فهرست مطالب muhammad saĪdi mehr

After proving the originality of existence, investigating the role of existence in essential predications is of the same importance as originality of existence, and is somehow a completion to it. In his works, Allama Tabatabaie has dealt with resolving that puzzle, but it seems that the expositors have depleted those statements of innovation. In the present article, we criticize a view according to which existence plays role in the form of a part of substratum, in a way that the formation of essential attribution is realized through the essence becoming the substratum to the restriction of existence. Then, we defend a view that considers existence the whole substratum. According to that view, if the essential products are properly constructed in the form of a sentence, they would be, in effect, the attributes of existence. Besides, one cannot absolutely defend the role of existence being the whole substratum; rather, this precept is specified to the external effects of the essence, and the existence is not described by the mental effects of essence.

The present article is seeking to investigate the question of why is, in Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics, gradation in the concept of existence not imaginable in spite of his belief in similarity of existence. In addition to Aristotle, Thomas has followed Avicenna in many of his positions. Aristotle regarded “being” as something other than synonym and homonym. Avicenna divided “synonym” into two groups: “univocal” and “equivocal”, and considered the third usage of “term” for Aristotle to be in “equivocal synonym”. Since he believes in similarity between cause and effect, he defends gradation and gradation in the concept of existence. Although Thomas does not speak of “similarity in existence”, he speaks of a third type called “analogous term” along with synonym and homonym. Although linguistic analyses support the idea of synonymy of the “analogous terms” in Thomas’ philosophy and “gradation” in Avicenna’s, metaphysical analyses of similarity on the basis of proportion by the new scholars who study Thomas is different from gradation of the concept of existence. Their analysis of similarity on the basis of proportion is close to Avicenna’s gradation of existence. However, since Thomas does not believe in similarity between the creator and the created, we may not consider this analysis of the above scholars as a proper interpretation of Thomas’ view on similarity.

Investigating the relationship between two basic notions of existence and thingness (or being and thing) is among the important issues in metaphysical systems. The relationship assumed by a philosopher between these two notions, based on special foundations is effective on his interpretation of the formation of world’s things and the metaphysical condition of non-existents. In the present article, two views of Ibn Sina and Nithin Soman on the relationship between existence and thingness are presented, and since Ibn Sina’s view is considered as a reaction to Muslim theologians’ view, we briefly mention their views as well. Centuries ago the Muslim theologians, and Soman in the contemporary times – each on different bases and with various motivations – believed that the relationship between existence and things is ‘absolute generality and peculiarity’, while Ibn Sina believes in the concomitance of this relationship. Considering the theoretical framework of the discussion, the present article seeks to benefit from the contemporary analytical philosophy’s explanation about the relationship between existence and thingness to better understand Avicenna’s view. More specifically, we are seeking, after comparing the similarities and differences of the views of the two philosophers, to clarify the status of Avicenna’s view. As a secondary goal, we mention one of the most important implications of the discussion (about the relationship between existence and thing), i.e. the metaphysical status of non-existents and the different solutions of the two philosophers for the problem of describing non-existents.

There have been four theories for discussing the necessity of distinguishing or not distinguishing between three modes in philosophy and logic. Some have basically denied any distinction while some others have determined different domains of usage of the three modes. A third group has regarded this distinction as a necessity, proposing a criterion there. The present article is seeking to suggest a forth theory to find a solution for the following two problems: firstly, why should we distinguish the three modes in logic from the contingency and necessity in philosophy? Secondly, what is the criterion for this distinction in logics and philosophy? To answer the former question, the authors argue that some important objections, including that of Hume and that of Kant, have been put forward for the metaphysical argumentations such as ‘ontological argument’ and ‘the argument from contingency and necessity’ and ‘the argument of the truthful ones’. The way out of this challenge is the distinction between the three logical modes and the philosophical contingency and necessity. To answer the latter question, they show that according to the criterion of the three modes in logic, if the predicate is the essence, one of the essentials or one of the requisites of the essence of its subject would be necessary. On the other hand, if the predicate is the opposite of essence, the opposite of one of the essentials or the opposite of one of the requisites of the essence of its subject would be impossible. And if the predicate is something other than the subject’s essence or its opposite, other than one of its essentials or its opposite, the proposition would be contingent. The criterion for contingency and necessity in philosophy, however, is being dependent or independent of cause. Since the philosophers’ analyses of causality are different, here we focus on interpretation presented by Avicenna and Mullā Sadrā.

