فصلنامه آینه معرفت
پیاپی 76 (پاییز 1402)

“The Rule of the One (Qāʻîdâh Al-Wāḥîd)” regarded as one of the fundamental philosophical rules, which is not only directly or indirectly connected with several philosophical issues about God, cosmos, knowledge and so on, but also some thinkers have used it in other sciences such as Physics (Ṭâbīʻîyyāt) and Jurisprudence (Ûṣūl al-Fîqh). Although historically rooted in ancient Greek philosophy, the Rule of the One, like other philosophical rules, after the introduction of the Science of Philosophy into the Islamic world, was dealt with by Muslim philosophers. The Rule of the One indicates that from a one simple cause only one effect is produced. The Muslim philosophers have often used this rule to explain how creatures are produced from a one supreme cause. However, this rule in that is related to God and His agency, can be considered as a Kâlāmī (theological) problem. Hence, most of Mûtâkâllîmūn (theologians) have discussed on it in their writings.In spite of the significance of this rule and its several usages in real and conventional sciences, the Muslim thinkers don’t agree on it. So, in discussing on the Rule of the One, some Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā, Sûrâwârdī and Mûllā Ṣâdrā, using the foundations of their philosophical systems, not only have accepted and proved this rule, but also have employed it in their philosophical views. But many Mûtâkâllîmūn (theologians) and mystics and even some philosophers have not accepted this rule, and consequently, have criticized it. Apparently, no book has been written about this rule by the early Muslim thinkers, but in the writings of the later Muslim thinkers, there are many works related to this rule. Of course, as far as I have searched, in most of these works, their authors have tried to criticize the Rule of the One, and in a few works, this rule has been defended. Since the acceptance or rejection of the Rule of the One has very important implications for the philosophical epistemological and cosmological issues, and many philosophers’ belief in this rule has been one of the main causes of the criticisms of the opponents of philosophy against the Muslim philosophers, it is necessary to classify, analyze and evaluate the criticisms arisen against this rule in order to respond to them, based on the foundations of Transcendent Philosophy. After classifying and examining the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One, it was found out that, in general, these criticisms either have arisen from denying or rejecting one of the philosophical foundations of this rule (Kâlāmī (theological) criticisms) or from considering this rule as incompatible with some other philosophical rules (philosophical criticisms). In this paper, I have tried to classify, analyze and evaluate, by a descriptive-analytical method, the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One. The findings of this paper show that these criticisms can generally be classified in two main kinds of criticism: the first kind is related to the criticisms which have been arisen against the reasons for the Rule of the One, and in which those reasons have been considered as insufficient for proving this rule; and the second kind is related to the criticisms which, apart from the reasons for proving the Rule of the One, have considered this rule as incompatible with some other philosophical rules.According to what has been discussed in this paper, it can be said that   For some contemporary scholars of philosophy, the Rule of the One is incompatible with some philosophical doctrines, such as “The Simple Reality’s being All theThings”, “The particular and immediate knowledge of God to things”, “The soul’s being, in its unity, all its faculties”, “The simplicity of the essence of Necessary Being”, “The immediate relation of the existents with the Necessary Being”, and “God’s being the Willing”. 2. Some other scholars of philosophy, taking a historical approach to the Rule of the One and its origin in Greek philosophy, believe that this rule is confined to the natural causes. They argue that Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā and Mûllā Ṣâdrā, should not applied this rule to the Divine agent, especially to the Necessary Being.3. Some others, emphasizing on some philosophical doctrines such as “the absence of necessary concomitance between the conceptual multiplicity and the extensional multiplicity” and “the possibility of analyzing a simple essence into various concepts”, consider the production of many effects from a one simple cause as possible, and thereby, criticize the Rule of the one.4.Finally, Some other scholars, based on some philosophical foundations, regard the essence of Necessary Being as the Comprehensive of all the Attributes of Perfection, which implies the possibility of inclusion of the multiplicity of existential perfections in a simple essence. At the end, I have concluded that in most of the philosophical criticisms arisen against the Rule of the One, we can see two kinds of error: “the confusion between the Concept and the Extension”; and presenting an incorrect and inaccurate image of the philosophical premises of the Rule of the One, such as “the principle of congruence”, “the impossibility of production of the simultaneous effects from a simple agent”, and “the necessity of differentiation between cognitive and objective multiplicity”.

