جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "abstract objects" در نشریات گروه "علوم انسانی"

Is Meinongian dicopulation justified? This is the main problem in this paper and our hypothesis is that Meinongian dicopulaism is counterintuitive. This is despite the rich list of syntactic and semantic features that Meinongian advocates of the double copula strategy attribute to the Meinongian (internal/encoding) mode of predication in contrast with the ordinary mode of predication. That is what we demonstrate in this paper. We argue that neither of the requirement that Meinongian formulas (i.e. those containing the Meinongian mode of predication) must be monadic; nor that they resist lambda abstraction; nor that logical closure governs them; nor that they can be incomplete (or inconsistent) and nor that they are no way contingent, may succeed in discriminating Meinongian from ordinary predications. Nonetheless, dicopulaistic semantics support our intuitive understanding of abstract objects as sets of properties only whence they embrace the counterintuitive conception of multiple denotations; of either copulas or (abstract) objects. Meinongian dicopulaism does not work.

Contemporary Platonists acknowledge that some abstract objects, such as mathematical objects, exist necessarily, eternally and independent. On the other hand, biblical theism and classical theism acknowledge that God is the sole ultimate reality. This is the challenge that Platonism has posed to the theology of the Scriptures and classical theology, as a result of which God is not the only independent, necessary, and uncreated reality. William Craig, a contemporary American theist philosopher, believes that theism is undone by Platonism. Thus a theist cannot hold a Platonic realist view of abstract objects; And believes that abstract objects exist and are also uncreated, necessary and eternal. Craig believes that believing in beings with these qualities is incompatible with God's perfection, and the doctrine of creation. Craig cites some biblical verses to prove his view of the incompatibility of Heavyweight Platonism with traditional Christian theism. He believes that by moving from a realistic to an  Anti-realistic view of abstract objects, the above challenge will be solved. Craig's arguments do not seem to be defensible in view of wisdom rudiments   in the science of Asul (the science of principles) And the use and generalizations of the creation from the verses cited by him is not correct. In the end, Craig's main claim of passing from the Platonic realism to the view of anti-realism seems perfectly justified, although his method does not seem correct.