محمد مشکات

The concept of the thing in itself in Kant's philosophy is the element which deprives us of knowing the thing as it is in itself. Hegel, who believed that knowledge is limited by nothing but itself, had to eliminate the thing in itself in his Absolute Idealism and in this way make his concept of Knowledge absolute. Many scholars believe that he did so in the first part of his Phenomenology of Spirit, titled 'Consciousness'. In this paper, in contrast to other studies which are concerned with Hegel's external critique of this concept and what he has said about it here or there in his System of philosophy, we'll examine his internal encounter with the Thing in Itself as it is occurred in the first chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. In doing so, we will try to show why he believed that, if we pursue the process of sublating the shapes of consciousness into one another, there won't be anything like the Thing in Itself.  Then We will attempt to explain why his efforts are futile and why, even in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the thing in itself exists exactly in the sense that Kant meant by the term.

In his Phenomenology of the Spirit, Hegel tries to explicate his claim that what he calls the System of Science should be organized merely through the "Life of Concept". In this paper, first, we will try to survey the role(s) Hegel assigns to the Concept in Phenomenology of Spirit. Then, we will examine his use of this term in Phenomenology of the Spirit and we will discuss the meanings of this term in that book. Thereafter We will discuss whether in Phenomenology of the Spirit, Concept is finite (as we have seen in Kant's philosophy) and whether it is limited to an external limit or not, and eventually we will try to show that in Phenomenology of Spirit, the absolute knowledge should be understood not as attaining a pure and simple static truth, but it must be understood as infinite unity of Concept and in fact as infinite movement of it. In fact, drawing on the interpretations of Pippin, Houlgate, and Stern, we argue that in contrast to the prevailing interpretations in contemporary Hegel studies, at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit, it is the concept that becomes absolute, not consciousness.

Schilling's treatise on The Philosophical Studies of the Essence of Human freedom (1809) is an attempt to establish a system of freedom. The most central concept in Schelling's system is the concept of "identity", which, with its correct interpretation and finding unity between the opposing concepts of freedom and necessity, justifies his main concern in the theory of absolute idealism. The principle that is pursued in the fundamental search for the formation of the system and the solution for the compatibility of the system and freedom is identity in the true sense that in pantheism as the only possible system of reason is possible. Heidegger's focus on Schelling's thought Revealed the importance of Schelling in the history of Western thought by writing Schelling's Treaties on the Essence of Human Freedom and his multiple interpretations in 1936 and 1941. This study shows how, according to Schelling, a misinterpretation of this principle allows the incompatibility of system and freedom in different interpretations of pantheism, and how Heidegger's interpretation of this principle leads to the question of what is the single and fundamental principle of beings.

The issue of necessity is one of the most important aspects of Hegel's philosophy. The meaning of necessity per se or necessity alone is not discussed here, but here we consider only the two constraints used in Hegel's expressions for necessity. The subject of discussion, accordingly, is the two words used in Hegel's statements, namely external and internal necessity. In the first stage, this article deals with the external and internal necessity. In the second stage, it explains the relationship between the two. Then in the third stage we discuss the relationship between these two types of necessity and Hegel's science or philosophical system, and finally in the fourth step, an attempt is made to critique and evaluate this relationship.‏

The Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809) is the most coherent form of Schelling’s attempt to describe the absolute system or the system of freedom. For the first time in the twentieth century, with Heidegger's careful reference to his treatise on freedom and his repeated commentary in 1936 and 1941, the importance of this treatise in the history of Western thought became apparent. Heidegger focuses on Schilling’s thinking, especially with Schilling’s treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, research into the formation of the system, and the question of the possibility of a system of freedom as a question of the essence of being. Schilling bases his research on the system of freedom on a correct ontological basis in order to transcend formal freedom as an independent determinant of mechanical causation and to achieve the true definition of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. And after proposing the inadequacy of formal freedom in the idealist systems before it, it introduces the real and living concept of freedom as the ability to do good and evil. Heidegger demonstrates the independence of the Schelling system in comparison with the Fichte and Hegel systems, and his innovations in response to issues such as evil, freedom, identity, and the relation of being and “is” are most evident in the metaphysical realm of the will; however, remaining within the metaphorical framework also prevents Schilling from approaching the question of the truth of existence. Schilling’s important issue is the elimination of the opposition between freedom and necessity, which, in his view, is the focus of philosophy. For this reason, the discussion of freedom is at the heart of the system in its true sense, and in his opinion, his dissertation is for the first time the design of a system based on the idea of human freedom. The possibility of a system of freedom must be created in accordance with the principle of identity, which does not ignore the meaning of the relation of theology. In Schelling’s Heideggerian interpretation of the principle of identity, the priority of ontological issues in matters of theological nature such as all theism is given more importance and the question of all theism as a question of the system to the question of “is” and how to connect the structure of beings as a whole. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Heidegger’s interpretation of the concept of the system of freedom according to Schelling with emphasis on the ontological distinction between ground and existence. This study seeks to answer these two questions: how does the design of the real concept of freedom open the way to explain the ontological foundation of the possibility of evil and the possibility of freedom in the system? Also, how does the distinction between ground and existence lead to Schelling's main goal in resolving the conflict between system and freedom? Moreover, according to Heidegger, to what extent does this distinction arise from Schilling’s metaphysical and subject-centered thinking?