In discussing on predetermination and freewill, especially from a religious viewpoint, the following questions arise: Does Divine Foreknowledge belong generally to all things and especially to the voluntary human actions? And if Divine Foreknowledge belong to the voluntary human actions, is this compatible with human freewill? In the Islamic thought, two groups have dealt with the problem of “predetermination and freewill”: Âshʹârītes and Mûʹtâzîlītes. The Âshʹârītes held in determinism and “the incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge with human freewill”, but the Mûʹtâzîlītes held in indeterminism and “the compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge with human freewill”. According to the Mûʹtâzîlītes, the distinction between a human being and the inanimate things is in free action, and if Divine Foreknowledge is a hindrance to human freewill, a human being will not be able to do his actions freely, and so, there will be no difference between a human being and the inanimate things. This paper aims at rereading the problem of “the compatibility/ incompatibility of Divine Foreknowledge with human freewill” and tries to show that which viewpoint is true viewpoint: Determinism or Indeterminism or a viewpoint between them? In trying to do so, this paper intends to answer the following questions: Does God have foreknowledge to the acts of His servants? What are the characteristics of Divine Foreknowledge? If God has foreknowledge to the acts of His servants, what is the relation of His foreknowledge with human destiny and freewill? Is His foreknowledge a hindrance to human freewill? If Divine Foreknowledge is a kind of predestination, can human beings interfere in what happens for them or they have no way but mere submission? Undoubtedly, if these questions are not answered, some religious doctrines, such as the duties of human beings before God and their moral responsibility for their actions, will lost their validity. Although many papers have been written about the problem of “predetermination and freewill”, the difference between this paper and other papers is in the way of solving the problem.In this paper, at the first stage, the meaning of Divine Foreknowledge, its characteristics and its relation with human freewill are discussed. And, at the second stage, a detailed and precise discussion has been made about the viewpoint of the School of Âhl al-Bâyt (peace be upon them), entitled “Âmrûn Bâyn al-Âmrâyn”, which is a viewpoint between Determinism and Indeterminism. According to this viewpoint, Divine Foreknowledge is compatible with human freewill and isn’t a hindrance to human freewill. This viewpoint neither negates some religious doctrines, such as a human being’s duties before God and his moral responsibility for his actions, nor limits the Divine Omnipotence in favor of human freewill.Moreover, in response to the historical problem of “predestination and freewill” in Islamic thought, this viewpoint proposes a third position between Determinism and Indeterminism, which is known as “Âmrûn Bâyn al-Âmrâyn”. This position explains the human agency by relying on human ability to do actions and the sovereignty of God’s Will. According to this position, by acquiring the power from God, a human being becomes able to do actions before doing them, and on the basis of this power, he wills and acts. At the same time, by acquiring this power from God, Divine Omnipotence isn’t limited, and nothing can happen without God’s Will, and if God’s Will doesn’t belong to do something, no one can overcome His will.

