saeid pourdanesh

Murtaḍā Muṭaharī is one of the Muslim thinkers who tried to show that the existence and validity of morality depend on God. The central problem in this article is to show how and with what unifying idea Murtaḍā Muṭaharī explains the dependence of morality on theology; to do so, his work has been completely reconsidered and reconstructed. The answer suggested by our understanding of his idea is that the human "self" is an entity that comes in degrees; it displays itself at two levels: its lower level can be called the imaginary “I” and its higher level can be called the real or superior “I”. It is the true “self” that gives rise to morals and it originates from God. Therefore, God is the origin, goal and ground of ethics. Thus, one may say that the true “self” of a human being is the point of connection, in virtue of which the dependence of ethics on theology is justified by Murtaḍā Muṭaharī.

Alfred Tarski is one of the principal founders of logical semantics. He founded representational approach in 30s and this approach is dominant in the logical semantics nowadays. But if we return to Tarski’s 20s works it seems in first glance there is no semantical approach in his 20s works. Current commentary of Tarski’s the 20s works is that he regarded logic with syntactical and proof theoretic approach in this periods. But one of Tarski’s commentators, Douglas Patterson, has showed in details that in Tarski’s the 20s works is seen a kind of semantical approach which can regard it as expressive approach. Tarski called this approach intuitionistic formalism, following his teacher Stanisław Leśniewski. In this article we are intend to address, according to Patterson’s interpretation, what is Tarski’s the expressive approach. we will attempt to establish two cl aims (a) intuitionistic formalism, according to Tarski, is an approach about function of language not an articulated semantical theory in which the central concepts of expressive approach are defined and analyzed; (b) intuitionistic formalism has no conflict with representational approach about language and the former is present in background of Tarski’s works, even several years after establishment of representational approach by him.

This article is concerned of the problem that weather Tarski’s definition of the ‘logical consequence’ in his seminal article ‘On the Concept of Logical Consequence’ (1936), as his article claims, captures the common concept of logical consequence or not. First of all, for understanding what defect had prevailing approach of logical consequence (proof- theoretical approach) that led him to attempt to present new definition of concept of logical consequence, I introduce proof-theoretical approach to logical consequence and examine its default and then explain two interpretations of his definition of the common concept of logical consequence. the First interpretation is that the common concept of logical consequence is the concept that all of ordinary and non-professional peoples in philosophy, logic and mathematics use. the Second interpretation is that what Tarski means by the common concept of logical consequence is the concept that for professional peoples in logic and mathematics is ‘common’ and already used in axiomatics. I defend the second interpretation and after descriptive-analytic examination of his suggested definition of this concept and presentation of example of it, I finally conclude that Tarski in his attempting for capture of the common concept of logical consequence has succeeded.

In this article, we aim to deal with Hume‘s attempt to answer the issue that he propounds in his book, A Treatise of Human Nature. In this book, on the one hand, he criticizes moral egoism and maintains that the other matter of interest is the condition of realization of morality, while on the other hand, he declares a certain level of moral virtue (artifact virtues), as justice, from the beginning come into being on the basis of self-interest and by the motive of protection of private ownership which only in the passage of time have been named virtue. In this article, we attempt to demonstrate how Hume, in A Treatise of Human Nature, and in his other moral book, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, with two varying narrations, attempts to show that these two views come together. Finally, we shall clarify which one is more coherent and more compatible with the principles of his moral theory.