محمد توپچی

The issues of Avicenna's philosophy begin with the topicality of being qua being; in the works of Avicenna, the human mind can draw the actualized external existence away into two distinct concepts of existence and whatness. Later this basic question was raised: Which one of the two concepts mentioned in the work of Sheikh is objective and which one is ideational. The following analytical-critical research, while explaining the conceptual principles, is looking for an answer to the question; is the distinction between the existence and the quiddity (whatness) an ontological question or is it merely an epistemological argument? Thus, by analyzing and critiquing recent articles on the field of Avicenna's belief about the question that what is the reality: the primacy of existence or primacy of quiddity is concluded that this argument -the question of the primacy of existence or quiddity- has no place here; Because these two have an identity with each other in the objective world; So with no external changes, talking about the fundamentality of existence and ontological fundamentality of quiddity is merely an epistemological problem. So in Avicenna's work, actualized external existent is a reality and in that sense it is authentic; so, it is separated into existence and quiddity in the mind of the perceiver.