نشریه منطق پژوهی
سال سیزدهم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1401)

Kripke's method in be suspected on the sameness of metaphysics and epistemology is to introduce examples of violations; Introduction of a priori possible beside necessary experimental propositions. It is disputed in these counterexamples. What follows is an attempt to revive metaphysics through natural language semantics parallel to Prof. Kripke's suggestion. In the body of the article, I try to show the concomitance of Frege's logic and his proper names semantics with the Copernican revolution. At first, from showing the inefficiency of Frege's (descriptive) proposal in the semantics of proper names, I conclude that there is no escape except the John Stuart Mill’s proper names semantics and the direct connection of the name and named. In the second step, I will try to demonstrate the inadequacy of descriptions for separating actual and fictional names also the Noncompliance of existence and determination, and from there show the otherness of metaphysics and epistemology. When the descriptive referencing to proper name implicitly root in Copernican revolution, uncertainty on descriptive referencing will result uncertainty on conformity of metaphysics and epistemology.

David Lewis was a reductivist and nominalist. He saw the majority of his philosophical works to be a campaign on behalf of Humean Supervenience; a doctrine according to which the distribution of perfectly natural properties (/relations) acts as a supervenience basis for all contingent truths; such as causation, counterfactuals, events, and laws. He also extends his reductivism to the domain of a necessary discourse like mathematics by trying to reconstruct second-order ZFC through mereology. A domain that he never addressed, though, was logic. The purpose of this article is to present a Lewisian interpretation of logic which similar to his own interpretation of mathematics, is based on mereology. On this interpretation, the relation of logical consequence is reduced to a mereological relation between singletons of possible worlds. Furthermore, the implications of this interpretation for the two main characteristics of logical consequence, i.e. necessity and formality, and also the consistency and completeness of logic are examined.

Avicenna has presented various discussions about hypotheticals. In these discussions, he has sometimes used a quantified hypothetical propositions and sometimes a non-quantified hypothetical propositions. Why did Avicenna do this? In this article, we answer this question. In this way, we will first examine the way quantifieres enters the discussion of hypotheticals by Avicenna. Then, we have attended the question of why Avicenna used a non-quantified hypothetical propositions along with of a quantified hypothetical propositions, and examined the possible answers one by one and selected the most appropriate one. We have shown that in all the discussions where Avicenna used a non-quantified hypothetical, he is repeating the opinions of previous logicians. While quantified hypotheticas discussions have been formed regarding the discussions related to quantified predicatives. Alto summarize, it seems that the relationship between quantified hypotheticals and non-quantified hypotheticals is not clear to Avicenna, and this issue is the origin of the dual structure of hypotheticals in Avicenna's works, as well as some disagreements after him about the theory of hypotheticals.

The theory of ground is committed to the grounding facts. As they contain non-fundamental notions, they must be grounded in something. Zero Grounding Account believes it is possible to show that by relating grounding and metaphysical argument these facts are zero-grounded. We want to introduce this theory and defend it against some challenges. The first challenge is some chains that are produced in the theory and could threaten the well-foundedness of ground. The second challenge is that Zero Grounding Account is not unionist which means ground and metaphysical explanation are not the same. The third challenge is the possibility of accordance of this theory and essentialism. The theory of ground is committed to the grounding facts. As they contain non-fundamental notions, they must be grounded in something. Zero Grounding Account believes it is possible to show that by relating grounding and metaphysical argument these facts are zero-grounded. We want to introduce this theory and defend it against some challenges. The first challenge is some chains which are produced in the theory and could threaten the well-foundedness of ground. The second challenge is that Zero Grounding Account is not unionist which means ground and metaphysical explanation are not the same. The third challenge is the possibility of accordance with this theory and essentialism.

It is a universal and partial of the issues discussed in philosophy and logic. Whereas, in order to avoid intermingle the issues of each science, their boundaries are Located through their subjects; The question arises why in both the sciences of logic and philosophy, both universal and partial are discussed? The present article seeks to find the distinguishing feature of this discussion in this scientific field. By studying the historical course and using the analytical method, it is concluded that from the beginning of the formation of this discussion in Aristotle's system of thought, there is no significant difference between his metaphysics and logic. Muslim philosophers, including Ibn Sina, although at first acting in the method of Aristotle as a commentator, later considered some issues, such as the categories in which the Five Universals as an entry of categories, to be outside the scope of the science of logic. On the other hand, the discussion of the Five Universals is one of the inevitable issues in logic due to the need for it in the subject of notions and definitions. There are also differences of opinion among philosophers regarding the source of division of the five generalities, which indicates the intermingle of the issues in philosophy and logic. Some views, in distinguishing this discussion in the two mentioned areas, have proposed different considerations and modes, and some have relegated the ontological discussion of generalities to philosophy and the study of its rules to the field of logic.

