مقالات رزومه حجت الاسلام حسین احمدی

Following the famous thinkers, Ayatollah Misbah considers the ethics to include moral education, but in his moral philosophy, he distinguishes between moral education and ethics. In his philosophy of ethics, he considers faith in God and belief in the resurrection to be the moral criterion, while he holds that the generosity of non-Muslims such as Hātam al-Ṭāʾī is valuable and will lead to a reduction in punishment. Considering that moral standard refers to the conditions necessary to reach the ultimate goal of morality, the generosity of Hātam al-Ṭāʾī as a non-believer should not have moral qualification and value; so what is the reason for reducing his punishment and what value can be considered for his generosity? With a new interpretation of Ayatollah Misbah's point of view in answering these questions, this research uses the distinction between ethics and moral education that are different at least in their aim, method, nature and criterion. Based on this distinction, the actions of infidels fails to qualify moral standards and lack moral value, while some of their actions may satisfy the standards and enjoy values of moral education. Ayatollah Misbah's view on moral education needs to be completed, and this article considers the criterion and standard of moral education as being the means for attaining nearness to God, and explains the goal of moral education in a way that the generosity of those like Hātam al-Ṭāʾī can enjoy the standard and value of moral education due to the goodness of the action.

Legal positivism has a particular view on moral and legal requirements and their relationship which has attracted the attention of many researchers over the past two centuries; Separating the semantic, ontological, epistemological dimensions, logical issues of moral and legal requirements and their relationship from the view of legal positivism, helps the audience to evaluate this view more accurately; This article, with the mentioned separation, examines the views of legal positivists in detail. Among legal positivists, some with a hard approach, under the title of rejective positivists, believe in the impossibility of committing to the moralization of legal requirements; others just believe in non-obligation to moralization of law. It seems that Legal positivists by rejecting the objective reality of moral and legal necessity in ontology and the belief in relativity in epistemology, have denied the logical relationship between "is" and "ought" problem and believed in separation of moral and legal requirements. According to the goal of closeness to absolute perfection, which is considered as targets of creation in Islam and is able to be clarified rationally, the view of legal positivism is not acceptable.

The most important discussion of the philosophy of ethics is the ontology of ethics, and the most important discussion of the ontology of ethics is moral realism and anti-realism. The title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any imperative, recommendation, feeling, taste, agreement, or bases those concepts and propositions on an external reality; however, anti-realism does not consider any reality for the morality other than an imperative, recommendation, feeling, taste or agreement. This research has analyzed Sheikh Ishraq's writings on ethics in a rational way. Validity of existence in his view has become an illusion of his non-realism in moral philosophy, but in addition to the rejection of the reason he provides for validating philosophical concepts, it is possible to present an interpretation of his view that considers moral concepts to be real; In this case, his point of view is included in the category of moral realism, stating that the meaning of moral concepts are concepts of the Sankh Noor that are considered real. This research has explained the realistic approach of Sheikh Eshraq through the realistic concepts of ethics, aesthetics, and eschatology, introducing the way of knowing and explaining how to create moral virtues.

In this article, moral and legal requirements in terms of semantics, ontology, epistemology, logical issues, and the relationship between them from the perspective of the late Haeri are examined. Many scholars have examined Haeri's view of the moral must, but his views on the legal must and the relationship must be moral and legal have not been examined. From a semantic point of view, he considers morality requirements as a means of non-essential necessity, and he considers a legal requirement as a means of credit necessity; From an ontological point of view, he considers morality requirements as the real relation between doer of moral action and action, but he considers law requirements as a credit derived from the construction of reason to achieve social order and justice. Epistemologically, he considers moral and legal statements to be predictive, but the preceptor for conformity with reality is considered to be the moral requirements of human wisdom and the legal requirements of common sense, which are formed on the basis of collective will in order to achieve social order and justice. In logical discussions, by delivering sentences that contain moral requirements and legal requirements to predicative sentences, he transforms the subject of should and existence into a relationship of existence and existence and considers this relationship in argumentative ethics. It seems that the lack of separation of semantic issues from ontology in the late Haeri's point of view has caused a mistake in the semantics of requirements, and the lack of a complete way of explaining ontology requirements and the way of revelation recognizing in the epistemology of law requirements is deficiencies of his point of view, Paying attention to them will be useful for the relative impact of ethics on rights.

