مجله الهیات تطبیقی
پیاپی 28 (پاییز و زمستان 1401)

In the history of western and eastern philosophy, the discussion of science and perception has been centered on the soul, and the body has been on the sidelines. Islamic philosophers, especially Masha'is, consider science and perception to be the function of the soul and not the body. In this research, we try to analyze the views of Ibn-Sina and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's thoughts about bodily perception using an analytical-descriptive method and a comparative approach. In this regard, first Ibn-Sina's views on the principles of psychology and then the role of the body in perception are analyzed. Then, the phenomenology of perception and the role of the body in it are examined from the perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Believing in the duality of soul and body, Ibn-Sina considers the soul as the basis of perception, but at the same time, he is not oblivious to the role of the body in the matter of perception. He sees the soul as a rider that uses its compound, the body, in actions and perception. On the other hand, according to Merleau-Ponty, the soul and the body are united and the body has a more prominent role in perception; in other words, the body is considered the only way to perceive existence.

As religious and philosophical thought is informed by natural sciences, process theology considers ‘spirit’ and its features to be derived from nature, and, therefore, has a naturalistic interpretation of innate inclinations (fiṭrat) as a fundamental concept in the knowledge of human beings. According to this view, human nature develops against the background of evolution and takes different forms depending on the position of each individual in society. Therefore, it would be absurd to talk about fixed innate inclinations in all human beings. Process theologians see religion as human nature’s response to the quest for God. Thus, based on the axiom that human essence is evolving and dynamic, they see religion as evolving in step with man’s innate inclinations and nature. In the present study, we examine the thought of process theology about knowledge of innate inclinations and its relation with religion, and, with an emphasis on the thoughts of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, assess and critique the theology’s viewpoint.

Linda Zagzebski is one of the philosophers working on the emotions and motivating dispositions of the saints. By expanding her theory of divine motivation, she tried to fill in an important gap in previous accounts about saintly life and show why thinking of the saints only as moral exemplars is insufficient. She argues that the saints’ connection to God is what makes them morally good. Zagzebski focuses rightly on the emotions of the saints and provides valuable insights into their moral psychology. In the present study, we first discuss the etymology of the word "saint" and examine its historical background in Christian culture, and then, through the explanation of Zagszebski's important theories of Exemplarism and Divine Motivation, we criticize her most important arguments about the saintly life. Although her attractive viewpoint makes some important advances toward understanding and justifying moral saintliness, it remains deficient insofar as she cannot accurately clarify the limits of imitating saints and the nature of their connection to God. Also, she neglects the role of religious institutions, communities, and spiritual disciplines in helping the saints come to share God’s motives; and she either does not give due attention to the specific virtues and gifts the saints- especially in non-Christian cultures- possess. So, her account is not comprehensive enough in this regard.

The typology of religiosity is one of the topics that has been considered by theologians. Seyyed Heidar Amoli and Abdolkarim Soroush are among the thinkers who have made such efforts. Our purpose in the present fundamental-theoretical study is to compare their viewpoints on this issue. Seyyed Heidar enumerates three levels of ‘Sharia (the Way)’, ‘Tariqah (the Procedure)’, and ‘Haghighah (the Truth)’ for religiosity. Soroush also suggests a typical typology of religiosity that has distinctions and interferences with the mentioned divisions. The three types of religiosity are: ‘thoughtful to expediency’, ‘thoughtful to knowledge’, and ‘thoughtful to experience’. Although Seyyed Heidar and Soroush have a common policy in many religious, intellectual, and cultural characteristics, their intellectual atmosphere and time have caused their principles and approach to become different. Seyyed Heidar deals with the typology of religiosity in accordance with the traditional and mystical approach while Soroush focuses on a social approach based on the modern world. The most important result, which distinguishes these two approaches, is Soroush’s attention to epistemology as one of the components of modern thought, and Seyyed Heidar’s attention to traditional ontology.

