mohammad habibollahi

The examination of the concept of mind in Aristotle’s psychology poses aconsiderable challenge within his work, De anima. This paper unravels thecomplexities by scrutinizing Aristotle’s expressions as both a response to and anadvancement of Anaxagoras’ Mind theory. Anaxagoras’ theory, whether explicitly orimplicitly, presents mind as both indeterminate and everlasting. However, thesecharacteristics contradict the primary function of the mind, namely, its capacity forknowledge and thought. Anything that is entirely indeterminate lacks resemblanceto anything else, thereby rendering it incapable of comprehending anything, in accordance with the widely accepted axiom that “like is known by like”. Besides, knowledge and thought involve a transformation from potentiality to actuality, implying the involvement of matter, while a material entity cannot possess eternity. In this paper, it is contended that the fourth and fifth chapters of the third book of De anima address these two dilemmas. Aristotle reconciles these attributes by endorsing and reinterpreting Anaxagoras’ theory.

Most scholars take Aristotle's Theology as Tanzihi, according to which the philosopher tries to refine and rationalize the principle ideas which are given in a certain religion. Some other scholars, on the other hand, deny such a theology in Aristotle and believe that there is an analogical model between Aristotle's Theology and First Philosophy. In this paper both views have been criticized and a third view has been proposed according to which the philosopher encounters the divinity in the course of his philosophizing and bears a rational experience of divinity. So religion is not the basis of First Philosophy for Aristotle, but is its outcome

Perhaps assuming a principle which is beyond reason and being is the most characteristic of the Neoplatonic thought. This principle is absolutely ineffable and no epithet deserves it. We can talk about it merely by negation. But such a transcendent principle, which Plotinus introduced it to the platonic philosophy, did not remain without any critique among Neoplatonists. The most elaborated critique by a Neoplatonist is that of Damascius in the first part of his Problems and Solutions. He argues that the One, being an arche, cannot be transcendent, and being transcendent, refuses to be an arche. So, there is an inconsistency between being an arche and being transcendent. Therefore, the Neoplatonic One, which is the first principle, is not beyond being, rather it is a being. However, this claim, which is the corner stone of Damascius’ argument, has been neglected by the writers on the topic, and they have sought other formulations for his argument. Based on Damascius’ texts, we have argued that we can ascribe such a claim to Damascius, and further, regard it as the foundation of his belief in an absolutely transcendent beyond the One, which is completely ineffable and about which only silence is due.