فهرست مطالب maryam mehdazadeh

Tax avoidance activities are basically known as methods to prevent the transfer of cash from shareholders to the government. The problem in this regard is that tax avoidance is not always in the interest of shareholders and opportunistic managers may use the excuse of avoidance. tax, direct or withdraw resources for personal benefits, which causes the increase of shareholders' expenses and as a result increases the expenses of tax avoidance to its interests. Based on this, in this research, the role of managers' self-interest on the relationship between tax avoidance and the value of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange has been investigated. The statistical sample of this research consists of 618 observations (year-company) for 103 companies during the period of 1396 to 1401, which were selected by systematic elimination method. The results of the research have shown that the interaction of tax avoidance and managers' self-interest has a significant and negative effect on the value of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

In this research, the moderating role of corporate governance power on the relationship between tax avoidance and profiteering of managers of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange has been investigated. The statistical sample of this research consists of 618 observations (year-company) for 103 companies during the period of 2016 to 2016, which were selected by systematic elimination method. The results of the regression analysis on the combined data using the random effects estimation method indicate that corporate tax avoidance has a significant and positive effect on the discretion of managers in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange, and the power of corporate governance on the relationship between tax avoidance and profit. The demands of managers of companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange have a significant and moderating effect in the direction of weakening.