عبدالصمد علی آبادی

The wise solution of Le’an's institution in Islamic criminal policy, based on God's grace, legislates to overcome difficulties in married life. Its wisdom lies not only in solving challenges faced by families involved in infidelity crises but also in preventing self-effort and arbitrary actions to solve such problems. However, the effectiveness of this institution is limited by the requirement of "seeing" the wife's betrayal. Therefore, the research question is whether, according to the jurisprudence of Islamic schools, proof of blasphemy depends on the husband witnessing his wife's adultery or not. Islamic religions differ regarding this "seeing" condition. The Imami jurists, except Shahid Sani, and one view of the Maliki jurists consider witnessing the wife's adultery as a condition for proving blasphemy. Hence, they do not view cursing a blind person or someone who has not witnessed their wife's illicit relationship as valid. However, according to Zaidiyyah, Hanafiyyah, Bashafiyyah, Hanbaliyyah, and other viewpoints of Malikiyyah jurists, witnessing is not a condition, and even a blind person who has not seen their wife's adultery can perform laan. Therefore, the subjectivity of the "seeing" condition in Le’an is not defensible. This goal can be achieved by describing and analyzing the propositions of Islamic jurisprudence and human sciences, as well as library data. The result is that the lack of subjectivity in this condition not only protects more individuals involved in ominous phenomena under the cover of the Le’an's institution, but also eases the bottleneck faced by the criminal justice system in executing justice for the aforementioned individuals.

If a man announced the action concerning rejection of paternity in his marriage bed, it is called rejection of paternity (Arabic: نفی الولد) in jurisprudential terminology, and the relationship of that child from the father is negated by performing religious and legal formalities. According to the ruling of Shāriʿ (the Legislator) and because of the relationship between the father and the child, the father is exempt in some rulings (aḥkām, Arabic: احکام, plural of ḥukm, حکم), such as the punishment of murder, i.e., the father is not killed by killing the child. Now, the issue of the present study is that according to the jurisprudence of Islamic denominations (fiqh ʿalá al-madhāhib al- al-Islāmīyyah) and Iranian law, if the father kills the child after denying him, he will be punished with retaliation in kind (Arabic: قصاص, romanized: Qiṣāṣ, lit. is accountability, following up after, pursuing or prosecuting). The jurists of different schools of thought disagree with each other about qiṣāṣ or non-qiṣāṣ of the father, and this is not mentioned in Iranian law. According to Jaʿfarī jurists, if the father does not deny the action concerning rejection of paternity, he will have qiṣāṣ. However, if he denies himself after the action concerning rejection of paternity and before killing the child, the well-known Jaʿfarī believes that the closest idea is that the father will be killed. The father is not killed at all from the perspective of Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Ḥanbalī, and Shāfiʿī jurists (Arabic: فقهاء, romanized: fuqahāʾ). This research, which is a descriptive-analytical method, shows that if the father does not deny himself after the action concerning rejection of paternity, he will be punished for his own confession, and if he denies himself, he will not be punished for the existence of shubha (Arabic: شبهه doubt, obscurity, or mis-grounded conceit), contrary to popular opinion.

In the course of history, geographical borders have always caused political conflict, aggression and harmful wars, and governments have continuously imposed strict regulations for border trespassers. It is considered the pillars of governance and a factor to ward off the conspiracy of foreigners. In line with the application of macro-legislative and governance policies, Iran's legislators have enacted proactive regulations and intellectual mujtahids based on dynamic governmental and political jurisprudence and based on jurisprudence and ijtihad evidence, issued jurisprudential fatwas, and at the same time, society members are required to comply with regulations and duties. They are Sharia.Therefore, the study of the validity of geographical borders in contemporary political jurisprudence is of double importance due to the formation of the Islamic government in the territorial area of ​​Iran. This research aims to obtain the scientific opinions of Islamic scientists regarding the validation or discrediting of the current geographical borders and to inform about the Shari'a ruling on the protection of borders and to emphasize the need to change the culture and attitude of the society regarding the limits and loopholes of the Islamic system in order to repel the rule of foreigners and prevent Disruption of order and realization of stable security at the national and international level and in order to imitate many Iranian citizens from the noble authorities, it will cause more and more protection of the borders. After checking the background of the research and not achieving a complete research on the topic in question; It was decided to conduct a comprehensive investigation in this regard.The type of research ahead is descriptive and its method is analytical, and to collect data, in addition to the verses and narrations, the systematic collection of ijtihad presented in the courses of Shia jurisprudence and the words of two precious leaders of the Islamic Revolution is used and to analyze the data. The proposed approaches have been used in some jurisprudence rules. The result of the research shows the validity of the current geographical boundaries due to the special conditions governing the world in the current era, despite