Moral cognitivism is one of the topics of moral philosophy and epistemology of ethics and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is among the moral cognitivists because: first, he refers to various ways for knowing the reality such as reason, fame, experience, revelation and intuition; second, he deals with the middle term as a criterion for knowledge; third, he accepts the demonstrability of the rational moral statements; and fourth, he adheres to moral absolutist. Since he is a moral cognitivist and given that all moral cognitivists are considered moral monists, Ṭūsī is also considered a moral monist; it seems, however, that Ṭūsī, in explaining the demonstrability of moral statements, has not proved the real relationship between the granting of divine blessings and the necessity of gratitude, and has come to the conclusion by claiming that this relationship can be considered the result of a causal relationship between moral act and its result; that is, every moral act, such as thanksgiving, causes happiness and perfection of human beings, and the obligation of thanking God shows the causal relationship between gratitude and the resulting happiness for the grateful person. Therefore, if it is asked why thanksgiving is obligatory, the answer is that this thanksgiving is obligatory because it can lead to happiness and perfection.

Moral semantics is one of the topics of moral philosophy that studies the definition of moral concepts, explains the truth, and determines the range of these concepts. Based on an analytical approach and an intellectual explanation, this study addresses the questions of the significance of moral virtues and vices and how we should understand them from the viewpoint of Allameh Tabatabai. Because of its unrealistic and relativistic nature, which leads to chaos, Allameh rejects the sociological approach to the semantics of moral virtues and vices. Instead, he explains the virtue-based and after-life-based approaches through perfection. In his view, the virtue-based and after-life approaches aim to attain worldly and after-life perfection. In moral semantics, however, the monotheistic approach emphasizes divine love as a means of approaching God. According to Allameh, virtues and vices are determined through comparison; therefore, they are philosophical concepts. Hence, the same method applied to philosophical concepts should be used here. In this respect, Allameh abstracts the meaning of these concepts by comparing voluntary behavior with the aim of the Islamic specific morality that is commensurate with human nature. It seems that Allameh has not specified the role of custom and intuition in the semantics of virtues and vices.

Moral semantics is one of the subjects of moral philosophy which discusses the semantic analysis of moral conceptions and propositions. Moral semantics has a close relationship with the ontology of ethical terms. The major issues in moral semantics are the study of the concepts of subject, predicate, and concepts in morality. The present study aims to investigate Mohaghegh Tusi's innovations by reviewing ethical concepts in his thought. Mohaghegh Tusi has studied the basic virtues in examining the concepts that are used in the subject and classifies the four famous virtues with the two criteria of quantity and quality. Like the famous thinkers of ancient Greece, he considered the basic virtues to be justice, wisdom, courage, and chastity. He has sometimes categorized these virtues by quantitative criteria. That is, justice is the degree of attainment of perfection of the other three virtues, namely wisdom, courage, and chastity, and each of these three virtues includes many other virtues. Justice includes all other virtues, has more territory, and wisdom in its sub-category and is higher than wisdom because, in addition to pure wisdom, it also has other virtues. In the qualitative classification, Mohaghegh Tusi considers wisdom to have a higher degree. In the qualitative division of virtues, he first divides virtues into two categories: virtues related to the soul, and virtues related to the body. Wisdom is a carnal virtue related to thought, and other basic virtues are related to the action and behavior. The manifestation of wisdom is the rational soul. In the importance of theoretical virtue, it is enough that theoretical virtue is more stable, but other virtues are not. In an innovative division, Mohaghegh al-Tusi divides the power of the human soul into two basic categories: the power of perception by essence, and the power of voluntary stimulation. Each of the two types has a secondary category. The power of perception by essence creates wisdom on the basis of the evidence of theoretical reason while on the other hand brings about justice on the basis of the evidence of practical reason. The power of voluntary stimulation is also divided into lust and anger resulting in moderation, chastity, and courage. In defining justice as a widely used concept in the subject of moral sentences, Mohaghegh Tusi believes that justice means equality, but equality means equality based on proportion in objects. Wisdom, as another widely used concept in the subject of moral sentences, according to Mohaghegh Tusi, refers to knowing things as they are and knowing voluntary actions as they should be, so that man can achieve happiness through those actions. Thus, wisdom is divided into two types: practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom. Theoretical wisdom means the result of knowledge of beings and facts, which includes metaphysics, mathematics, and physics while practical wisdom is the perception of man's voluntary actions. In another division, practical wisdom is divided into two types: individual actions that have nothing to do with the society, and social actions that take place with social participation. Individual actions are called personal ethics, and social ethics is divided into house and civil politics. Mohaghegh Tusi considers the meaning of moral good and evil as the real relationship between "happiness and cruelty of the behavior" and "praiseworthy and reprehensible". Explaining the concept of perfection, which is a widely used concept in ethics, he believes that every creature has a property due to its nature. That is, a property in which no other being participates with this being, and this is his perfection. Mohaghegh Tusi paid close attention to the semantics of virtues and vices and introduced innovations in the theory of mediocrity so that by considering the quality in mediocrity, he has more accurately expressed the realms of basic virtues and vices. However, he does not seem to have paid enough attention to the good and bad moral semantics that have accepted the separation of the three meanings from Fakhr-e Razi, because it is possible to combine these meanings in one category. It seems that he has not proved the true relationship between the granting of divine blessings and the necessity of worship in explaining the ontology of morality. In any case, Mohaghegh Tusi is considered as realistic, absolutist, and morally monist