Philosophers, especially at the beginning of the era of philosophy, have made various arguments to explain the origin of existence. Allameh Tabatabai's argument of reality is among them. In this study, Swinburne's account of the simplicity principle is analyzed. Then, the principles and concepts postulated in the argument of reality are analyzed and examined based on the facets. What seems impressive in the argument of reality is brevity. In this research, an attempt has been made to answer two research questions: 1) Is it rational to consider the simplicity criterion in assessing the truth of a theory and its probability? Also, is the argument of reality in the viewpoint of Swinburne's simplicity principle, simpler than other arguments? Swinburne positively agrees with this view. He considers simplicity to be a fundamental a priori truth, and the criterion of the probability of an explanation.‘Simplicity’ is one of the fundamental concepts of epistemology. ‘Syntactic simplicity’ measures the number and brevity of the basic principles of a theory and its formulation, and ‘ontological simplicity’ measures the number of kinds of concepts postulated in a theory. William Ockham did not explicitly mention the principle of simplicity, but he is known for the famous term "Ockham's Razor". He does not consider the assumption of plurality without the necessity to be rational. Popper argued that a simple theory is easier to be falsified. According to Eliot Sober, simplicity is meaningful only if it is placed in a particular context. So, he proposes the principle of ‘parsimony’. According to David Lewis, the predicates and concepts that formulated a simple theory should refer to perfectly natural properties. Quine considers the tendency to prefer simple theories to be caused by ‘translogical features of human thought’ that tend the world to be simple. Swinburne argues it is an a priori ultimate epistemological principle that simplicity is evidence of truth. He considers simplicity to be the criterion of the probability of a theory and the evidence of the truth of that theory and suggests six facets in his account. Philosophically, the factors are 1) the number of concepts and principles postulated, 2) the number of kinds of concepts, 3) understanding the concepts postulated in a theory not to be entailed in understanding other concepts and principles, 4) a theory consisting of a few principles is simpler than one consisting of many principles, 5) a formulation of a theory in which principles relate to a few concepts is simpler rather than many concepts, and 6) a mathematical formulation is simpler.The principles and concepts postulated in the argument of reality are general and obvious in that their definition is literal, and they consist of the concept of eternal necessity and the concept of reality. The concept of reality takes precedence over the concept of the authenticity of existence and nature. In Allameh’s argument, from the beginning, the external reality is considered, regardless of whether that reality is an example of existence based on the authenticity of existence, or based on the authenticity of nature, it is an example of a contingent nature or a necessity nature, which does not make a difference in the completeness of the argument. Because it is enough to be clear that absolute reality exists unconditionally. This argument relies on the inviolable truth of the proposition that absolute reality necessarily exists. This brevity in the principles and concepts of the argument of reality makes it very compatible with the principle of simplicity and the facets that Swinburne enumerated in his account. According to Swinburne’s account, simplicity is a fundamental a priori truth. The Proposition "absolute reality necessarily exists" is a priori true and never accepts negation, and it always corresponds to a reality, either negatively or positively.The results of the present study show that, according to Swinburne's account, simplicity is the criterion of the probability of an explanation. In other words, if an explanation is a priori true, so the fundamental evidence for its truth is the simplicity of that explanation. Therefore, according to the correspondence theory of truth, it seems to be rational that the argument of reality is simpler and more probable than other arguments. In addition, it seems there is a correspondence in the argument of reality for each of the facets Swinburne enumerated for simplicity making it simpler than other arguments.

