فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه
سال هجدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 69، بهار 1401)

Immanuel Kant's aesthetics in Critique of Judgment has always been the subject of discussions and the discovery of many points about the anatomy of the faculty of Taste and its judgments. Because of contemporary aesthetic issues, the inquiry concerning the possibility of the reflective perception of dissatisfaction and following that the position of ugliness in Kant’s aesthetics has been considered by commentators. Ugliness and its judgments have different places in Kant's pre-critical philosophy in comparison with his ideas in the framework of the critical system. Before writing triple critiques, he has taken note of Ugliness in the format of sensorial perceptions and anthropological concepts as the object of merely empirical positive displeasure perception. But the query about Ugliness as a reflective judgment is impossible on his critical aesthetic horizon because the possibility of such a judgment would be contradictory with the systematic purposes and methodology of the third critique. In order to clarify the position of Ugliness in Kant's aesthetic horizon, while the present article examines his view on Ugliness in the pre-critical horizon, it explains the reasons for the absence of the Ugly as a reflective judgment in Kant's critical considerations and proves the impossibility of realizing the reflective judgment on Ugliness in transcendental philosophy.

What do we mean when we talk about cogito sum? What do these words refer to in their use? How did they appear for the first time? How have they progressed and at the same time the progress of which concepts they are? This paper aims to research cogito sum’s form and concept. Therefore, it asks about the formal and conceptual structure of cogito sum in order to move towards the questionable aspect of the cogito sum question, ie “Being”. Hence this paper is a step towards providing the possibility of dialogue with this philosophical concept, that is, the possibility of answering it on the way of necessity aspect of philosophical questioning. The aim is to find a set of contributions to this philosophical concept, through the texts that significate the questioning aspect of Cogito sum. Based on tradition, the subject is gathered by Martin Heidegger. Thus, it makes this step possible with respect to a part of Heidegger's encounter with this question.

One of the central notions in Thomas Kuhn’s thought is the notion of incommensurability. Generally, we can distinguish two kinds of incommensurability: methodological and semantic incommensurability. The methodological incommensurability is the thesis that the standards of theory appraisal are themselves theory-dependent. So, some kind of standard variance can be recognized at the level of theory appraisal. On the other hand, semantic incommensurability seems to imply semantic variation between theories or paradigms, regarding the terms occurring in them. These two kinds of dependencies have been employed in support of two forms of relativism: truth relativism and epistemic relativism. The main focus of this paper is on the possible relations that one can depict between incommensurability and these two kinds of relativism. First, I outline possible connections articulated by sufficient and necessary conditions. After that, I attempt to assess the viability of the resulting propositions.

In this article, after the author theoretically studies social-political events, and how to develop the theory of civil society, he goes on to understand and study the development of public will in civil society and the state and the dialectic between them in Hegel's political thought. Hegel was the first philosopher in the history of philosophy to consciously place a strategic position on civil society. And through the three basic elements, namely the legal system, the police, and the guilds and unions, as well as by examining the classes, all of which are in the service of civil society for the first time, it takes steps to form a partial will to form the public will. And through the theory of institutions, not only can he achieve the objectification of the abstract human will, but he also achieves the first stage of a unique general explanation. Here Hegel steps into government. Upon entering the public sector, Hegel quickly distinguished the field on the three principles of the organic matter versus the mechanical matter, the public interest over the personal interest, and finally the general precedence over a part of civil society. Consequently, with the precedence of the state over civil society in its own sense, it considers the public will to be the truth of the partial will, morality, and moral life.