Ethics studies the principles of conceptualization and assent of the science of morality that includes the four following subjects: moral semantics, moral epistemology, moral ontology and the logical subjects of ethics. Moral semantics provides the study and semantic analysis of the concepts and moral propositions. Considering that the meaning of the sentence relates to the concepts of the sentence components meaning its subject matter (Arabic: موضوع mawdū‘) and predicate (Arabic: محمول mahmul), the major subjects that are stated in the moral semantics are to study concepts of the subject matter and predicate of the moral sentences. This paper aims to survey the semantics of the mentioned concepts with the analytic method through intellect from the viewpoint of Sheikh Eshraq. He has created the conceptual definition method in the moral semantics and has argued some ethical concepts but he has not mentioned how to get the meaning which constitutes the compound concepts and has not presented a solution for the semantics of the simple moral concepts for those who are not able the witnessing perception of the simple concepts. The solution alternative to this opinion is to notice the attributes of the philosophical concepts that the moral concepts are of these concepts. The most important attribute of the philosophical concepts is comparative and they are achieved by the mental attempt. It is important for the semantics of the moral concepts to compare between the act or the optional feature with the moral goal that the meaning of the mentioned concepts is obtained from this comparison.

One of the main issues of moral philosophy is ethical ontology, and the main theme of ethical ontology is Moral Realism and moral anti-realism. The title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any order, recommendation, feeling, taste, agreement, or bases those concepts and propositions on an external reality; however, anti-realism does not consider any reality for the morality other than an order, recommendation, feeling, taste or agreement.The influence of Farabi on the creation the Islamic civilization is obvious to the thinkers; he made an extensive attempt during his life to Islamize the sciences. Important works have been written about Farabi's moral views, But Unfortunately, none of these works has addressed the topics of Moral Ontology that is considered the main topic in Moral Philosophy.Farabi has stated at least four arguments to prove realism. Sometimes Farabi gains help from the aesthetics, and he also proves reality sometimes through the semantics of moral concepts and felicity, through achievement of ultimate perfection on occasion, and also at times through determining the recognition path. The present research attempts to present the ontological subjects of Farabi's ethics in a new form so as to familiarize the researchers with the helpful method employed by Farabi in Moral Philosophy in order to prepare a ground to make a greater use of the method and content potential of Farabi's discussions of Moral Philosophy by Farabi. It seems Farabi does not address a number of ethical issues that need to be addressed to them because of the power of reasoning for realism, such as the rational explanation for human proportional perfection and how the way of happiness is the knowledge of the disability. Also, Farabi's attention to the separation of ethics from customs will eliminate the relativistic charge from him.

Farabi, like the early thinkers before him, did not author an independent book in the field of Moral Philosophy because the Moral Philosophy had not branched out then as a separate knowledge, but there are some discussions of Moral Philosophy dispersed in some of his works. We can gain some of his novel attitudes on Moral Philosophy through the examination of his writings. So this article uses analytical philosophical method and It takes its materials from the library way.