According to Mûllā Ṣâdrā, a human being is a creature who is educable during his life. By “Education” Mûllā Ṣâdrā means to purify human soul from the vices and to prepare it for receiving the manifestation of the Divinity. Relying on his philosophical foundations, Mûllā Ṣâdrā argues that the soul is corporeal in its coming-into-being and spiritual in its survival. He believes that the soul comes into being with the coming-into-being of the body and thus begins its perfecting motion from the lowest degree in order to achieve its actuality, immateriality and the highest degree of perfection. This paper tries to discuss descriptively and analytically on educating the human soul from Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s view and its relation with his understanding of the Existential Dependence on and the Essential Need to God. The Essential Need to God refers to the existential dependence of an effect on a cause and the essential dependence of a Contingent being to the Necessary Being. Among the things which can influence on educating the human soul and on a human being’s understanding of his existential dependence on God, one can refer to a perfect self - knowledge and its role in educating the soul, his understanding of his existentiating cause, and its influence on educating the soul. Of course, it should be noted that there are numerous papers about Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s view of education, but what distinguishes this paper from other papers is the role of the Essential Need to God in educating the soul, which has not been discussed in none of the other papers.1.The perfect self-knowledge and its role in educating the soulSelf-knowledge is one of the things which play a very important role in educating the soul and a human being’s understanding of his Essential Need to God, because if self-knowledge is correctly done, this will make a human being reach his existential perfection, which is the purpose of educating the soul. Mûllā Ṣâdrā believes that the perfection of soul is the true eudaimonia. According to him, a human being will reach the perfection of soul, i.e. the true eudaimonia, if he know God and is committed to divine teachings and rules as well. Thus, the vision of God requires both the theoretical knowledge and using the theoretical wisdom and the practical knowledge and using the practical wisdom. In fact, self-knowledge is a firm pillar that reliance upon it makes a human being approximate to God and reach other-worldly eudaimonia, and the negligence of it for those who have the capacity and possibility of acquiring it is the source of all miseries and evils in this world and the otherworld. Thus, if we study the cause of the close relationship between self-knowledge and knowledge of God from Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s view, we would reach the conclusion that, according to Mûllā Ṣâdrā, a Contingent being subsists in the Necessary Being, the Soul subsists in the Intellect, and the Intellect subsists in God. A human being’s understanding of his Existentiating Cause and its influence on educating the soulAccording to Mûllā Ṣâdrā, Existence is concomitant with Goodness and Eudaimonia, and since the existents are different in their perfection and imperfection, whichever existent is of a more perfect existence, its eudaimonia will be further and more perfect, and since the existence of God is the most perfect existence, He has existentially the highest degree of eudaimonia. For Mûllā Ṣâdrā, although the existence of everything is pleasant for it, understanding its existentiating cause is more pleasant for it, for its existentiating cause is the perfection of its existence. Hence, understanding the existentiating cause brings about more eudaimonia for a human being, for that cause is considered as the perfection of his existence. Thus, if a human being know his existentiating cause, his eudaimonia which is the purpose of educating the soul, will be more. Generally speaking, according to Mûllā Ṣâdrā, a human being’s understanding of his existentiating cause is, in fact, his understanding of his existence in a more perfect degree, for that cause is regarded as his existential perfection. When a human being understands his own existence, a pleasure and a state of eudaimonia are gained for him, and understanding his existentiating cause can bring about a higher degree of pleasure and edudaimonia for him, which is considered as the perfection of educating the soul.In Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s view, the Essence of God is the manifestation of all his Attributes and Names, and His essence is a mirror in which and by which the forms of all Contingent beings can be seen, without happening any immanence or union. For Mûllā Ṣâdrā, one of the features of an Effect is that it is present for its Cause and this presence can be of certain educational effects for a human being. One of these educational effects is a human being’s attention to God’s presence and understanding this presence. This means that understanding God’s Presence can make a human being control him against the sins. In other words, our sins have a reversed relation with faith in God and understanding His Presence; i.e., the more the faith, the less the sin. Besides, understanding God’s Presence can bring about responsibility and commitment for a human being. The growth of moral virtues in society, controlling the instincts, and avoiding of the violation of people’s rights are some of the other educational effects of attending to God’s Presence. At the same time, the most important educational effects of attending to God’s Presence are to strengthen the human spiritual wayfaring in this world, to give meaning to life, and to be liberated from nihilism. ConclusionAccording to Mûllā Ṣâdrā, a human being’s understandingof his Essential Need to God, who is his Exixtentiating Cause, can bring about educating the soul for him. Self-knowledge is one of the things which are very effective and useful in educating the soul. For Mûllā Ṣâdrā, the final end of a human being in his life is to reach his existential perfection, and his existential perfection is to reach the intellectual detachment and, thereby, the approximation to God. This means that a human being must be existentially assimilated to God, and his attributes must become similar to the Divine Attributes in order to understand God’s Presence. Besides, in Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s view, a Contingent being subsists in the Necessary Being, the Soul subsists in the Intellect, and the Intellect subsists in God. Finally, for Mûllā Ṣâdrā, Existence is concomitant with Goodness and Eudaimonia, and the existence of everything is pleasant for it, but its understanding of its existentiating cause is more pleasant for it, for that cause is its existential perfection. Therefore, if a human being know his existentiating cause, his eudaimonia which is the purpose of educating the soul, will be more.

