جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "دلایل عمل" در نشریات گروه "علوم انسانی"

In her 2014 paper "Internalism About Reasons: Sad But True?", Kate Manne defends a version of Internalism about normative reasons for actions. She starts by considering the interpersonal context of reasons to emphasize how reasons are limited by psychological states of the agent. Then, she defends a necessary condition for reasons; i.e., Ideal Reasoning Thesis, which every theory of reason should satisfy. However, she claims, externalism fails to do so. On the contrary, we suggest that it is not clear whether the process of Ideal Reasoning happens in an ideal or non-ideal time. Furthermore, it seems preferable to take time to be ideal too. Clearing the ambiguity about time makes externalism able to satisfy Ideal Reasoning Thesis and, thus, the argument for internalism fails.

Moral dilemmas are situations in which the agents are provided by two conflicting moral judgments but it's not possible for them to act upon both judgments at the same time. Proponents of moral dilemmas say that agents in conflicting situations, have to act in a way that it is morally wrong. Agents will experience negative feelings such as guilt, regret and remorse, no matter which alternative is chosen by them. Opponents, on the other hand, argue in contrary and say that these situations don't avoid incoherence in a moral theory. They claim that although a good moral theory should be action guiding in any situation, it shouldn’t provide the agent with two conflicting moral judgments. Moral dilemmas violate the principle of being action guiding in a moral theory. Proponents often argue in virtue ethics framework and believe that virtue ethic theory is coherent and action guiding and it provides an appropriate explanation for moral dilemmas.

Ontology of reasons is a topic in the broader area of the theory of reasons and is concerned with the kind of things reasons are. Factualism is one of the main views here, which treats reasons as facts. After some preliminary points, considerations for and against Factualism are reviewed. Although an attractive view, critics ascribe some unacceptable commitments to Factualism, including the thought that explanation is non-factive and that reasons play no causal role in action. In response, it is argued that by distinguishing motivating reasons from explanatory reasons, Factualism can find some way to respond to these objections or explain them away. Then, some considerations behind this distinction are explored, showing that the distinction is interesting regardless of the current debate, and Factualism's recourse to the distinction is not an ad hoc solution. Though the distinction helps Factualism to deal with some objections, we do not claim that the distinction alone is enough to respond to all objections to Factualism. This is the task of the last and the main section. The paper is closed by some concluding remarks.