The doctrine of monotheism is the most important doctrine that sheds light on all areas of religion, i.e. rulings, morals, and beliefs, at the head of Islamic teachings. Moreover, the importance of the doctrines of confidence and trust should also be seen under the importance and dignity of the doctrine of monotheism because the believer, with trust, considers God to be the only effective force in existence and relies on Him alone in the affairs of his life. This research tries to obtain an accurate reading of the psychological concept of self-confidence by using the descriptive-analytical method and benefiting from the techniques and tools available, after studying the doctrine of confidence from the perspective of Sadrul Matalhin.For the accurate interpretation of confidence and trust from Mullah Sadra's point of view, it is necessary to reveal how it is combined with the psychological concept of self-confidence. Although in psychology, self-confidence is presented in a neutral and unvalued way as an important factor in mental health, with a negative perception of this concept, the sum between self-confidence and trust becomes impossible because such a person, in the chain of causes, does not give dignity to God, and without the need to trust God, sometimes he rules over existence and destiny.However, in the positive perception of the concept of self-confidence, which is close to self-esteem and self-efficacy, Mutawakkul (trustee) sees his capabilities as a tool to get rid of pests such as self-deprecation, weakness, and laziness. However, in the way of matching and summing trust and self-confidence according to Sadra's principles, self-confidence should be considered to be combined only with some levels of trust, and in others it is irrelevant. In other words, in explaining the degrees of trust, Mulla Sadra considers the lowest level of trust to be when the person who trusts in it trusts God like others. Therefore, the justified meaning can be considered for self-confidence. According to Mulla Sadra, the highest degree of trust is the moment when the person trusts in God for all causes.Mulla Sadra's conclusion is that on the one hand, many things in the world arise through mediation; on the other hand, all those means are channels of God. Even though the causes are considered to be causal, they are not given independence to become a force within the divine power. Also, in the negative perception of self-confidence, the sum between self-confidence and trust becomes impossible. Because such a person, in the chain of causes, does not give any dignity to God and does not need to trust God. According to Mulla Sadra's view, self-confidence should be considered a low and medium level of collectable trust. At the highest level of trust, it is no longer possible in the sense of longitudinal causality, numerical causality, or any other meaning.

Epistemology is a science that discusses human knowledge, including its nature, possibility, ways, types, territory, etc. of knowledge. It is a field that philosophers, theologians, and religious scholars have taken more effective steps in deepening and developing it. Jewish thinkers have also paid special attention to this issue. Sadia bin yusuf al-fayoumi, nicknamed Sadia Gaon, the father of Jewish philosophy and the head of the Rabbinical religious school "Sura", is considered one of the most important theologians in the history of the tradition of Rabbinical Judaism. He is known as the first Jewish philosopher and exegete in the middle centuries due to his innovative and systematic ideas. He is the first person who, in addition to his detailed views on theology and cosmology, has also raised important opinions on epistemology in two works ‘Kitab Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat (the Book of Beliefs and Opinions)’ and ‘Tafsir Sefer Yetsira (Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira)’. The two works suggest two different structures of epistemology. Sadia points out that the human mind is able to explain reality in two ways: one is based on empirical rationalism and the other is based on divine illumination and self-revelation in the mind. In other words, the human mind can act in two modes like the act of dialogue (i.e. arguing and reasoning or being silent, meditating, listening, and seeing).Considering the unique role of knowledge arising from reflection and revelation, in reaching the complete truth, Sadia plans and examines it from various angles in his important works. Along with Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat, he makes a detailed discussion in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira about epistemology. Its study helps a lot to understand his thought. Sadia's thinking in religions and beliefs has a controversial nature. In the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, he has relatively deep and esoteric thinking.This study, using the analytical comparative method, investigates the topics related to epistemology raised in the two mentioned works of Sadia. In his works, knowledge has different meanings: in Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat, it is shown as the correspondence between external reality and its concept in the human mind, while in Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, knowledge is related to the origin and nature of creation.In ‘the Book of Beliefs and Opinions’, Sadia, in a positive answer regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, considers his goal to be certain and removes all doubts. In this book, while proving the same validity of knowledge and results that can be achieved through revelation and rational reasoning, he cites verses from the Bible to prove the foundations of his epistemological teachings. He considers the factor of knowledge to be the intellectual power of the soul, which only God has rightly placed in the person's existence. Despite the fact that the cognitive process relies on sensory perception, the intellect includes a system of principles and generalities that exist independently of sensory data. The Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira considers the goal of the author of the book to be the representation (portrait) of how things come into being and find their existence so that the knower can understand them and the wise beings can learn them. Therefore, while confirming the possibility of acquiring knowledge, this work emphasizes the role of revelation in this connection.Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat presents the elements of the ‘cognition process’ in the form of a hierarchical model in three steps: 1) a complex and vague idea that is only a vague and confused idea of the nature of the research subject, 2) an analysis of this idea, and 3) accepting the ultimate truth by a belief freed from doubts. Here we witness a process of gradual internalization of knowledge that occurs in the mind, a process during which sensory perception turns into belief. In this process, reason gradually removes the factors that cause doubt and error, and then reaches the understanding of the truth by refining and classifying the mixed information of the external world. This is Saadia's model to reach the correct belief.The Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira does not include regular epistemological statements that describe the process of cognition in detail. But it associates three necessary factors (knowing, thinking, and believing) with the three corresponding faculties of the soul. He attributes knowledge to the power of collecting data (al-Qowwah al-Hashira) of the soul, which collects the discussed data and transmits them to the second power. The second power is the ‘discernment power’ (al-Qowwah al-Momaizah), which recognizes true and false data and verifies the facts by rejecting false data. Then, this power transfers the refined information to ‘Al-Qowwah al-Mu’taqidah’ which preserves it and becomes sure of its authenticity.In the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, along with the three general sources of knowledge, mentioned in Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat, the knowledge of ‘lightning-like’ (Kal-barq), i.e. illumination, plays a prominent role. In complete contrast to his negative assessment of lightning-like knowledge in Al-Amanat, in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, he states that the principles of things appear in the mind like lightning, then they become clear and certain before his eyes. Of course, this duality goes back to different approaches of Sadia's epistemology in these two works as well as the related fields. In Al-Amanat, the knowledge of ‘lightning-like’ refers to sensible reality per se. But in Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, knowledge has the nature of representation. That is, the mind relies on itself in the complete absence of sensory data. Therefore, it seems that illumination is the only way to understand this ‘other reality’.In al-Amanat and beliefs, knowledge means the correspondence of external reality and its meaning in the human mind, while in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, it is related to the ultimate roots of creation, without considering sensory perception.Wisdom is one of the most controversial epistemological words of Sadia. Saadia's definition of wisdom is based on various biblical passages, and thus it can be seen as the result of Saadia's exegetical activities rather than independent philosophical reflection. In Al-Amanat, al-Hikmat is defined as “kawn al-ashyaʾ ʿala ḥaqaʾiqiha al-maʿluma wa-laysa-l-ḥikma an takun al-ashyaʾ ʿala tamanni mutamanin wa-la shahwa mushtahin” and the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira defines it as “al-ḥikma hiya tartib al-ashyaʾ maratibaha wa-taqdiruha maqadiraha”.In short, according to Sadia, it should be said that reality speaks in two languages. In other words, the human mind is able to understand and express reality in two ways: one is universal and unanimous, and ultimately based on sensory and intellectual perception, and the other is based on God's self-revelation through human intuition.

