitution in Levinas with the concept of replacement on sympathy.Of course, although the concept of “other” in Levinas’s thought is different from the other in sympathy, the relationship between ‘replacement’ (taking the place of) and ‘substitution’ in the two can be examined; for although in Levinas’s view the position of the “other” is defined beyond the essence of the subject and in sympathy after the stage of essence, substitution in Levinas can be proposed in terms of rank later than the stage of essence.‘Substituting the other’ in Levinas, unlike “replacing the other” in sympathy, while excluding cognition, changes from another level of understanding the other to the position of expiation of the other, and such a change is justified by the explanation of subjectivity.No independent research has been done on the relationship between the replacement in sympathy and substitution with the “other” in Levinas, and no analysis has been provided in this regard. This paper, in order to analyze the relation of replacement as one of the principles of sympathy and substitution proposed in Levinas, first defines sympathy and examines the other’s place in it, and then in order to achieve the concept of substitution in Levinas’s thought, examines concepts such as subject, saying, said and responsibility from his point of view.

Practical research, according to Aristotle, strives to actualize the Supreme Good as the ultimate end of life. The Final Good could be determined if preceded by an outline based on conceptual analysis. For this reason, Aristotle considers agathón (ἀγαθόν), as the universal concept of good, and clarifies its conceptual-categorical structure to explain how we can understand it. In virtue of the similarity between good and existences for their extension of senses (good has as many meanings as existences), Aristotle proceeds to analyze good compared to existence as an absolute philosophical conception. Alongside his comparative study of good and existence, we can consider a metaphysics for good similar to the metaphysics of being and question its possibility. Corresponding to the metaphysics of existence that considers being qua being, one can imagine a metaphysics for good that investigates goodness qua goodness and explores its philosophical characteristics and theoretical attributes aimed at the question of its possibility.It appears, in the process of Aristotle’s analysis that there is a common meaning and central definite characteristic in several significations and different categories of being by reference to one starting point: the primary being or substance. From the categorical point of view, similarly, various categories are accidental qualities of the fundamental category of substance. Because of the one principle of the primary being or substance, a metaphysics for being which contemplates on being qua being would be possible.But good, on the contrary, is used homonymously in various different senses without any common meaning and with no reference to one principle. Of the categorical attitude, good is applied in any individual category independently with no connection with each other and by no reference to one main category. There is not, in fact, any category of primary good or substantial good which constitutes universal meaning and a single category as an appropriate subject matter for the intended knowledge of the metaphysics of good. Consequently, it is not possible to establish one primary philosophy for goodness qua goodness in the same way as the first philosophy of being as being.Knowledge, according to Aristotle, is composed of the eidos (form or essence) as a universal absolute subject and eidetic attitude as a necessary theoretical way of understanding. Eidetic view and eidos entity are based on the common meaning and single principle which are not found in the concept of good. Thus, the theoretical approach to good, which could not constitute the eidos of good and eidetic knowledge, leads to the Platonic Idea of good and the dialectical attitude. But Aristotle who does not follow dialectic, cannot obtain the eidetic path to goodness either, and, therefore, reconstructs good as the well-being which is the final good that humankind can obtain practically. So he goes on to outline good not as the good in itself which in essence necessitates theoretical cognition, but as a final good of human life that is a condition that entails practical realization.