Currently, nail planting has become a large and popular industry among communities; but there are many uncertainties regarding its ruling, which requires a comprehensive study from different aspects. The effect of nail planting on the conditions of purity, especially in the field of creating an obstacle for water to penetrate into the members of ablution, is among the important issues investigated.So the question of this research is that considering the fact that nail planting is an obstacle for purity, what ruling has been established for this act? In other words, what is the ruling on voluntary disable for ablution? This article aims to answerthe above question. One of the disputed issues in the jurisprudence of different religions is to voluntary disable for ablution, which induction and evaluation of the pros and cons’ reasons can provide the basis for understanding the ruling on nails planting.

The present research, using a descriptive-analytical method of content analysis, tries to analyze the views of Islamic jurists regarding the permissibility or impermissibility of voluntary disable for ablution in order to clarify the ruling of nail planting in the light of it.

Ablution is considered as one of the conditions for prayer and people should not deliberately and voluntarily put themselves in a situation where they are unable to perform ablution. In this regard, artificial nails disturb the validity of ablution, because it creates an obstacle for water penetrate into the members of ablution and since ablution is prerequisite for prayer and there is a necessary connection between the prerequisite and the consequent, as a result, nail planting is absolutely forbidden (before or after entering the time of prayer).

From the perspective of Imami jurisprudence and Iranian law, a pregnant woman whose husband has died or divorced her cannot marry anyone other than her ex-husband during pregnancy and must wait until childbirth; However, it has been seen in some cases that a woman without a husband who got pregnant through illegitimate means was married to  an adulterer or none adulterer at the time of pregnancy; Even in some cases, the couple finds out after marriage that the woman is pregnant by someone else. The verdict of these examples is not very clear. The question of the verdict of marrying a pregnant woman from an illegitimate relationship from the point of view of jurisprudence and Iranian law is an issue that needs to be explored until reaching a suitable answer. There are three opinions about the marriage of a pregnant adulteress: famous jurists believe that it is permissible, some jurists believe that it is not permissible, and some others believe "Tafsil" that is differrentiating. In this way, marriage is considered permissible, but intercourse and cohabitation during pregnancy are not permissible.This research shows in a descriptive and analytical way that the famous evidence is incomplete and the "tafsil" view based on the principle of innocence is a problem, because despite the generality of the chapter, it does not come to the flow of the principle. As a result, according to the weakness of the evidence of the first and third views, using the generality of the evidences of the obligation of Idah( a period of   time that a woman cannot marry after divorce or her husband's  death) and in order to preserve "Miah" (sperms) and lineage from mixing, marriage during pregnancy is not permissible. From the medical point of view, there is also the possibility of a pregnant woman getting pregnant again during pregnancy, which is called double pregnancy.