One of the long-standing Kâlāmī problems in Islamic thought has been the problem of “predestination and freewill”, which has occupied the minds of many thinkers. This problem has two sides. On the one hand, a human being has freewill. This means that a human being, by his will and reason, chooses either the path of salvation and prosperity, or the path of wretchedness and destruction, and becomes deserving of reward or deserving of punishment. On the other hand, a human being is completely lake of any freewill in some matters such as determining his parents, the place and time of his birth, and so on. In the Holy Qur’an both these two sides of the problem have been referred to. There are verses in the Qur’an that refer to the human freewill, such as the verse: “SAY: ‘Truth comes from your Lord. Let anyone who wishes to, believe, and let anyone who wishes to, disbelieve.’” (18:29); in which the Qur’an speaks of anyone’s voluntary believing or disbelieving in Truth; or the verse: “We have guided him [= the man] along the [right] path, whether he is thankful or thankless” (31:3); in which the Qur’an speaks of the Lord’s guidance, and points out that people have a state of gratitude towards the Lord’s guidance, which means the “acceptance”, or a state of ingratitude to it, which means the “rejection”. At the same time, there are verses in the Qur’an that refer to the concept of “predestination”, such as the verse: “Anyone whom God guides, remains guided; while anyone He lets go astray will never find any patron to set him straight” (18:17); in which the Qur’an refers to divine guidance and going astray; or the verse: “God guides anyone He wishes to a Straight Road” (2:213); in which the Qur’an speaks of God’s Guidance to the Straight Road for whomever He wants. Âsh'ârītes insist on predestination by appealing to some Qur’anic verses, without paying attention to other verses of the Qur’an and the premises needed for correct understanding of the Qur’an. Mû'tâzîlītes, by appealing to some Qur’anic verses about the human will and matters such as God’s commandments and prohibitions, or His rewards and punishments, know human freewill as certain. This paper aims at answering, by a descriptive-analytical method, two main questions: (1) according to the Shīʹîte Îmāmī Kâlām, is a human being a free being or a predestined being? and (2) what are the educational effects of considering a human being as a free being or a predestined being?The results of this paper are as follows: in explaining the incompatibility of “freedom of the infidels with their inherent wretchedness”, it was found out that attributing wretchedness to the nature of infidels contradicts both with freewill and with predestination. Its contradiction with freewill is obvious, but the relation of wretchedness with the nature of infidels contradicts with the deterministic view that God is the complete cause of all things, because according to this view, the nature of infidels is considered as the complete cause of their wretchedness. Regarding the objection of “the freewill and fate (qâḍā) and destiny (qâdâr)”, it was clarified that the act to which God’s fate belongs, God’s fate belongs to that act with the limits of that act, and one of the limits of that act is that it must issue from its agent freely. Also, it was found out that the fate and destiny contradict with considering them as the complete cause of human acts. About the objection of “the freewill and the order of causality”, it was clarified that not only the order of causality is not incompatible with human freewill, but also doing the actions needs many causes, one of which is causality. Moreover, about the objection of “the freewill and generality of creation”, it was mentioned that attributing the badness to the essences of things is not correct, but badness is due to the factors outside of the essences of things. In other words, a bad act is a permissible act that has not been performed through its legal channels. Besides, with regard to the objection of “the freewill and Divine Providence”, it was found out that the Divine Providence is an existential-legislative providence; i.e., God, by His existential providence, has willed that a human being be free, and the final cause of doing actions is human will. It should be noted that, based on the Shīʹîte Îmāmī Kâlām, sending the Prophets has had an important role in educating the human beings, and faith in the Prophets has given rise to the righteous action. Also, it should be mentioned that the tradition of trial and affliction is closely related to educating the human beings, and human beings are afflicted by pleasure and pain in order to grow. Besides, we must know that responsibility is one of the essential elements in human growth and upbringing, and to the extent that a human being pays attention to his responsibility, he becomes resolute in training and purifying his soul. These show that belief in human freewill plays a central role in educating a human being, and, therefore, the key to purifying the soul is to strengthen the will.

