میلاد همایونی زاده

Venture capitalists have a role to play in providing their startups with more than just funding and creating value for their start-ups. The present research, using the case study method, investigates the cooperation pattern of venture capitalists and startups companies through the analysis of 6 risky investments made in the period (1393-1400) through 23 semi-structured interviews with venture capitalists and start-ups, examines the mechanisms of non-financial value creation using qualitative interview content analysis and centralized coding.The results of this study show that the creation of non-financial values of venture capitalists has two general external and internal orientations. The results also indicate that not all venture capitalists are necessarily able to create non-financial value in all areas, and it is necessary for such investors to consider the simultaneous and balanced development of non-financial value-creating capabilities in their long-term approaches and select start-ups.Start-up companies should also pay attention to the selection of venture capitalists and determine their expectations from this investment to prevent possible conflicts in interaction with this type of investors.

In their interaction with startup companies, venture capitalists play a role beyond providing financial resources for these companies and create value for them. The present research, using a case study method, investigated six venture investments made in the period (1393-1400) through 23 semi-structured interviews with people active in venture capital and startup companies, and the mechanisms of creating non-financial values and control and governance methods. It has been analyzed using qualitative content analysis of interviews and axial coding. The results of this research show that the creation of non-financial values of venture capitalists is generally done through six mechanisms with general external and internal approach. There are two general approaches in the control and governance of venture capitalists. In a venture investor approach, through its representative on the board of directors of the statrup company, it follows its goals and expectations and leaves the company with complete independence and authority in executive matters and how to achieve the goals. In another way of control and governance, the venture capitalist operates somewhat similar to holding companies, through active participation in the company's planning process and control and monitoring of the company's performance through regular monthly meetings. It minimizes management conflicts.

In interacting with Start-ups, venture capitalists play a role beyond providing financial resources for these companies and create value for them. The present research, using the case study method, investigates the factors affecting the cooperation pattern of venture capitalists and innovative companies, focusing on the mechanisms of creating non-financial values, through 23 semi-structured interviews with the deputies and consultants of two domestic venture capitalists and 6 start-ups affiliated with them in the time period (1393 to 1400) has been covered. In this research, the effective factors on the non-financial value creation mechanisms of two selected venture capitalists have been investigated using qualitative content analysis of interviews and axial coding. The results of this research show that in both venture capitalists, the five factors of clear expression of expectations, trust and respect, timely fulfillment of obligations, high flexibility and non-interference in executive affairs by venture capitalists have played an effective role in the value creation of these investors for start-ups and laid the groundwork. The success and effective interaction between these two collections has been in the period of cooperation. On the other hand, there is a fundamental difference between these two venture capitalists in the two factors of the effective presence of the board of directors representative and the culture of planning and control, which is due to the difference in their control and governance approaches in interacting with start-ups.