raˆīm qorbāni

Dun Q Pite, as a journalist and a priest, has radical ideas about the reliability of science, and on this ground rejects the cognitive character of religion and its teachings. In his studies, he runs into lots of contradictions, commits fallacies, and forgets about academic fairness. He talks about religion as a kind of mythology, and introduces religious teachings as some sort of magic and spell. Despite the fact that his studies are merely focused on Christianity, but he unjustifiably generalizes the results to all religions, including Islam. Almost all his approaches and theories about religion and its relation to science are fundamentally criticized. This article is an example of such critical approaches to his writings.

The problem of “the internal inconsistency of propositions” has caught the attention of philosophers and thinkers from the early days. Some of them have considered it as a fallacy, others as a fundamental incoherence between science and mathematics. Still some have called it a linguistic problem, and others thought about it as an ontological and objective issue. Each and every group has also tried to explain and solve this problem. This paper is an effort to study and briefly scrutinize different approaches. In this study, three solutions are examined: a) philosophical solutions, b) logical solutions, and c) meta-philosophical and meta-logical solutions. It looks into different ideas proposed under each solution as well.