Ibn Sīnā has allocated the last three chapters (nâmâṭs) of his last work, Âl-Îshārāt vâ al-Tânbīhāt (Pointers and Reminders) to the exposition and defense of mysticism. Besides, he has described a period of intellectual and spiritual wayfaring in his Rîsālât al-Ṭâyr by a symbolic language. The main story of this treatise is about some deceived birds that were caught in a hunter’s trap. According to the story, a bird which is the narrator of the story, by seeing the free birds, became aware of his captivity and remoteness and asks them for helping to save and free himself and other trapped birds. In this treatise, Ibn Sīnā depicts the descent of the soul from the world of spirits to the terrestrial world and the ascent of the human rational soul from the degree of corporeal detachments and being caught in the trap of worldly dependencies to the highest degree of spiritual perfection and the degree of Vision of God. For Ibn Sīnā, the wayfarer who has been caught in a trap and realized the depth of his remoteness and captivity, starts a journey with the trapped birds and arrives at the palace of King and asks the king to dig out the remained bonds from their feet. But the time of Permanent liberation from captivity and the rescue from remoteness has not yet come. In the Rîsālât al-Ṭâyr, from an anthropological perspective, Ibn Sīnā has expressed the situation of the wayfarer in a way that is very close to the way of Illuminative Philosophers and the Mystics. Hence, this treatise can be considered as one of the sources of the thoughts of the Illuminative Philosophers. In this treatise, Ibn Sīnā deals with the descent of the soul and its ascent and immortality. For him, the soul after falling into the darkness of the world is trapped and must liberate itself from the trap by a movement of perfection, and ascend to its original homeland. If the soul do so, it will display the truths of the unseen world in itself and return to its lost origin. For this reason, Ibn Sīnā speaks of the stages of wayfaring. In his view, the Bird is the symbol of the rational soul or human soul, the Hunter is the symbol of the nature and material world, and the Trap or Cage is the symbol of the body and corporeal detachments which prevent the soul from flying to the spiritual worlds. Also, in his opinion, the Flight is the symbol of the soul’s effort to reach perfection and ascending from corporeal detachments and reach spiritual degrees and the Vision of the King. Besides, in his belief, the Free Birds are the symbol of the wise and learned men who have found the way to salvation and have reached the complete freedom. Again, in his eye, Liberating from the cage is the symbol of releasing from corporeal detachments, but the birds caught in the trap must travel to the king’s palace and ask for his help in order to reach the complete liberation from the remained detachments. Finally, he believes that passing through each of the nine mountains in this journey is the symbol of the liberation of the rational soul from some detachments to corporeal things, which have prevented the rational soul from transcending and returning to its own origin. In mystical writings, the animal symbols are used to express some truths. Most animals have a symbolic meaning which indicates to the spiritual states of man. In other words, each of the characteristics of the animal soul, which exist in every human being, is attributed to a specific animal. Ibn Sīnā uses various animal symbols to show the elegances of wayfaring and human capabilities during his spiritual journey. The Hedgehog is the first animal symbol that Ibn Sīnā attributes to the wayfarer in his Rîsālât al-Ṭâyr. The wayfarer must collect himself by inspiring from the hedgehog, introspect in himself and engage him carefully and without raising a tumult in self-knowledge. The second animal symbol is the Snake. For Ibn Sīnā, just as a snake comes out of its skin once or twice in a year, the wayfarer must also come out of the world of nature and body, which is a skin for a person, and reach the quintessence. By this shedding the skin, the wayfarer liberates himself from all the corporeal detachments which have occupied his intellectual and spiritual faculties and prevented his soul from flying, and gradually provides his soul for spiritual intuition. The third animal symbol in this treatise is the worm. In Ibn Sīnā’s view, the wayfarer, in his spiritual journey, must walk slowly, cautiously and without any affectation, and not hurting anyone. The fourth animal symbol is the scorpion. Ibn Sīnā believes that the scorpion is a symbol of pure awareness, constant preparation and the restless journeying of the wayfarer, and controlling his sensual and appetitive faculties and turning them into spiritual faculties.Moreover, Ibn Sīnā mentions four other animal symbols which have the characteristics he attributes to them: Ostrich, Viper, Salamander and Bat. Of course, these four animals have vices that a wayfarer must not learn, but they have four virtues that he must learn: the “resistance” of the ostrich, the “persistence” of the viper, the “fire-fighting” of the salamander, and the “day-avoidance” of the bat; i.e. not being a sensualist. By using these symbols beautifully and precisely, Ibn Sīnā has drawn well the spiritual capacities of the wayfarer and the harms of the path. It is the reason that, in this paper, we have discussed descriptively and analytically on Ibn Sīnā’s mystical anthropology according to his view of human capacities and capabilities for spiritual wayfaring, based on the Rîsālât al-Ṭâyr.

