فهرست مطالب maryam barooti

In the thoughts of theologians and philosophers of religion, symbolism and cryptic language are used as a means to convey the immaterial world and express metaphysical truths. This functionality is also employed in certain philosophical texts to describe the relationship between humans and God. The aim of this article is to explore the general concept of symbolism from the perspectives of Suhrawardi and Jaspers. After explaining and analyzing the nature and reasoning behind symbolism, as well as its characteristics and specific use in elucidating the concept of its role in the relationship between humans and God, the article compares the views of these two philosophers, identifying similarities and differences. For instance, Suhrawardi uses cryptic language to conceal meanings, while Jaspers aims to clarify the truth as much as possible through symbolism. According to both philosophers, the main feature of symbolism is its representational nature, and what is intended is an inner meaning, which ultimately cannot be fully deciphered. Suhrawardi believes that the encounter with symbolism occurs in the world of imaginal forms, while for Jaspers, it takes place in this very world. From Suhrawardi's perspective, symbolic language is not the only way to connect with God; God is not the sole creator and source of symbols. However, according to Jaspers, the transcendent manifests solely through symbolism, and the purpose and origin of symbols are solely attributed to God.

The theory of subjective considerations (i’tibāriyāt) is an epistemological theory that has had a significant influence in various domains of knowledge. The Principles of Jurisprudence is one of the most important sciences where the theory of subjective considerations has been foundational, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, in his book "Al-Kifāyah with annotation", has utilized this theory to explore the issues of this major science. According to him, "command and prohibition" are subjective matters, and the consequences of subjectivity is the leadership. Command is the act of associating and connecting the desire and will to another action. One of the most contemporary issues in the domain of command in the Principles of Jurisprudence is the problem of the unity of desire and will, where scholars like Ākhūnd Khurāsānī have endorsed unity of desire and will in terms of meaning, creation, and the outside. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has addressed this issue in the three domains: linguistic, usūlī and rational. He utilizes the implications of the theory of subjective considerations to explain and resolve it.

On Allameh tabatabaee’s view, the existence of God is self-evident and also all proofs of affirmation of God’s existence are self-evident. Including these proofs, is the proof, famous to righteous that among previous sages, is used to affirm God’s existence, but in exquisite exposition, Allameh tabatabaee has discussed it as self-evident proof. In this article, I try to analyze and criticize this proof in terms of being self-evident. Since this proof doesn’t have the criterion of self-evident proof completely, another exposition of self-evident proof that has this criterion completely or at higher level. In this article, these exposition on the basis of analysis of genesis and annihilation is extracted and explained from Allameh tabatabaee’s writtings.

In the majority of his works, Tabatabaie takes the side of cataphaticism about divine attributes. But the theory is presented in his different works in different ways. There are at list 3 ways in which he has presented the theory including (1) verticality of meaning regardless of instances, (2) verticality of meaning with respect to expression of instances, and (3) ungradedness of meaning with respect to the goal and the common function. In this article, we shall try to explain and analyze the three models, and give examples of each one from his works. Notwithstanding that cataphaticism have advantages and transcends the finitude-oriented natural language and makes use of it with regard to God, it suffers from noteworthy shortcomings.

The simplicity of the necessary-by-itself is one of the most important issues discussed by Islamic philosophers and theologians. It has also a prominent position in transcendental wisdom (Hikmat e Motaaliyeh). Allameh Tabatabai, as a transcendental philosopher, puts emphasis on the real simplicity of the divine nature and provides a lot of arguments for it. With the analysis of the foundations of his arguments, it is demonstrated that two different views are expressed on this issue: one is the simplicity of the necessary-by-itself and the arguments for its affirmation based on the positive attitude to quiddity; the other is the simplicity of the necessary-by-itself and the arguments for its affirmation based on the negative attitude to quiddity. It seems that Allameh Tabatabai assumes the second view which is free from the first view’s difficulties as it proves simplicity in a direct way. The present article aims at delineating the second view and demonstrating its superiority to the first one.

In Allamah Tabatabaee’s works there are found at least three apparently different views about the relation of Divine essence and His attributes of act: 1. the unity of God’s essence and His attributes of act; 2. the ontological distinction between His essence and His attributes of act and 3. the impossibility of attribution of such properties to God’s essence. In this paper we try to establish that these three views are essentially consistent. Our analysis shows that each one of the above-mentioned positions can be considered from a special aspect. The first view is based on considering the mere reality (Haqiqah) of such attributes while in the second view we are just concerned to the appearance (Raqiqah) of them. The third view، however، is a result of a pluralistic analysis of the attributes of act.

Allamah Tabatabai interprets the doctrine of Attributive monotheism of God under the philosophical theory of the identity of God’s perfection attributes with His essence. Because, in his view point, it is the only rational way for explanation of Attributive monotheism. According to this theory, all Divine perfection attributes are identical with each other and with God’s nature in external world; although they conceptually differ from each other and with God’s nature. His demonstration is based on some Islamic philosophy principles, such as “the bestower of a thing cannot be lack of it” or on “simplicity and purity of Divine essence”. In order to show the consistency of this explanation from Attributive monotheism, with acceptance of conceptual plurality of attributes, Allamah has presented two theses: A) the concepts of Divine attributes are posited mentally or virtually; B) the negation of plurality of attributes from God’s very nature. Through an accurate analysis, we can understand that these two theses are compatible and there is no contradiction in it. The first one is based on the fact that, since the concepts of attributes are virtual and mental, so conceptual plurality of attributes cannot damages the external unity of God’s attributes and essence. The second one, however, steps beyond and purifies Divine essence from any existential and conceptual qualification.