The treatise of Rules for the Direction of the Mind can be traced back to the period of Descartes’ youth in which, until rule eight, he has presented some foundations of the theory of truth and error; such as the truth being founded on manifest and distinct intuition and deductive inference which is an adaptation of his analytical geometric theory. However, in rule twelve, he has vaguely addressed how the set of human faculties commits errors. Since this philosopher has also given attention to the matter of errors in Principles of Philosophy and in the treatise Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences and Objections and Replies, in this article an attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive view and critique of Descartes’ theory regarding truth and error, albeit, focusing more on rule twelve of the treatise of Rules for the Direction of the Mind. According to Descartes, two things play an essential role in cognition; understanding and will. One of the differences between these two is that the scope of understanding is limited and it cannot acquire knowledge of everything; however, the scope of the will is unlimited. Now, if there were to be errors in our perception, they must either arise from understanding or will.In his treatises, Descartes has addressed the different dimensions of errors in perception and, overall, has shown the various aspects of error in the theory of cognition. The existence of pre-judgments and differences between the levels of understanding and will, that is, the infinity of the will and finiteness of understanding, are some of the matters that Descartes counts as factors of errors. It is noteworthy that while Descartes considers errors to be the result of the interference of the will in matters that the intellect does not have sufficient knowledge of, that is, clear and distinct knowledge, he considers this error to be true in the domain of judgment or assertions. The present article recounts the reasons for errors and analyzes them based on different works of Descartes, including Rules for the Direction of the Mind but also considers Descartes to be unjustified in some matters and criticizes him regarding those.One of the criticisms aimed at Descartes’ theory of truth is that he states that only manifest and distinct perception is true and what lies beyond it is error. He considers this principle to be demonstrable or innate. After studying the different aspects of this theory, the present article shows that even in the area of mathematics to which Descartes has given serious attention and, in fact, according to him, it is a mark of manifest and distinct thought, it is not acceptable to consider this an innate matter unless Descartes accepts it as an axiom of his philosophical system. The absoluteness of the will is also not a sufficient argument regarding the infiniteness of will which provides another possibility for error; however, attention to the essential property of the will which is indefectible is noteworthy. The theory of considering concepts and realities to be graded which has been studied in different parts of his views especially in proving the creator and regarding infinity is also not provable in Descartes’ philosophical system unless he considers it as an axiom.

Great naturalist philosophers like David Armstrong, David Papineau, Jeagwon Kim, and others have argued that the best arguments for naturalism are based on Physical Causal Closure (in brief P.C). P.C that is a premise in these arguments implies that only natural/physical causes are responsible for natural events and supernatural/non-physical causes cannot have any effective role in the natural universe. By adding some reasonable rules such as Ockham's Razor or Eleatic Principle to P.C, they have concluded that there is no non-natural cause such as God.Many theists, in the face of the physical causal closure, may accept it and see the relationship between God and the natural world not as causal but as something entirely different; as existential or necessary relation. But this view seems to have problems. First, it is passive because it simply accepts the basic premise of the naturalistic view, and secondly, it seems unacceptable from a theistic point of view to reduce the relationship between God and the world to existential or necessary relation and to eliminate the possibility of causal influence on natural things.In this paper, I will claim that P.C is not only against supernatural causation but is also against human agency and mental causation. To show this, first, I will present an argument against human mental causation based on P.C, and Then I will consider four different physicalist (which are committed to P.C) approaches that try to save mental causation. These approaches consist of 1) anomalous monism, 2) non-reductive physicalism, 3) over-determination, and 4) reductive physicalism.The first solution is the idea that Davidson came up with to solve the problem of mental causation. By criticizing type identity and reductionism, he first re-examines the issue of mental causation in a new form. Examining the first (anomalous monism), I will show that this approach cannot save mental causation, and, in fact, mental causation will be rejected in this view. The second approach, although it hopes to maintain both mental causation and commitment to the physical closure, this article will show that it wouldn't succeed in doing either. Although at first glance, acceptance of over-determination may seem like a better solution, I show that this solution has fundamental problems, including the fact that in this approach mental causality becomes redundant, without which physical causes will produce the same result. But without a doubt, the main and popular solution of naturalists will be the last, that is, reductionism. Reductionism in this approach distances itself from early reductionism and seeks to establish a token identity between mental and physical states. But this moderate reductionism also faces fundamental problems such as the hard problem of consciousness, intention, and human agency, which will reject the possibility of its success. I will show, therefore, that none of these approaches can solve the problem of P.C and mental causation.By criticizing all of them, I will show that P.C has an absurd consequence and cannot be a plausible premise in the argument for naturalism. Therefore, the best argument for naturalism will fail and cannot work against God.

