فهرست مطالب محسن دنیوی

Moritz Schlick divides our knowledge of reality and independent external world into two domains of conventional knowledge needed in everyday life, and scientific knowledge. Relying on this division, he shows how logical positivism is not in need of metaphysical confrontation with reality and external world in either of these realms.
The present article studies Moritz Schlick’s academic trend and the turning points of his scientific life, from the tradition of philosophical physicists to succession of Ernst Mach, and to his association with Vienna Cycle; and meanwhile attempts to answer the question of what has been his image of reality and independent world as ontological issues? What always has been taken into consideration about logical positivists is limited to their epistemological and methodological aspects. Here we intent to reproduce the ontological aspect of Schlick’s thoughts, taking into account the challenge that he and the Vienna cycle pose to metaphysics

Analyzing any concept in Wittgenstein's thoughts has a strong relationship with his contemplation on "language". And analyzing the concept of reality is not an exception; especially because the reality is the closest concept to the language as a key element in Wittgenstein's thought. And perhaps it may be possible to pose the main question of his two periods of contemplation in this way: "how does language reflect the reality to us"?
In this paper I have tried to, by referring to Wittgenstein's intellectual framework, analyze the relativity of language, mentality (thought) and reality. And I would like to, by comparing the Wittgenstein who is seen in the Logical-Philosophical treatise with the second Wittgenstein who is divulged in the philosophical studies, to reconstruct the traversed route in the treatise and analyze the reality in a hypothesis and finally pose this question that "is it possible to achieve an illustration of reality in the latter Wittgenstein's thought from the functional hypothesis of meaning or language in the guise of function?"
This route ends in two different schools: realism and anti-realism. It seems that both attitudes are not adaptable about Wittgenstein and a kind of relativism in confronting with reality can be observed in Wittgenstein's thought which is largely semantic and in some layers it is also ontological but it never ends in extreme realism.

Since the publication of Scientific Image¡ van Fraassen has criticized scientific realism and¡ instead¡ introduced constructive empiricism as an appropriate alternative. Adhering to the tenet of empiricism that ‘experience is our only source of information about the world’¡ he considered acquiring any knowledge of the unobservable level of the world as impossible. According to van Fraassen¡ the realistic belief in the (approximate) truth of scientific theories has no epistemic basis; and¡ in this case¡ he only allowed belief in the empirical adequacy of these theories. The present assay explains and examines the key elements of constructive empiricism and contrasts it with scientific realism. We will indicate that van Fraassen’s argumentation in rejecting realism and defending his position is not able to provide the necessary and sufficient justifications for the replacement of scientific realism with constructive empiricism

Mirbagheri and Paya have the same viewpoints about meaning of technology and the possibility of technology and culture coordination, although, they have different ideas about how we must encounter with the Western technology. At first, we express the similarities in their points of view. Then, we attempt to answer this question: "Why do the same foundations conclude different results in the viewpoints of Paya and Mirbaghri?" At the end, it is depicted that the different understandings of the same apparently obvious antecedents cause the variation of consequences