The philosophical analysis of universals needs to clarify two terms: the world and the mind. If we can understand the relation between these two, it is possible to answer two questions. First, what are universals? And second, how to make universals? The present research aims to compare universals from the viewpoint of Shahab Al-Din Suhrawardi (1154-1191 CE) and Duns Scotus (1266-1308 CE). Both of them follow the Greek legacy and are under Abrahamic religions.They distinguish between common and special features of the world when they describe it. In Islamic philosophy, these features are called "existence" and "quiddity". But Suhrawardi, by the revival of the system of light, recognizes them as the "light" or the "being". He distinguishes between existence (Wojoud) and being (Maujoud). This distinction is linguistic and ontological. Existence is always in the mind while the being is found in the world outside of the mind. He believes that the specific feature of the world is shown by the beings (Maujoudat). But Suhrawardi does not search for the common feature in existence. He explains that feature by the light (Nour) and the layout of the system patterned by the lights (Anwar). This cosmos system includes the longitudinal and widthways orders. The results of the two orders are two versions of universals.The first version (it could be named the Aristotelian version) belongs to the longitudinal dimension. This version is presented by mind functions. Suhrawardi is among a few Muslim Philosophers that highlights the mind’s function. He believes that the mind has an active and a passive role. The passive one is only a place for perceptions and memories, but its activeness or agency is introduced by the intellect-mind relation. The intellect-act (ontological and epistemological) relation is limited by the mind.Suhrawardi discusses platonic ideas in a widthways order. It results from the second version. But it is important to mention that Suhrawardi’s reading is a wider view of the universals. Suhrawardi’s reading of platonic ideas explains upward and downward lights. The upward light is the result of illumination (Ishraq) and the downward light is the result of observation (Mushahadah). The upward one expresses the Aristotelian universals, and the downward one shows the platonic version.On the other hand, in the medieval period, the term “common nature” express a major problem of universals. This term originates from the Natural Universals of Avicena. The Avicenian concept was so ambiguous, i.e, what he describes is not in the world nor the mind. So, medieval philosophers and commentators had a problem with Avicenna’s quote. The problem was how to interpret universals. Avicenna confirms that the term universal is neither in the world nor in the mind, that is, it has no necessity.Scotus confronts such a strange ontological state. He doesn’t make the Natural Universal in the mind or in the world; rather, he tries to go out of it from its contradictional state. At first, Scotus rejects the theories that consider universals only in the mind and only in the world. He stands in the middle of these two. With two ideas, the common nature goes out from its pureness: non-numerical identity and commonness. The first refers to the idea that everything that has a real identity hasn’t a numerical identity. The real identity of nature exists from the pure state, and, at the same time, it is not an objective nature. But it seems to be in the mind while it is a conceptual issue. Thus, Scotus explains commonness as opposed to universality. Considering this idea, he says that commonness belongs to actual quiddity, not to quiddity in the intellect or mind. It is noticed that two interpretations be possible from the actual quiddity; the first is the objective quiddity, and the second is the quiddity Scotus has proved, i.e, the absolute quiddity that has someplace in the world, but not a sensual object. The commonness belongs to the second interpretation. The reason why the quiddity has commonness is the quiddity itself.Scotus represents the Aristotelian version of universals. He believes that human knowledge achieves experience and separation from particulars. Cognition is divided into sensual and intellectual aspects. The beginning of cognition is sensual but it results in an intellectual path. These are the general roles of the mind. But non-numerical identity and commonness are particularly mental acts. The separation of common nature’s features is by seeing the objective order. The non-numerical identity is obtained by considering the numerical identity. Also, commonness is obtained by considering the real quiddity. Concerning the above explanations, Scotus sees the particulars’ features as real or non-numerical identities and the common features as commonness.Both philosophers believe in active and passive roles of the mind. But, the reading of the mind’s activity is different. Scotus thinks like Aristotle, i.e, perceptions are just obtained from particulars. But Suhrawardi confirms that the mind makes some concepts without world interference, which means some of the universals are made only by the mind. While Scotus believes in the Aristotelian version of universals, Suhrawardi expresses both versions of the universals, although he does not make any connection between the two versions. It is to say that their ways for the explanation of universals are different, but they consider theories on the common and special features of the world. Suhrawardi expresses the light as the special feature and the quiddity (i.e, diversity of quiddity) as the common one, and Scotus proves the real identity (or non-numerical) as the special feature and the commonness (in front of pure universality) as the common one.