In this article, our aim is to examine the place of “reality” in Richard Rorty’s thought in view of the important and key discussion of language in the philosophy of this thinker. In other words, we know that with the occurrence of the “linguistic turn” in the middle of the twentieth century, the relationship between language and reality has become one of the central debates of philosophy, especially analytical philosophy, and has become of particular importance. Is it language that determines the external reality for us? Is knowing the world outside the mind possible only through the possibilities that language gives us? And to what extent does the structure of language affect our cognitive pattern? These are only a part of the linguistic concerns that have occupied the minds of contemporary philosophers. The main concern and problem of the present article, which has been approached using a descriptive-analytical method, is to examine the relationship between language and reality in Richard Rorty’s thought and to show how he defends the linguistic structure of having reality. Rorty, following an analytical philosophy that, in addition to detailed analyses of traditional philosophical concepts, like the concepts of truth, meaning, necessity, etc. and by changing the discussion from experience to discussion from language in the direction of pragmatizing the basic principles of positivism, believes that it is trans-lingual (outside our descriptions) and trans-temporal (fixed and unchangeable). The common denominator that Plato found in the outside world and transferred to man in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition is sought in analytic philosophy in language, and so analytic philosophers continue to pursue the traditional philosophy project of providing a trans-historical and eternal framework for the accurate representation of the world. Rorty tries to overcome this view of analytical philosophers with a Darwinist and pragmatic view of language and under the influence of philosophers such as Wittgenstein.For Darwinists, language is a tool among other tools that gives its users the ability to better and more efficiently adapt to their environment and meet their needs. For the likes of Wittgenstein and like-minded people, despite their many and sometimes profound differences, language had an important and pivotal place with its eventual and possibility feature. Influenced by thinkers such as Wittgenstein, and in the context of his Darwinist and pragmatic approach to language, Rorty attributes certain characteristics to language that can be said to influence his whole thought. Firstly, he considers language as a tool like other tools and, therefore, considers it to have no fixed nature and identity. Given that it is not possible to leave the language and on the other hand language has a poetic and metaphorical character, the function of language cannot be a representation of reality and reality can never be available to us naked and as independent of language and descriptions. Therefore, from Rorty’s point of view, reality is a linguistic and constructed matter of language that we humans have invented in cooperation with each other and in accordance with our historical-cultural situation and needs. Of course, Rorty’s point in saying that reality is made by language is by no means that we create reality arbitrarily and as we wish; rather, what is happening is that we are responding to an external stimulus, a response of various sentence types that manifests itself as linguistic reactions.

The theory of conceptual metaphor claims that abstract concepts are understood by concrete and less abstract concepts. Conceptual metaphors map the conceptual structure of the source domain over the conceptual structure of the target domain. In this view, a conceptual metaphor is an intrinsic component of human thought, and the appearance of metaphors in language is only a sign of their existence in human thought.Lakoff and Johnson introduce causation as one of the important abstract concepts that are understood and described by various conceptual metaphors. Causation is conceptualized both in ordinary and everyday language and in scientific and specialized texts through single cognitive mechanisms.Mulla Sadra is one of the greatest Muslim philosophers and Al-Shawahid Al-Rubūbīyyah is one of his most important philosophical books. In the framework of the conceptual metaphor theory, this study has analyzed the various terms used to describe causation in Al-Shawahid Al-Rubūbīyyah written by Mulla Sadra. The most important conceptual metaphors that are used in this book to describe causation have been extracted. Each of these metaphors emerges through the derivatives of one or more lexical roots in this book.In this study, Mulla Sadra’s use of metaphors is quantified based on statistical methods. By calculating the frequency of metaphoric usage of all the words that describe causation related to a metaphor, the frequency of that metaphor is extracted in the book.The “Causation is motion out” metaphor (306) emerges through the derivations of «ṣ-d-r» (49), «n-sh-’» (124), «f-y-ḍ» (82), «r-sh-ḥ» (2), «j-l-w » (18) and «ẓ-h-r» (31) roots. The “Causation is making an impression” metaphor (112) is revealed by the derivations of «‘- th-r» (112) root. The “Cause is source” metaphor (120) is related to the derivations of «b-d-’» (120) root. The “Causation is being basis” metaphor (156) is represented by the derivations of «q-w-m» (156) root. The “Causation is making” metaphor (117) includes the derivations of «j-‘-l» (107) and «ṣ-n-‘» (10) roots. The “Causation is transfer of possessions” metaphor (61) is revealed by the derivations of «‘-ṭ-w» (14), «w-h-b» (15) and «f-y-d» (32) roots.The frequency of metaphorical use of each of the lexical roots and related conceptual metaphors in this book is shown by numbers in parentheses.According to the statistical results, the “causation is motion out” metaphor has the highest frequency and the “causation is transfer of possessions” metaphor has the lowest frequency in the book.Statistical differences between the two metaphors can find a philosophical explanation. According to the “causation is motion out” metaphor, the cause is like a boiling and luminous fountain whose effects are considered as its manifestations and overflowing water. Such an image of causation is in great harmony with Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system. But in the “causation is transfer of possessions” metaphor, there is a clear distinction between cause and effect, and causation is considered as a kind of forced movement caused by the application of force. Such an image of causation is less compatible with Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system.