It is not permissible for an unmarried pregnant woman to get married until she gives birth, unless he marries his ex-husband, and if the pregnant woman marries while knowing this deed as haram (forbidden), that man will be forbidden to her forever. However, at present, an unmarried pregnant woman who has been pregnant illegally marries an adulterer or non-adulterer during pregnancy, and sometimes the husband even finds out after the marriage that the woman is pregnant by someone else, and its ruling is not very clear. Therefore, the research question is that “From the point of view of jurisprudence of Islamic Denominations, what is the ruling on the marriage of an unmarried pregnant woman as the result of illegal relationship during pregnancy?” There are different viewpoints between denominations whether the marriage of a pregnant adulteress is permissible or not; According to the denominations of Maliki, Hanbali and Abadhi, and some Imami jurists, marrying the adulteress is not permissible and she must wait until she gives birth. According to the most of Imami and Shafi‘i jurists, getting married to an adulteress is permissible and intercourse with her is also permissible. However, according to the Hanafis and Zaydis, marriage to an adulteress is valid, but intercourse is not permissible, and one can have intercourse with her after giving birth. This descriptive-analytical study shows that jurists prefer not to permit that adulteress to marry during her pregnancy, since the main reason for those who believe in its permission, is the common texts, however, based on the combination of the evidences, the narratives that refer to adulteress marriage as impermissible are more reliable and the narratives referring to impressibility are specific narratives.

As a pioneer of the Salafi school, al-Albani's views deserve attention in various areas of the methodology of Salafi thought. al-Albani's aggressive and anti-Shia fatwas are perceptible in many of his jurisprudence books. Such fatwas arise from his view towards the sources of inference; however, the scope of the authority of sources from aL-Albani's point of view is not fairly clear due to the lack of an extensive and coherent research in this regard. al-Albani has a specific approach in using the four sources of inference i.e. Book, Sunna, consensus and intellect for his own jurisprudential ijtihad. The present paper has been written with the aim of identifying the extent of the authority of those sources from the view point of Nasir al-Din al-Albani. This research, using a descriptive-analytical method, shows that al-Albani considers Quran and Sunna to be of equal ranks in the process of ijtihad and believes in no priority in using these two sources and does not accept a preference between verses and hadiths. In addition, he believes that a hadith narrated by one person has authority with regard to precepts and beliefs. al-Albani defends hadith in a way that, in his opinion, hadith has authority even in case it contradicts Quran. Moreover, he weakens the category of hadiths according to which, all hadiths should be compared to Quran, since he considers their content to be against Quran. Intellect has no proper place in al-Albani’s system of jurisprudence and ijtihad and he generally advocates narration and is anti-intellectualist. In addition, al-Albani considers the consensus which is accepted among Usulis as controversial.

Istibra' means the innocence of the womb and its purity. In Islam, istabra' has been legislated for the purity of the womb from pregnancy, which is a non-pregnant istabra' by seeing menstruation. Since adultery is one of the issues that has always been common, especially in today's societies, it is necessary to discuss the Istibra' of the adulteress. Now, the question arises as to whether an unmarried and non-pregnant adulteress needs to be innocence if she intends to marry. The purpose of this study is to criticize and analyze the view of most jurists about the ruling of Istibra' for an unmarried and non-pregnant adulteress. Our main question is how to criticize and examine the view of most jurists for non-obligation of istibra' of the adulteress? Imamiyah jurists differ on the obligation or non-obligation of istibra' of non-pregnant adulteress. Most jurists agree on the non-obligation of istibra'. Of course, some jurists have agreed on istibra' as being Mustahab and others have been cautious in this matter. This descriptive-analytical study shows that the most jurists' arguments are incomplete; because the jurists refer to the general and absolute arguments that imply the obligation of istibra' and most of jurists' disagreement on this issue do not weaken the narrations and the obligation of istibra'. Because, firstly, the jurists' opposing arguments are not very clear from the past, and secondly, these arguments are not because they had a reason that has not handed down to us, but their opposing arguments are based on ijtihad. The findings suggest that in spite of the narrations of the obligation of istibra', the rule of "la Yajouz Ijtima' al-Ma'ayn fi Rahem Wahid (putting two persons' semen in one womb is not permissible)" and the keeping the semen and generations pure from mixing is preferable to the view of the obligation of istibra'.

