جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « definition » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

Based on Tabatabai’s theory and the method of logical analysis, the present research has dealt with the methodology of defining conventional concepts and presented fifteen methodological rules. The method of defining these concepts is the method of conceptual analysis, and some of the presented rules are dedicated to the basics of definition, some to its types, and some to methods for discovering the conceptual components of conventional concepts. According to these methods, it is possible to discover the components of these concepts and use these components in the definition using the method of conceptual analysis. Of course, it should be noted that the most important component of a conventional concept is its purpose, which must be used in any definition. The use of other components in the definition may vary according to each concept.

According to a narration of the Holy Prophet and the consensus of the jurists of the two major denominations (of Shi’a and Sunni), "gharar" (risk-taking) is known as one of the reasons for the invalidity of transactions. But what is the nature of gharar?
Despite its importance, there are few researchers who have studied its truth and definition; This research has tried to determine the nature of gharar by gathering different views on the definition of gharar and providing a detailed analysis of its application in jurisprudence. This research has been able to compile the sayings of the jurists in description of gharar and by providing an analysis of its application in jurisprudence, to determine the genus and nature differentia of gharar, "sale", "barters" (mu’āwiḍāt), as well as the point of view of jurists about the differentia of gharar in cases such as "impossibility to measure" or "non-safety of annihilation before deliverance" or "leading to the conflict" or "complicated and confused things" or "having risk" or "Something that its attainment is unknown" or "something that its access or its amount is unknown" or " deserving to be avoided by custom" or "its attainment being unknown". From the point of view of this research the jurisprudential definition of gharar according to the practical method of jurists is as follows: "Every exchange and anything related to it in which the existence, occurrence or value of one of the two substitutes is unknown." The result of this research will be used in the more precise implementation of the rule in jurisprudence issues and will be cited as a dynamic rule.

Studying the progress of epistemology in Islamic philosophy shows that although the issues of epistemology have not been discussed separately and seriously and are usually implicitly discussed under the headings related to ontology, at the same time there are materials that It can be a solution to the problems in epistemology. In such an intellectual environment, the research problem is clearly how to show the epistemological approach in Ibn Sina's philosophy by investigating and extracting some epistemological issues through case studies. Of course, Ibn Sina's ontological views cast a shadow on his epistemological topics such as science, abstractions, imagination, etc.; But considering that the foundations of epistemology in Islamic philosophy are based on the three foundations of sense, reason, or intuition, we can refer to the epistemological system of Islamic philosophers in general, and Hikmat Masha in particular (mainly based on reason and reasoning) and Hikmat. Sinoy realized in particular (based on reason and reasoning with the element of intuition). The importance of the research problem is in the conditions that the history of philosophy is a connected whole, and showing this connection reveals various and sometimes invisible angles of the thinking of philosophers, especially Avicenna and his followers. In fact, based on the detailed analysis of Avicenna's epistemological issues, the current research unveils another Avicenna.

In different religions, there are various concepts, and in order to better understand these concepts and propositions, it is necessary to pay attention to the key words used in each religion in order to gain a deeper understanding of the beliefs and foundations of each religion and to avoid the confusion of different topics in the complete understanding of religious propositions. In the present research, the semantics of the concept of suffering from the perspective of Buddhism and Islam is discussed in a descriptive and analytical way. In this article, the idea of Buddhism and Islam regarding the concept of suffering is described and its various aspects are examined and it is also stated that the concept of suffering from the point of view of Buddhism is one of the second concepts and from the perspective of Islam it is one of the first concepts, also from the perspective of both Suffering is a real concept. By using these explanations, it is possible to take advantage of the contents and concepts expressed in this article in researches and articles related to the concept of suffering in Buddhism and Islam and provide more complete explanations. Also, by using these descriptions, it is possible to reach the basic and main points related to this concept in these two rituals.

