seyedeh massoumeh mousavi

The concept of freedom is one of the most central concepts in Kant’s Philosophy which has a critical role in both theoretical and practical reason. Some interpreters believe that agency and spontaneity of reason in theoretical knowledge is another expression of autonomy and freedom. In another hand, freedom plays a central part in practical reason too. In fact, practical reason as a will that determines itself abstracted from the casual system of nature is nothing but freedom. But there is a challenge that this fundamental concept in Kant’s philosophy encounter. This challenge in Hegelian terms is that this freedom is just “Transcendental”; it means this freedom is abstracted and cut of reality and Kant never succeed in proving this fundamental concept of his philosophy and just supposed it Transcendentally, as something needed for establishing his philosophy. In this article, we first try to explain the challenge and then critique the possibility of solving it by focusing on Kant’s writings on History. So, in the introduction part, we explain the critique of Transcendentalism in the concept of freedom. Then, we try to show how Kant in the philosophy of history tried to find a way out of the Transcendental grasp of freedom and shows that freedom is an actuality that appears in history. In conclusion, we critique the sufficiency of our reading and this suggested solution.

In this essay, we are trying to inquire and critique Allen Wood's ideas about the problem of formalism in Kantian Ethics. Wood is one of Kant's interpreters who has been dealing with the formalism problem for so many years. Once he believed that the problem is a real challenge for Kant's ethical thought and then he tried to suggest a solution for it.At first, we try to explain the theoretical foundation of the problem and in light of that show the importance of the problem for judging Kant's ethics and illustrate why and how the formalism problem was brought about. In the second part, we explain Wood's approach to the problem and critique the final position of him as an advocator. Then deal with critiques that Wood's solution can not handle; the critiques that Robert Pippin suggests and their foundations are in Hegelian heritage. In conclusion, we show that why ascribing a theory of value can not overcome the formalism challenge. In the same part, we introduce an approach that can help solve the problem; an approach that claims that we may be able to fill the emptiness of moral law and rational moral agent in Kant's ethics by focusing on Kant's philosophy of history and philosophy of religion provides. Contents that can shed light to solve the problem by connecting moral agents to the world and his concrete entity.