"Narrative reputation" is one of the topics in the science of the principles of jurisprudence. Scholars in this field have sometimes defined "narrative reputation" as the multiplicity of narrators, and sometimes as the multiplicity of narrations. According to one definition, "narrative reputation" is a hadith that is narrated by many narrators, of course, in such a way that their number does not reach tawator (mass transmission), and thus it causes the reputation of the narration. The title "narrative reputation" was not found in Sunni sources, but the term "famous narration" is used instead, which has the same meaning as "narrative reputation". In order to know the status of "narrative reputation" and its application among Islamic denominations, we conducted a descriptive-analytical research using library sources, which reached the conclusion that according to the consensus of the jurists of different denominations, "narrative reputation" is one of the preferences in accounts conflict. From the point of view of most Sunni jurists, famous narrations provide reassurance and their applications in the preference between conflicting accounts, in the conflict between accounts and deductive analogy, as well as in abrogation and specification are mentioned with differences.

The ruling on marriage to an adulterous woman (zāniya) is considered as one of the most controversial and challenging jurisprudential issues. The research question is what is the ruling on marrying an adulteress from the perspective of Imamiyah jurists? Imamiyah jurists have different viewpoints on its legitimacy or illegitimacy. Most jurists consider it permissible to marry an adulteress, and on the contrary, this is ḥarām (forbidden) from the point of view of other jurists. However, those who hold the latter view have different perspectives on whether ḥurmat (being ḥarām) includes only the adulteress, or the known and public adulteress (an adulteress who is known by everyone or commits adultery in public). The present study, which is based on a descriptive-analytical method, indicates that most of views of the jurists who consider marriage to an adulteress to be makrūh (detestable) by combining arguments do not agree with the rules of conflict. The conclusion is that perhaps from the appearance of some narrations, only marrying a famous adulteress can be considered as ḥarām but according to Shahid Sadr's Fiqh al-Naẓariyah and Fiqh al-Niẓām, permanent marriage to an adulteress is ḥarām. Because marriage to an adulteress does not fulfill any of the goals set for marriage and family formation, and in this case, a healthy and righteous family is not formed and corruption is institutionalized in this family.

The phenomenon of human genetic biotechnolo gy, which is done with the aim of repelling human evil, building a desirable society, and achieving important advances in human knowledge, is not prohibited in the basic jurisprudential propositions. But due to the tension of this human knowledge with huma n ethics and manners, its scope is not very clear and no integrated research has been conducted. Therefore, the question of the scope of the license to use this human knowledge needs to be explored until obtaining a proper answer. The present study aims to identify and study the permissible scope of human genome engineering.

The present article has been written in a descriptive - analytical method using library data, both real and virtual. In this way, first the views on the acceptance and non - acceptance of genetic engineering, as one of the emerging issues and secondary topics of dynamic Islamic jurisprudence are Planned and then analytically the possibility of accepting the view of doing it in the light of jurisprudential and rational arguments is reviewed and the scope of acceptance’s license of this knowledge is assessed based on the mentioned arguments.

Jurists and religious thinkers do not have the same approach to the phenomenon of human genetic biotechnology. But from the analysis of their documents in the framework of jurisprudential and rational arguments, it seems that the reasons for the followers of this human knowledge are more solid. Provided that in addition to not approaching the jurisprudential and rational bo undaries of loss, damage, reduction, etc., it occurs only in the sphere of productivity and conquest of the phenomena of existence and it is a role - playing tool for the creation to create the social welfare and comfort of human life and the liberation of d ivine creatures from the bottlenecks in the evolutionary path.

Kissing someone's hand and its ruling is one of the issues that has always been discussed and debated among the followers of religions, especially in the present age and with the expansion of the media, it has become more serious. Since there is no extensive and integrated research conducted on this issue, the question about the ruling of hand kissing is an issue that will need to be explored in order to reach the stage that a good answer is found. From the Imamiyah's point of view, hand kissing is makrooh, except for the honor of a scholar, master, father etc. There are two viewpoints among the Sunnis: According to the first viewpoint, hand kissing is absolutely makrooh, and the owner (of the religion) and many of his follower have taken this view. According to the second viewpoint, all of the Sunni sects (Hanafi, Shafe'ei, Hanbali, and a group of Malekiyah) have elaborated this issue and, in their views, hand kissing for religious purposes (such as knowledge, asceticism, justice, honor, merit, adultness) is permissible or it is mustahab, and therefore it is permissible to kiss the hand of the scholar, the righteous man, the just ruler, and so on. Shafe'ei jurists also state that it is mustahab to kiss the hand of Sadats who are the children of Hazrat Fatima (s) - because of the honor of the family- but it is makrooh to kiss the hand because of worldly issues (such as wealth, status, etc.). Narratives have always been the main reason for those who believe in the permissibility or non- permissibility of hand kissing which of course, based on some of the arguments, the narratives that indicate the permissibility of the hand kissing - in terms of quantity, quality, and implication - are preferable to the narratives that indicate the sanctity of the hand kissing. In addition to hand kissing, kissing on the cheeks, forehead, eyes, glabella, face, head, etc., is also permissible. This study has been carried out with the aim of recognizing the arguments and explaining the ruling of hand kissing, which based on most of Imamiyah jurists, including Hanafiyah, Shafe'ei, Hanbaliyah and a group of Malekiyah, is considered permissible for religious purposes.