It is possible to propose numerous statements about the realist nature of Farabi proving that he is a moral realist. In the present research we only explain the following arguments indicating the Moral Realism that can be inferred from the sayings of Farabi.Proving the Moral Realism through Aesthetics. One of Farabi's arguments used to prove the morally realist nature of Farabi is that he considers ethics as a beautiful subject (Farabi, 1992; P.243; Farabi,1992: P. 65) and he also considers beauty to be equal to existential perfection (Farabi, 199a: PP.42-43). Therefore, Farabi considers ethics as the existential perfection, and the existential perfection is the same as existential enjoyment, that is, it is real.Proving realism through finalism. Farabi is a finalist scholar and he believes in the real ends and finalism is considered one of the realist schools, so Farbi is a realist. Farabi believes that the goal of ethics is to enable human to achieve the real felicity and he considers the real felicity and goal of ethics as an existential object (Farabi, 1995a, PP.101-103). Regarding the definition of Moral Realism, where the title Moral Realism is applied to a theory that considers an external reality for the moral concepts and propositions regardless of any order, recommendation, feeling, taste or agreement, or bases those concepts and propositions on an external reality (Ahmadi, 2017: P.118), many Muslim thinkers are moral realists.Proving Moral Realism through semantics of moral concepts. Farabi defines the concepts indicating the moral predicate that can be interpreted as predicate concepts, as existential and real and when the moral concepts are real, the proposition formed by the moral concepts will be real and thereby the Moral Realism will be proved.Proving realism through Epistemology. If Farabi did not believe in any reality for ethics, then it had been senseless to introduce wisdom as a method to recognize ethics, while Farabi has determined multiple ways like wisdom to recognize the moral reality (Farabi, 1995b: P.42).

Farabi explained his absolutism through dividing goodness into absolute goodness and non-absolute goodness. The absolute goodness explains human's ultimate perfection and real felicity and the non-absolute goodness explains the relationship between the action and ultimate perfection1. Farabi also offers a particular innovation in defining and explaining wisdom because he believes that wisdom in a special sense means that the wisdom reason out the best things through the best knowledge. The best knowledge means the permanent knowledge and knowledge of essence that is imperishable and presential that is considered the best knowledge2 and he explains about the wisdom of divine proximity and human's needs for God's blessings even in acquiring the ultimate perfection. Then he explained about the path to the ultimate perfection in Moral Philosophy by defining wisdom in a novel way.Another innovation of Farabi was to determine the instance of the real felicity that none of his preceding scholars had completed and Islamicized the Greek moral theory so accurately that he did. He accepted the divine proximity theory as a supplement to the moral theories of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle and enriched it through explaining the features of divine proximity degrees.Despite all the innovations of Farabi, but it seems necessary that Be explained The following content, such as rational explanation for the appropriate perfection for humans, and for relation between knowledge of the caused to its need from Cause and the true perfection of the caused, as well as the separation of ethics from customs.

The Famous thinkers, explains Īji's view of ethics, like other Ash'arites, as one of divine command theory, But he does not consider moral good and evil to be limited to the meaning of the merit of praising the Shari'a and blame, sometimes also means perfection and imperfection or expediency and corruption. According to Īji's moral ontology, it can be attributed to him that he is realist based on the promise to reason good and evil and he is subjectivist based on the promise to religious good and evil. Although he does not make a logical connection between good and evil moral meanings, he accepts Argument ability for meaning of reason good and evil. his reason for not communicating logically between these meanings, which is God's compulsion, seems invalid because, if explained logically, God's legislative will is based on God's creative will, and it will not be forced by a non-god.

Moral semantics is one of the subjects of moral philosophy which discusses the semantic analysis of moral conceptions and propositions. Moral semantics has a close relationship with the ontology of ethical terms that solves many problems in moral philosophy. Major issues in moral semantics are the s tudy of the concepts of subject, predicate, and concepts in morality, such as perfection and happiness. This research intends to find Farabi’s innovation by review of ethical concepts in Farabi’s thought. Farabi considers the morally good as the relationship between moral actions and their result. He offers an explanation of the absolute good, rejects ethical relativism and proves realism about the morally good. He takes wisdom, in the special sense of the word, the virtue of a human unders tanding that intellects the bes t of things through the supreme knowledge. The supreme knowledge is a kind of rational knowledge with which humans get knowledge of the attainment to his perfection, through the firs t cause. Farabi by this meaning of wisdom explains the nearness of God and the need of man to God, even in achieving ultimate perfection. He by the definition of wisdom explained the kind of moral reality and the way to ultimate perfection in moral philosophy. It seems we can regard the explanation of the higher degree happiness through knowledge by presence of the relation of human perfections to the firs t cause, as completion of Farabi’s theory.