In the sacred books of Abrahamic religions, namely the Testaments and the Qur'an, central features are attributed to God. These features make God identifiable to the audience and create an image of Him in the mind. Each of these holy books has attributed characteristics to the God of their religion that has commonalities and differences with other religions. These characteristics permeate all aspects of religion; therefore, they are considered very important and fundamental and shape the atmosphere of any religion. Normally, one attribute of God is of central importance in every religion among other attributes, and any other attribute is considered a compliment or a ray of it. In this study, an attempt is made to obtain the central characteristics of God in the three religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam through the verses of the Testaments and the Qur'an. Knowing these central features helps us to better understand the specific path of each religion toward its supreme destination and facilitates the dialogue between their followers. The three characteristics of spirit, word, and light are of fundamental importance in these three religions, but each of these three plays a central role in each religion.

Unity of existence, arrangement of levels of existence, and perfect man are the significant mystical subjects that have been consistently considered by thinkers and scholars of Islamic mystical tradition. Taking an analytical-descriptive method, the present study aims to draw the ontology of Ibn Arabi and Aziz Nasafi, the two mystics of the first and second traditions, with respect to the creation of the world and its levels and also to present a consistent model based on fundamentals and structures of their thought, the extent Aziz Nasafi have been influenced by Ibn Arabi and his original theories. Explanation and analysis of Aziz Nasafi’s views about existence reveal that he should be regarded among mystics of the second tradition, albeit with his familiarity with the fundamentals of the first tradition. Aziz Nasafi’s ontological views are informed by those of Ibn Arabi and his followers, yet since Nasafi displays originality in mystical subjects, he has likewise novelty in ontological views.