The problem of free will, which had been discussed by the ancient Greek philosophers, has been discussed in Islamic philosophy at length. For Muslim philosophers, the will is one of the faculties of soul, which causes the action by motivating the desire and making the bodily organs move. In recent decades, due to the great progress made in the field of neuroscience, some materialists have tried to use the findings of neuroscience for explaining their deterministic and materialistic viewpoint and interpreting the process of issuance of the action from a human being according to the neural changes in the body. Sam Harris is one of those who have taken such an approach, and by emphasizing on Libet’s findings and new experiments on the cerebral cortex as well as emphasizing on the factor of environment, considers the human behavior as arising from the environment and genetics, and denies the voluntary and free action. On the other hand, he considers the body as the origin of action and rejects the idea of ​​“Mind” and “Soul”. In this paper, I have tried to criticize Harris’s viewpoint according to the foundations of Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s Transcendent Philosophy.FindingsSam Harris has tried to deny the human free will by focusing on the environment and genetics and considering it only an illusion. But, based on the philosophical foundations of Mûllā Ṣâdrā’s Transcendent Philosophy, Sam Harris’s viewpoint faces some major criticisms which makes it irrational and unacceptable. Emphasizing on the role of genetics, considering all behaviors as predictable by neurons, appealing to chance and randomness in justifying some behaviors, emphasizing on human unawareness of the origin of human actions, considering the behaviors as arising from the activities of body, ignoring the substance of the Mind (the Soul), and confusing determinism with compulsion are some of the cases which reject Harris’s materialistic viewpoint. The will is the crystallization of the soul, which distinguishes human beings from other creatures, and its function cannot be related to the neural activities of the body. Discussion and ConclusionSam Harris sees free will as only an illusion. By emphasizing on the findings of Benjamin Libet in his famous experiment and also by emphasizing on the role of the environment, Harris believes that we are not free agents in doing our actions and that it is genetics and the environment that determine how we must behave. Considering the free will as an illusion goes to the extent that Harris sometimes knows free will as mysterious or essentially meaningless. He emphasizes that free will has nothing to do with any kind of reality and that human beings have no awareness of the origin of their actions. Harris considers human actions as completely compulsory and the product of family, social and environmental conditions in which a person grows up. He, then, points out that human beings are unaware of the process of life and that the hidden dimensions of the mind, which are the origins of many behaviors, are hidden from us. This leads him to the denial of human freedom. On the other hand, Mûllā Ṣâdrā considers the will as one of the faculties of soul, and believes that it is not a material thing. According to Mûllā Ṣâdrā, a human being has free will, and the conscious and purposeful actions which issue from him indicate the existence of the faculty of will in his soul. And, in his view, the true will is a graded thing. Sam Harris’s materialistic interpretation of free will faces challenges and criticisms which make it an unreasonable and unjustifiable interpretation. His reliance on environment and genetics is the most important weakness of his materialistic interpretation of human free will, because it cannot negate the human free will.