Theory of meaning isn’t the central problem of Husserl’s phenomenology, but he treats of meaning for supporting his notion of pure logic. Since there is a strong connection between logic and language, Logical investigations begins with the discussion of language and meaning. In order to identifying the essence of expression, Husserl excludes indication and reference from it, and argues for distinction between sense and reference. Then he applies this distinction on different types of expression (proper name, universal name, sentence). This distinction is the center of Husserl’s theory of meaning, and according to this article, it continues in Husserl’s second intellectual period. In the second period, He proposes this distinction under the distinction between noema and object. In this article, we shall concern with Husserl’s view on sense and reference and the nature of sense. In the last section of this article, we shall discuss of Husserl’s solution for avoiding Platonism.

Shams al-Din Samarqandi in his books Qistas al-afkar and Sharh al-Qistas presented two new analyses of the khariji, haqiqi and mental propositions which are different from those of his predecessors. He held relations among these propositions which have new consequences on the inferential relations between them. Samarqandi conditioned the khariji proposition on the "external existence" of its subject and predicate, also conditioned the haqiqi proposition on the "possibility" of the external existence of its subject and predicate, and considered the mental proposition unconditional to these two conditions. He has also regarded the khariji as implying the haqiqi and the haqiqi as implying the mental, all these in the affirmative propositions and the converse of these relations in the negatives, without distinguishing the universals from the particulars. These inferential relations claimed by Samarqandi are different from those expressed in the works of other Muslim logicians such as Afzal al-Din Khunaji and Qutb al-Din Razi, who seem to be the only Muslim logicians who have explicitly discussed this issue. In this article, we have analyzed and critiqued the claims of Samarqandi and shown that the inferential relations claimed by him do not correspond to the examples he gives for khariji, haqiqi and mental propositions, and are therefore not accurate enough.

Logic is considered a Criterion of thought correction, and in order to be a criterion, it must have sufficient clarity to correct thought. Naming and defining are imaginary principles of science and need this clarity more than other topics. The naming of modal proposition in traditional logic is less committed to this principle and has been exaggerated and ambiguous. Naturally, modal proposition in traditional logic is met with reluctance by logic students. The use of strange words and vague naming methods in the position of education, leads to more reluctance in this area. This method will reduce the logic learner's desire to continue the discussion in traditional modal and will lead to its seclusion in traditional logic. So, the research question is: what is the critique of the traditional modal Logic method in naming modal proposition? And how can we change this method to make it easier to teach logic? In this article - analytically - we have criticized the naming method of modal proposition in traditional modal Logic. And we have shown how we can use proper names in naming modal propositions. This way, reduced the difficulty of naming modal propositions in traditional modal Logic.

The principle of contradiction in the three domains of epistemology, philosophy and logic is of incomparable importance, and it is necessary to examine the conditions of its realization in order to know the cases of its flow. Among the conditions of contradiction are the unity that must be maintained in two contradictory propositions. There has always been a difference between logicians in detailing the conditions and the number of unity conditions. The famous opinion, the requirement of eight unity is contradictory, but thinkers have always tried to correct this opinion, in such a way that they either added conditions to it or reduced the famous conditions to fewer cases. The present research, with the method of conceptual, propositional, and systemic analysis, examines the conditions mentioned in logic books and concludes that all these conditions are reduced to two conditions: "the unity of the subject" and "the unity of the predicate". In the second part, according to the late philosophy of Wittgenstein, it is proved that in the unity of contradiction, another condition is necessary that is not mentioned in any of the books of the predecessors and on the other hand, it is not an example of any of the aforementioned conditions, and that is the phrase From "unity of language".

Reconciling mysticism, Proof (truth), and the Qur'an is one of the distinctive features of Ṣadr ad-Dīn Muḥammad Shirazi philosophy.But considering the dialectic of some mystics and philosophy's emphasis on rational intellect , this mission does not seem so simple. Among the mystical dialectic positions , we can mention the belief of mystics in the realization of some contradictions in the world of ideas. This article aims to investigate what solutions Mulla Sadra adopted in the mentioned position to get out of the dialectic and to what extent these solutions have logical and rational correctness. Using the method of critical analysis, the author has assumed that Mulla Sadra , in order to get rid of the mystical dialectic and the reconciliation of mystical doctrines about the world of ideas , has started to restriction the law of contradiction in the realm of abstract from material. The review of the authors indicates that some of Mulla Sadra proofs in this field suffer from logical problems. However, some of his arguments are also acceptable. This article firstly explains the mystical dialectic in the world of ideas, then Mulla Sadra's attempt to get rid of it, and finally the critical analysis of his attempt.