In order to expand the limited space of the place of running, some floors have been built under and above the original site. This act has brought about a question on the legitimacy of conducting the ritual running in the expanded parts. This question will be answered in the present article through a descriptive-analytical method. The upper floors are in two modes: in some places, these floors are lower than the two mountains of Safa and Marwah, and in some other places they are higher than these mountains. Most of the Muslim jurists decree that doing the ritual running is permissible if the floors are lower than the two mountains of Safa and Marwah. However, if the floors are higher than Safa and Marwah, there appears a disagreement among the jurists. Five stances have been narrated from Shia and Sunni jurisprudents. First, doing the ritual running on these floors is permissible. Second, performing the ritual running on these floors is not permissible. Third, performing the ritual running on these floors is permissible if there is crowdedness. Fourth, there is a caution. That is to say, if one does the ritual running on these floors, he/she should adopt a representative to do the ritual running on the ground floor. Fifth, abeyance is needed on the decree for this problem. From among these stances, the third one seems to be true. As the underground floor is between the two mountains of Safa and Marwah, most of the Muslim jurists, believe that ritual running is permissible. The present article, by examining the different schools, examines their diverse opinions and reasons.

Sai (the Ritual running) in the expanded area of the Place of running and its ruling is a new question for the Islamic jurisprudence. With regard to the crosswise doubling of the Running place near the Sacred Mosque in recent years, the jurisprudential ruling of the Ritual running – as one of the pillars of the greater and lesser Pilgrimages – is unclear from the viewpoint of the Islamic denominations. This due to the fact that there hasn’t been any comprehensive and solid study in this regard yet! Consequently, permissibility of the Ritual running in the crosswise expanded area is a topic that is in need of exploration and should be responded with a suitable answer. After a thorough scrutiny of the jurisprudential sources of the Islamic denominations, it was found out that a few thinkers of the jurisprudence domain do not allow for the Ritual running in some newly expanded areas of the Running place and believe that those areas are out of the space between Safa and Marwah hills. However, based on the attestation of the witnesses as well as the historical, geographical, and geological examinations of the committee supervising the Running place expansion project, it is possible to consider the expanded area as a part of the space between Safa and Marwa hills, and therefore, rule for the permissibility of conducting the Ritual running in it. The study at hand set out to disclose the limits and gaps of the already present arguments and to jurisprudentially specify the ruling on permissibility of conducting the Ritual running in the crosswise expanded area of the Running place. To this end, the author used library research as well as fieldwork methods to collect data. The obtained data was then analyzed to extract the jurisprudential stances of the Islamic denominations in this regard. At the end, the conclusion was made that conducting the Ritual running in the expanded area of the Running place is permissible.

The rule of "permission of committing a corrupt action in avoidance of a corrupter one" is among the mostly utilized ones in all fields of Islamic jurisprudence. Although the rule is considered legal by the "Quadruple Reasons" but there has not yet been enough study on it except some sporadic and scant hints throughout Islamic Jurisprudential literature. The rule considers it legal to commit a corrupt action in order to avoid a corrupter one, as an instance of the rule of "Important and the More Important". In this paper, the content, supporting reasons, exceptions and adaptations of the rule are discussed according to the Sunni and Shia valid sources.