In the process of rapid changes in the world, tourism is no longer just a journey of horizons, learning lessons, and moral experience, but is defined as a meaning-making phenomenon based on the actors' understanding of it under the economic-cultural background in every society. The diversity and multiplicity of actors and fields of tourism formation have led to the formation of colorful definitions of tourism. In the review of the existing definitions, characteristics and features of tourism were extracted and divided under the title of fundamental and desirable principles of tourism, but none of the definitions included these principles and features at the same time. However, even if a definition includes all of the principles, there are other essential features to understand and describe tourism as a multidimensional activity that is necessary but left out or ignored. The main goal of this research is to extract and infer the abandoned or neglected characteristics of tourism in order to redefine it.

Design/methodology/approach: 

The current research follows a descriptive-exploratory method in terms of its purpose and is a mixed study, composed of both quantitative and qualitative approaches.  In terms of the audience, this study is basic research.

The findings were reported in the form of existing definitions and characteristics of tourism (thesis), neglected characteristics of tourism (antithesis), and interpretation and combination of existing and neglected characteristics of tourism and its redefinition (synthesis).

As an important result of this research, in order to define tourism, it is necessary to first define the philosophical source and approach of definition and its position in the value system of the society; is it supply-oriented, demand-oriented, or holistic? In addition, within each approach, the full features of that approach should be considered. For this purpose, the concepts can be categorized and elementized so that the definition is not lost in the heart of words and concepts, and then the categories and elements are described in a continuum.

Originality/value:

 By emphasizing that "tourism is tourism", a redefinition of tourism was presented by combining existing definitions and newly identified elements.

One of Mūllā Ṣadrā’s logical innovations based on the theory of the primacy of existence is that “the definition of an object is unique to its recent differentia”. Mūllā Ṣadrā believes that in order to achieve true unity in composite quiddity, it is necessary to gather all the previous genuses and differentias in existence or in the same recent Form and differentia; in other words, in the recent Form and differentia, they are merged and depreciated. One of the consequences of such an attitude towards the recent Form and differentia - as the provider of the true unity of the composite quiddity - is that the previous materials and genuses are integrated in a simple way in the recent chapter, but each one, in a detailed way (that is, with actualities multiple) are not the constituents of the compound object and are considered outside of its truth. The inevitable result of the above point is that the inclusion of previous genuses and differentias in the definition of quiddity is not as an intrinsic component of that, but as equipment or branches of quiddity. Ṭabāṭabāʼī, as one of the most important commentators on Mūllā Ṣadrā’s view, did not accept this view and proposed three objections to it: 1) it is not appropriate to be content with the differentia alone; while the “definition” must be detailed 2) the exclusion of previous genuses and differentias from the truth of the object requires a revolution in essence 3) The exclusion of the genuses and differentias from the truth of the object is in conflict with “dress after dress” in the substantial motion. This article, after a brief reference to Mūllā Ṣadrā’s view on the uniqueness of the definition of an object through its recent differentia, presents Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s threefold criticisms with a critical attitude. Examination of these three criticisms led to the conclusion that none of Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s criticisms is correct and that Mūllā Ṣadrā’s intention is to exclude the genuses and differentias present in the detailed order, not the genuses and differentias mentioned in the brief and simple order of the recent differentia. Also, during the study and response to Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s criticisms, some of the hidden dimensions of Mūllā Ṣadrā’s view, such as the affirmative actuality of the genuses and the previous differentias.

Shihab al-Din yahya Suhrawardi, illuminationist philosopher, explaining his epistemological views, proposed a new point of view that known as illuminationist relation and in this way he considers the acquisition of many perceptions, including vision, of through of intuitive knowledge.The present research focuses on the nature of knowledge by presence and its role in the problem of “vision.” It considers the following key question: Does Suhrawardī mean the same thing by “knowledge by presence” in all degrees of perception from the most primitive external levels—that is, vision—to the deeper levels? Then, given his epistemic model, can we treat him as a phenomenologist? The present article considers the nature of knowledge by presence in the process of vision according to Suhrawardī and presents a different approach to it. By reference to Suhrawardī’s discussion of issues of vision and a conceptual clarification of “presence,” we show that Suhrawardī could not have used the term “knowledge by presence” in the case of vision in its common sense as opposed to “knowledge by acquisition” (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī). Instead, this is a different notion, and thus the term is equivocally used in his work. Moreover, we argue that his epistemological model for vision is phenomenological. The method of research in the present article is qualitative and analytic