Ethics reviews conceptive and statement basic of morality. Ethics include four part: moral analytic, moral epistemology, moral ontology and logical discussion. One of the issues in Ethics is logical discussion that reviews deduction of moral conception and statement and moral false reasoning, therefor logical discussion reviews relation between “Is” and “Ought To” in the view of Allameh Tabatabai that hasn’t been critic up to now like this way. The author tries to critics the view of Allameh Tabatabai in this problem in all aspect. Allameh Tabatabai argues that moral statements are reductive, predicative and also logically. He calls it debate. But it is possible to certainty and we are capable to answer problems to certainty. In any way he believes debate for moral statement and it is based on reality. However Allameh Tabatabai don’t accept moral relativism and he reductive relation between “Is” and “Ought To” to “is” and “is”.

The epistemology of ethics is one of the foundations of morality. and cognitivism and moral non-cognition as one of the most important views of moral epistemology. Ethical cognition refers to a theory that believes in the recognition of some fixed and external moral sentences in the epistemology of ethics. Moral sentences are fixed when they have either objective or definite facts or are based on objective and stable reality. To determine the value of recognition, the type of recognition path is determined in epistemology. This research seeks to provide the epistemology of al-Farabi’s ethics with a new regularity, interstitial way. Moral cognitivism includes Farabi because he Introduces recognition ways and introduces several ways to understand moral judgments. Farabi believes in the Argument of ethical sentences and the existence of moral self-evident judgments and Rejects ethical relativism.

Metaethics deals with conceptual and propositional principles of ethics. It comprises four arguments: semantics of ethics, epistemology of ethics, ontology of ethics, and logical discussion. The most important part of semantic of ethics and analysis of moral concepts are those concepts used as predicate in ethical propositions and include obligation and value concepts, such as “good”, “bad”, “should” and “obligation” respectively. Existence of moral concepts propositions and their mode of being are all dealt with in ontology of ethics. Much work has been made on “moral obligation”. The present article, however, is to examine the viewpoint of professor Larijani who has taken a big step in explaining metaethical debates by distinguishing ontological considerations from semantic contemplations on “moral obligation”. His view on moral obligation is similar to the theory of G. E. Moor in “moral goodness”. Therefore he is semantically intuitionist and ontologically realist. But the problem is that he has not offered any valid proof for his claim. The only argument presented in favor of his view is appeal to conscience to which the opponent of this theory can also appeal

Metaethics studies the fundamental principles of ethics and includes four fields: ethical semantics, ethical epistemology, ethical ontology and logical treats. In the last field, ethical concepts and statements are put into discussion; the relation of ought to and is, therefore, is studied in this field, while little attention has paid to it. In the paper, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli`s view on the relation of ethical statements with each other and with non-ethical statements has been studied. He knows ethical statements to be conventional based upon reaity, performative, reasonable and certain. Yet it seems that in Javadi`s view there may be found a difference between certainty and the confirmation made by reason, practical and theoretical; as he considers the practical as agent of movement and the theoretical as that of perception. For the author, his view is referred to others, though one may not agree with him on reconciling ethical statements` quality of being performative as he explain with their being demonstrative and certain.

Semantics of ethical concepts is one of the topics of meta ethics. Moral concepts, including the issues of value and necessity, are the concepts used in the premise of ethical propositions. "Good" and "bad" are two examples of value concepts, and "must", "must not" and "obligation” are examples of necessity concepts. A lot of papers have been published about the meaning of "moral obligation", but this paper seeks to elaborate on the theory of Bel-Qi'īth Bel-Ghir (in-relation-to-something else, by- something-else, a theory proposed to complete the theory of the necessity of Bel-Qi'īth elal-Ghir. Based on this research, the theory of Bel-Qi'īth Bel-Ghir has such flaws as being incomprehensive, leading to impossible infinite regression, and confusion of discussion which prevents it from being accepted as a defensible theory. Moreover, the theory of the necessity of Bel-Qi'īth Elal-Ghir is free from the defect that the necessity of Bel-Qi'īth Bel-Ghir view claims to be capable of correcting. This library-based paper uses an analytical-philosophical method.