 The existential argument in contemporary Islamic philosophy has been criticized on the basis of one of the initiatives and innovations in this philosophy. This innovation is about discussing propositions and their division and the condition of contradiction. This critique is more concerned with Anselm's argument. But it also includes other narratives of the existential argument, especially Descartes. Javadi Amoli, one of the commentators and followers of Sadr al-Muta'allehin of Shiraz, made a relevant criticism. The main aim of the present study is to analyze Javadi Amoli's critique of the existential argument, in addition to the author's critique and evaluation. One of the authors' critiques and evaluations has also been proposed and criticized by the author of this study. Although the aim of this study apparently has two components: the author's evaluation from Javadi Amoli's point of view and the author's evaluation of one of the author's critique of Javadi Amoli, this duality is purely apparent and the research problem is the same. The study confirms Javadi Amoli's critique of the existential argument based on the difference between the two predictions. As a result of this evaluation, the extent to which this critique needs to be reviewed and, at the same time, its resilience to criticism is explained.

This paper in the first in short look into form of  Stern's bookand then it criticizes the content of this book,especially threeimportant parts of it, which are the most difficult and at the same time The most important its parts, compared with Hegel's phenomenology but All his system. These are preface, introduction and the final chapter.We want to know how much Stern has been successful In consideration of the content of these three sections. Also does the seventh chapter of his book have internal coordination with content of them?

The purpose of this research is to formulate a preventive model of the utilitarian moral education with emphasis on undesirable conducts in Mill’s viewpoint. The method used is the “descriptive-analytical” method. Undesirable conducts include wrong conducts (violating rights and comfort of others), and unpleasant conducts, the existence of which can be explained with fails in duties. The goal of moral education is happiness, and moral education includes dimensions of prevention and punishment. Punishments appear in the following forms: reprobation for violating the rights and disturbing the comfort, and losing the positive attention of others because of the behaviors lacking personal dignity. By prevention, we mean primary prevention that is governed by the principles of justice and contemplation. The governance of justice is related to the conducts violating the rights, but governance of the principle of contemplation is in preventing wrong conducts, and in meanings of “care of soul” and care of reasons. In unpleasant conducts, the ruling principle is the contemplation with aforementioned meanings. These findings support Mill’s belief that "the main foundations of moral life in the new age are justice and contemplation." Prevention strategies referring to the two types of undesirable conducts are strengthening conscience and giving insights. The linkage of strategies to principles is presented in the preventive model. According to the findings on prevention, considering reasonable punishment for wrong conducts and paying attention to justice and contemplation in explaining undesirable conducts is a positive aspect of Mill's perspectiv. However, his views on unpleasant conducts have been criticized, because interventions and punishments considered for these conducts lack the necessary performance for guaranteeing the prevention of self-harm and reforming the holders of unpleasant conducts. Also his opinion about people's owing to one another lacks the strong executive support for action in relation to the holders of these conducts. Removing these weaknesses requires a revision of Mill's harm principle and correcting and reconsructing some of his beliefs.

Can Herder's philosophy of culture be a model for what is now called intercultural philosophy? Following the list of the components of intercultural philosophy from the standpoint of Ram and the Wimer in one case, Herder's thoughts about the plurality of cultures and critique of the Enlightenment 's Eurocentrism read out, with respect to those components, to answer this question,. By this to read out, Herder's hidden ideas in this contemporary issue, or in other words, a model for it, appears. While in the Enlightenment, the rest of the cultures were immature and humiliated, for more than two centuries, Herder, with the idea of cultural diversity, provided the basis for intercultural thought in his philosophy of culture. And with critique of Enlightenment's Eurocentrism, he resolved the biggest obstacle for it. Herder's precise boundary is between Rejection of radical relativism and skepticism, and promising cultural pluralism. The ultimate causes of history or affairs, in his own words, are good and perpetual, such as humanity, Happiness, Development and providence are his facilities against radical relativism. As a result of these matters as well as on the effect of cultural openings over each other, and other common issues, Herder provided important areas and mediums for polylog and coexistence of civilizations and cultures.