The intelligibles are divided into primary, secondary philosophical, and secondary logical intelligibles. Mulla Sadra differentiates between the three according to the process of abstraction of general concepts from particulars as well as their position in the mind. Hajji Sabzevari, however, distinguishes between them on the basis of objectivity or subjectivity of prosody and ascription. On the other hand, Motahhari introduces another distinguishing factor, an ontological one, on the basis of Mulla Sadra’s theory of copulative and non-copulative types of existence. Studying Mulla Sadra’s and Hajji Sabzevari’s factors, the authors of this article prove that they refer to a single fact, and the ontological factor is the combination of the two. They also seek to analyze Motahhari’s criticisms of Mulla Sadra’s and Hajji Sabzevari’s factors in order to demonstrate that they are often irrelevant.

All notions pertaining to quiddity are prone to re-interpretation after one accepts the idea of the principality of existence, because one has to interpret them on the bases on the attributes of existence. The authors in this article try to infer Mulla Sadra’s idea about “genius” based on his unique idea and ontological interpretation of “differentia”. They want to know that, according to him, with an intuitive knowledge of which level of existence one becomes capable of contemplating about genius. In fact, they want to apply the same approach Mulla Sadra has taken with regard to the real differentia to the problem of genius. Since he considers differentia as reflecting “individual being”, the authors take the real genius as reflecting the all-pervading existence. They also refer to the incompatibility of this idea with Ibn-Sina’s well-known idea of the abstraction of genius from matter.

The issue of modals (necessity, possibility, and impossibility) and modal propositions is discussed in both philosophy and logic. Muslim logicians very often, during their discussion of types of propositions, divide predicatory propositions into modal and non-modal (absolute) propositions, and then discuss about their subdivisions and their predicates. Philosophers also divide concepts or quiddities into three categories of necessary being, contingent being, and impossible to be. The question to be investigated pertains to the difference between the logical and philosophical meaning of matters and modalities, and whether it is essentially a logical or a philosophical issue. Muslim thinkers have answered in three ways: a) difference in meaning; b) same meaning in different spheres; and c) same meaning and sphere.In this article, the author reviews two former answers and then discusses the third option as the idea favored by Mulla Sadra. According to his theory, this issue is basically a philosophical problem, and if discussed in logic, it would be a peripheral discussion. Then the author criticizes this idea and tries to show its flaws, including the confinement of modals to specific types of predicatory propositions. Finally, he suggests a fourth option, according to which the difference between logical and philosophical modes is described by reference to modes pertaining to truth, and modes pertaining to existence.

Kripke applied the notion of possible worlds to present formal semantics of modal logic. However, the application of the notion of possible worlds is not restricted to modal logic semantics. Rather, this notion has also been used in certain theories of philosophy of language or philosophy of logic in such theories of the nature of propositions.In view of the increasing significance of the notion of possible worlds, the present article studies in short the views certain contemporary theoreticians have raised on the nature of these worlds and their alleged characteristics. To do so, the writer first gives a very intensive account of Kripke’s metaphysical views on the nature of possible worlds and the two chief approaches to the notion of possible worlds under the titles of realism positivism and abstractionism and goes on to make a comparative analysis in this regard.To meet this purpose, the writer deals with David Lewis’s view as the most influential representative of realism positivism and Alvin Plantinga’s view as the distinguished representative of abstractionism.

Among the important philosophical issues in relation to the “Causal Principle” which, to some extent, partakes of theology, in addition to its being of strong philosophical aspect, is the “yardstick of need for cause”. In this relation, four major views have been put forward which can be referred to as 1- the view of existence, 2- the view of contingence, 3- the view of essential possibility and 4- the view of existential possibility.Having studied the self–evident quality of the principle of contingent beings’ need for cause, the writer attempts to make some critical remarks on these views, explaining the philosophical foundations of a fifth view called’ the view of essential contingency’ as an alternative for the above-mentioned views. To do this, the writer explains in detail the widely accepted definitions and interpretations given for the essential contingency by the Muslim philosophers, giving some reasons for the preference of this new view over the older ones.