Meta-ethics deals with the conceptual and affirmative principles of morality. One of the issues in meta-ethics is logical discussion which deals with the deduction of moral concepts and propositions, therefor the relationship between moral “is” and “ought” from the perspective of Mohaghegh Isfahani can be considered a metalogical issue that has not received due attention. The present article is an attempt to delineate Mohaghegh Isfahani’s views on the realtionship between moral statements. Mohaghegh Isfahani tries to prove the logicality of moral statements. He considers the relationship between moral “ought to” and “is” not a deductive one but one which shows semantic overlap. He agrees that the relationship between immoral good and moral “ought to” is deductive. He calls this type of relationship “debate”. He believes in the certainty of moral statements. It seems that his blind eye on provocation, as an integral part of the meaning of “Ought to”, is problematic.

One of the important discussions of moral epistemology is the epistemology of "moral obligation" wherein such issues as the possibility of knowing "moral obligation", regarding sentences containing "moral obligation" as affirmative or imperative, and the absoluteness or relativity of such sentences are dealt with. Allama Tabatabaie, the famous Muslim philosopher, has no explicit statement on the epistemological discussions of "moral obligation". Thus, the expositors of his statements are in high disagreement. However, most of them have considered him as a imperativist and non-cognitivist, while some others have introduced him as a relativist!
The present study uses an analytical-philosophical method to define affirmative and imperative statements in moral epistemology, and to prove that Allama regards the sentences containing "moral obligation" as affirmative statements. Besides, this article defines cognitivism and non-cognitivism in moral epistemology, and regards Allama's theory on sentences containing "moral obligation" as a cognitivist and absolutist theory.
Considering three ways of recognizing moral sentences in Allama's theory is one of the evidences for his being a cognitivist.

Meta-ethics deals with conceptual and confirmatory principles. In part, it deals with issues related to deduction of moral statements, such as the relation among moral statements and the relation between moral and non-moral statements. According to Martyr Mutahhari the fact that moral statements are demonstrable is among logical meta-ethical questions that are seldom treated. Explaining Mutahhari's opinion on the demonstrability of moral statements, the author says that Mutahhari intended to prove that moral statements produce certainty. Contrary to what appears from some analysis of his words, he intended to say that moral statements are rational. Albeit in his Methodology of Realism, he explains AllamaTabatabaei's words on the indemonstrability of moral statements in five ways, he however rejects all these five explanations in his Perpetuity of Moral Principles, considering some moral statements as self-evident truths of practical reason, which are, in turnendorsed by theoretical reason as well.

One of the issues in moral epistemology is cognitivism and non-cognitivism. Most researchers interpret Isfahani’s thesis as a non-cognitivism. In this paper we aim to explain the terms in the thesis and vindicate moral cognitivism. Isfahani means by “the theoretical certainties” “self-evident” and by “generally accepted propositions in broad sense” “non-essential generally accepted propositions” and considers moral propositions as theoretical. He maintains that moral propositions such as “justice is good”, “oppression is bad” are decisive judgment and aren’t surmise. He tells us how to know and determine moral propositions; therefore he is cognitivist.

The most important part in analyzing moral concepts includes those used as predicate in moral sentences covering moral concepts of valuation and obligation. Moral concepts in the field of values include those like “good” and “bad” while obligatory concepts include “ought to” and “ought no” and “duty”. Many papers have been written about “moral obligation”; however, dissociating the area of semantics from ontology of the concept of “moral obligation”, this paper has proposed a new interpretation of Allame Tabatabaie’s viewpoint about semantics of “moral obligation”. This study intends to prove that for Allame Tabatabaie, the meaning of “moral obligation” is known as “necessity by the other” because he founds i’tibaryat theory based on “Sakkaki`s view” and there is no distinction between literal meanings of these kinds of metaphors from their real meanings, but figurative meanings are different from real meanings. Therefore, the meaning of “ought to” would not be different in real and credit usages and according to the fact that from his viewpoint the meaning of “real ought to” is “necessity by the other”; thus, the meaning of “credit ought to” will be “necessity by the other”, too.