The validity of deductive reasoning is the main subject of logical theories.  According to the definition of validity of reasoning in Classical Logic, deducing the conclusion from the premises by applying the rules of inference is a necessary and sufficient condition for validity. Therefore,  and  known as EFQ and EQT principles, are valid. However, our natural intuition does not confirm the validity of these two arguments. In dealing with those principles, we face with three approaches.  Some logicians have tried to close the ways of proving these principles with some adjustments at some foundations or some syntactical and semantic rules of Classical Logic. Some other logicians have divided the material implication paradoxes into two kinds of conventional and logical paradoxes, calling EFQ and EQT conventional paradoxes rather than logical paradoxes. Another group’ of logicians believe that the mathematical proofs follow the classical logic, but they rely on principles such as “reductio ad absurdum”, “the conditional proof”, “the disjunctive syllogism”, and “the law of absorption”, which are established in the field of mathematics and cannot be applied to other fields. Based on this approach, the above-mentioned principles can only be taken seriously if they have an effective application in logic and mathematics.  In facing with this problem, we have taken the first approach in discussing on the classical truth-function system in Propositional Logic. Moreover, by adding two new conditions for the validity of arguments, we have given a new definition of validity. Based on this definition, the validity of arguments  and  is no longer proved. This definition requires some revisions in the rules for inference and the arguments in Classical Logic. These changes have led to the establishment of the truth-function system of Propositional Logic, which is free from the paradoxes and challenges of the Classical Logic, and, in my view, has achieved its goals.  Âsâdollāh Fâllāhī has criticized this theory in a paper entitled “HajiHosseini’s Truth-Functional System”, published in Ᾱyeneye Mâʻârefât, Spring 2023. The “circular definition of the validity of arguments” is Fâllāhī’s main criticism of this theory, which we have answered in this paper. The point is that in discovering the contradiction, by which the proof is finished, it is not necessary to satisfy the syntactical condition of the premises’ not being inconsistent. Therefore, in the truth-function system the formula’s not being inconsistent should be discerned independently of the new conditions for the validity of arguments in the same way as Classical Logic, with the difference that in the truth-function system some rules of inference don’t change, and so the vicious circle doesn’t follow. “The Loss of the Substitution Rule”, “Non-Validity Preservation of Substitution Rule”, “The Incompatibility of the Conditional with Deduction”, and “Deductions’ not being relevant” are other criticisms that have been arisen by using the criteria of Classical Logic or Relevant Logic. But since these criticisms require leaving the criteria of criticism, we have regarded them as rejected criticisms. “The counterexample for defining the syntactical consequence” and “equivalence of a formula with several non-equivalent formulas” are two other criticisms of Fâllāhī’s paper; the first arises from an inadvertent error in book, which needs to be corrected, and the second is based on a presupposition which is ambiguous, and by clarifying it the objection is answered. Besides, three other criticisms called “loss of reductio ad absurdum”, “ambiguity in the definition of harmony”, and “the artificiality of the condition "not being a theorem" in the definition of formulas substitution-instances” arise from misunderstanding HajiHosseini’s book entitled A New Sketch for the Principles and Foundations of Logic, and have been answered. There were some other criticisms that we have discussed and answered under the title “Scientific Criticisms”.   In criticizing a theory, it is expected that the basic assumptions of the theory, which any change in them leads to the loss of the theory, be separated from the other assumptions that are not so. Also, the assumptions on which the theory is based should be discerned and considered. Similarly, it is expected that the areas which, based on the theory, need to be revised, and be identified and examined whether those areas have been or haven’t been revised. Besides, it should be noticed that the criticisms be related to the basic assumptions and to the revisions arisen from those assumptions, and the criticisms be not judged by the standards of other theories. In addition, the criticisms which relate to other assumptions, should be presented separately and, if possible, in the form of proposed corrections.  In this paper, however, we have shown that almost none of the above-mentioned norms has been observed in Fâllāhī’s critique of the theory of the truth-function system of Propositional Logic.   In response to some criticisms, we have noted that in criticizing a theory we should not depart from the requirements of criticism and judge a theory by other theoretical criteria. In this paper, based on the assumption that the logical theories are not excluded from the scientific theories, we have argued that the best theory is a theory which provides a better explanation of the evidence in comparison with scientific theories. In the field of logic, the criteria of expressiveness, separation of propositions, explanatory power, separation of inferences, consistency, coherence, compatibility with the evidence, sufficiency of data, clarity, simplicity, and unification are the criteria for preferring a logical theory to other logical theories.