In the evaluation of knowledge from the epistemological point of view on one hand such as fundamentalism, coherentism, and reliabilism, and on the other hand externalism and internalism have been proposed. The pure Virtue Epistemology theory was proposed by Linda Zagzebski. According to Zagzebski, contemporary epistemology is based on virtue ethics. By modeling moral virtues and their application in epistemology, she speaks of intellectual virtues, especially understanding and phronesis. From her views, contemporary epistemology has faced issues such as wisdom ignorance and understanding, focusing on certainty, monopoly of knowledge to propositional knowledge, confusion in the sense of justification, neglecting the role of free will, and lack of attention to feeling and emotion in search of knowledge. There are many critics on the pure virtue epistemology which can be categorized into three sections: first, internal critiques derived from epistemology itself, second, critiques derived from the philosophy of mind, and third, critiques derived from the philosophy of ethics. In this study, the question is whether the epistemological theory of pure virtue is capable of responding to these critiques and whether it has internal or external consistency. By turning the evaluation of knowledge from belief evaluation to the evaluation of agent-based belief and his or her characteristic and personality traits, Zagzebski finds a way to open up and seems to be successful in doing so. The research method of this discourse is Lakatos research program with regard to the central core and seat belts and positive and negative strategies.

Allameh Tabatabai has used various interpretations to define credit perceptions, but none of them are suitable. This article, after examining the proposed definitions and measuring them, based on the characteristics of a desirable definition, attempts to provide an alternative definition. A definition that is in maximum agreement with his views without objection and ambiguity. The definition of Etebari perceptions consists of two central elements: the general element and a divider. The general element is mental imagination. After numerous reviews of the various divisors used in the definition of credit perceptions, "Being made by mental acts" was selected as the best of the four obtained options. So, the summary of the alternative definition is: Etebari concepts are concepts whose essence is determined by mental actions. These voluntary actions create imagination by using feelings. The sum of these concepts and their relations create the Nafs-al-Amr to which the Etebari propositions correspond to it

The position of emotions in Aristotle's thought is often identified with his theory of the weakness of the will, but the study of his works shows that emotions play a wider and more complex role in mental activities. For him, there is a deep and mutual relationship between emotions and other mental functions and activities. That is, both emotions affect the rational part functions of the soul and the rational part functions affect the emotions and their intensity and weakness. In this article, for explaining the claim of the reciprocal relationship between emotion and the rational part, after expressing what emotion is and how it works in the mind, on one hand, we will study the influence of emotion on the rational part of the soul and examine its role in the will, power of judgment, and sensory perception. In our view, contrary to popular belief, emotions are not just a dangerous threat to ethics and rationality, rather, they can play a serious role in strengthening rationality. On the other hand, to understand the effect of the rational part on emotions, we will examine the role of some mental activities in the production of pleasure, pain, and emotions such as friendship, compassion, and resistance to the motivational force of emotions. We will also explain that mental functions do not work the same in creating emotions, there is also a direct relationship between the intensity and weakness of mental functions and the intensity and weakness of emotions.

Tabatabai and Motahari consider Sadra's philosophy to be a realistic philosophy and claim a kind of realism in the book "Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism". Ilham Dilman also believes that Wittgenstein's rejection of realism does not make him an idealist. Rather, Wittgenstein is also considered a realist in a sense. This article examines and compares the realism proposed in "Principles..." on the one hand and the realism that Dillman attributes to Wittgenstein on the other hand.

In this essay, the first part of Parmenides' dialogue is analyzed. This dialogue presents two challenges to the theory of Forms: "Infinite Regress Arguments" or "Third Man Argument" and "impossibility of knowledge". At first, we try to yield a precise description of the first part of this dialogue, and then by analyzing Parmenides' arguments, we exhibit that his arguments are based on the assumptions of "Self-Predication", "One over Many", "Principle of Non-Identity" and "Principle of Uniqueness". We then make it clear that Parmenides is not justified in applying the assumption of Non-Identity and cannot make an Infinite Regress. Then we deal with the problem of the separation of Forms from the objects of this world and the subsequent "impossibility of knowledge" and by analyzing his arguments we show that Parmenides, in declaring the impossibility of knowledge, has committed at least two logical mistakes, and he then could not conclude that we do not partake of a Form of knowledge.