Throughout history, philosophy has always been accused of being abstract and unrelated to the everyday issues of human life, so some later philosophers have offered solutions to some individual problems and social problems. Some of them are called “philosophical consolations.” Of course, “consolation” in custom means to calm a sad or afflicted person, but the meaning of the term consolation in philosophy and social sciences is somewhat broader than its customary meaning, and it means to calm the person through the way he looks at problems and provide a solution to the problems. Although philosophical counseling is a contemporary movement in the field of practical philosophy, b this does not mean that previous philosophers were silent about it; rather, some of them, in the form of practical wisdom discussions, have developed specific epistemological points and practical approaches to address the shortcomings of everyday life, including “financial poverty.”But among Muslim philosophers, Ibn Sina (Avicenna) is more famous than others. While getting acquainted with Aristotle’s practical wisdom, Farabi’s additions to it and some of the opinions of the scholars of Ikhwan al-Safa, he used a new innovative style in the discussions of practical wisdom and, therefore, in the Islamic tradition, he has influenced all his later philosophers. On the other hand, in the West, Immanuel Kant attached considerable importance to practical philosophy over theoretical philosophy. To this end, Kant also paid special attention to the philosophy of ethics, and his teachings overshadowed the ideas of most late Western thinkers.Because “financial poverty” has long been considered the mother of many physical and mental problems in human societies, the present research tries to explain and compare the recommendations of Ibn Sina and Kant in the face of the mentioned problem through a descriptive-analytical method. In Ibn Sina’s words, in addition to Aristotelian teachings, there are also Enlightenment approaches influenced by religious texts, but Kant, as one of the system-building thinkers in the Enlightenment, lacks Enlightenment views and rationally focuses on customary affairs to provide a solution. Ibn Sina conducts his discussion on the basis of rational and metaphysical concepts but most of Kant’s views are based on his empirical approach to human cognition, although he finds the science of “anthropology” very slippery, at least in terms of method, and finds its results uncertain.Ibn Sina examines the ill effects of financial poverty in order to comfort the poor. Ibn Sina has considered “deprivation of sensory pleasures” as an important necessity of financial poverty and considers the way to cope with poverty to depend on the passage of sensory affairs and knowledge of extra-sensory pleasures. Trans-sensory pleasure includes sensual pleasure (illusory or imaginary) and intellectual pleasure, which can be achieved even without material wealth, and the perception of intellectual pleasures may erase the bitterness of poverty and its effects for human beings. But while acknowledging the many problems of financial poverty, Kant knows that there is no cure for it other than wealth, so he places great emphasis on the element of work and effort. Since he considers poverty to be the greatest cause of carnal vices, he calls the acquisition of wealth through work, since it leads to happiness, man’s duty to himself.Ibn Sina’s idea is in fact one of the methods of tolerating poverty and tolerating it, and with Ibn Sina’s solution, the maximum psychological effects of poverty are removed. But Kant does not accept the conditions for tolerating poverty for human beings. Basically, in Kant’s view, money solves most, if not all worldly problems because man can benefit from the art and expertise of others through financial means.