فهرست مطالب seyyed ammar kalantar

In this article I discuss Aristotle’s view on εστί (“is”) being a verb in de interpretaine and the significations which he explicitly attributes to “is”, and in several points the views of some of Aristotle’s commentators, including Ammonius, Boethius, al-Farabi, and Aquinas, are reported and criticized. Therefore, first Aristotle's definition of verb is examined, including its most important feature, “additionally signifying time”. In fact, "is" is due to having this feature is a verb, and thus the first signification of "is" becomes clear. After that, I discuss other two significations of "is", namely “additionally signifying combination” and "determination of truth", and the relation of these three significations to each other. Finally, it is concluded that according to Aristotle, "is" (with two objects) does not signify a categorical thing, but only additionally signifies combination. And since "is" is additionally signifying time, it can be said that for Aristotle in de interpretaione "is" is additionally signifying temporal combination.

Aristotle in his logical works, in addition to the statement, introduces the concept of proposition and defines it based on affirmation and negation in Prior Analytics. There are two issues about Aristotle's view of preposition, i.e., the interpretation of its definition, and its relation to the statement. In this article, first, three interpretations of preposition, including Alexander of Aphrodisia's and classical ones, are discussed and criticized. And because Aristotle points to the relation between contradiction and proposition, first, the definition of contradiction from Aristotle's point of view and, then, its relation to proposition are discussed. Finally, my interpretation of proposition is explained: proposition is a statement which its relation with contradiction is considered and the attention to this relation leads to the acceptation of the rule of contradiction which is the foundation of each deduction. The linguistics meaning of proposition is compatible with this interpretation: proposition is to propose one side of contradiction, and because of this, the dialectical proposition has two forms: question form the answerer and its replay as a premise in dialectical deduction.

According to the common interpretation, Aristotle, in the fourth chapter of “De Interpretatione”, defines statement based on truth and falsehood. But in the end of the fifth chapter, he offers another ‘account’ of ‘simple’ statement. In this article, I will argue, that the account is in fact the definition of statement without qualification based on belonging and not belonging as elements of the realm of reality. Accordingly, the interpretations of commentators about the last part of the fourth and the fifth chapter will be presented. Then it is discussed that the definition of statement based on truth and falsehood is incorrect and has some incompatibilities with the Aristotle's text. After that, my interpretation of Aristotle's text will be explained and it is indicated that dividing concepts of signifiers is defined in a different manner. Finally, the chosen definition of statement and its similarities with Porphyry's interpretation are explained.