One of the important issues in rhetoric is the subject of definition, which is included in the issues of semantics, and for its use of high rhetorical purposes that can be discerned in Nahj al-Balaghah, i.e. elucidation, and for the use of the word is a probabilistic knowledge of the meaning it contains that cannot be expressed by denial. The definition is considered one of the rhetorical methods required by the conditions of the addressees and intended by the speaker. Grammarians spoke about it from a purely syntactic point of view, and alBayanists and scholars of rhetoric spoke about it from another angle and another field, where they talked about the purposes and reasons for which the definition is. In light of the purposes included in the speeches of Nahj al-Balaghah, we will stand in front of some of the definitions contained in them in order to reveal the secrets of its expression, adhering to the opinions of scholars. To reach this goal, we relied on the analyticaldescriptive method. That is why we have enumerated this phenomenon and clarified its aesthetics during speeches, and we have mentioned the wonderful meanings of it in some speeches, such as glorification, contempt, brevity, brevity, specialization, and ... To benefit greatness and achieve the purpose of the sermon.

Social monotheism" is a recent, new term that arose from the thought of modern-minded Muslims and social reformers, and the necessary knowledge about it has not yet been produced, therefore it is necessary to explain its nature and provide its definition. The importance of dealing with social monotheism, on the one hand, in its special place in the "social theology" and on the other hand, in the dominance of social dignity over the individual dimension of humans in today's world, is the void of a general plan for life based on the teachings of revelation and the need to respond to the emerging needs of Islamic societies which are often concerned with emerging social issues. Therefore, in the present article, an attempt is made to clarify the nature and definition of "social monotheism" by descriptive-analytical method and using library sources. The findings of the article show that "social monotheism" which is defined as a subcategory of "social theology", is the epistemic and cognitive dimensions of monotheism in the macro structure of society, which is revealed by reading "theological monotheism" with a social approach. In this social approach, monotheism, in addition to the belief aspect, is understood as a redemptive, practical, transformational plan, model and general vision that has an impact on all aspects of human life and human societies. The requirement of this understanding of monotheism is the absolute sovereignty of God, not being satisfied with the existing situation and trying to bring the society to the main goal of creation and finally realizing the monotheistic society.

Peter van Inwagen, despite of his influence in the contemporary philosophy, not in spare places, does argue and analysis contra to the accepted ways and jargon of the contemporary analytical philosophy. This has led him to adopt some unusual positions. For these perplexities we believe that his methodology and metaphilosophy need to be reconsidered. In this paper, we try to make clear his view about philosophy and its appropriate method. To do this, we will directly go through his philosophical works and try to spell out the components of his metaphilosophical puzzle: how to argue, how to define, how to analysis philosophical jargons, how to do metaphysics, what is the philosophical intuition, and metaontology. Putting all of these together will provide a complete picture of his metaphilosophy. Therefore, each section of this paper investigates one of these metaphilosophical questions. Without taking this picture to the consideration, we believe that will be impossible to understand his philosophy and its arguments properly.

The Sinan approach to the theory of definition is an explanation and expanded from of Aristotelian definition. He has accepted Aristotle’s definition of objects based on analyzing their quiddity in terms of their genus and differentia and extended it. Moreover, Ibn Sīnā has added some innovative views to it that have not received the attention that they truly deserve, and researchers have not explained and organized them in a consistent and structured from. Following a descriptive-analytic method, this paper explains the theory of Sinan definition within a consistent framework and analyzes the quality of Ibn Sīnā’s encounter with the views of Aristotle and Fārābī. Moreover, it refers to Ibn Sīnā’s innovations regarding the problem of definition and, by emphasizing its less studied aspects, responds to the following questions: to what extent is the unknown nature of objects’ differentia consistent with Ibn Sīnā’s theory on the definition and knowledge of objects? Does the theory of Sinan definition merely target quiddative affairs, or does it also extend to non-quiddative affairs? Which mechanism does Ibn Sīnā provide for defining non-quiddative affairs?

Prison is a category which is relevant to the crime and deviation (from laws, mysticism and ethics) in society. Throughout human history, there have always been those who have acted in contrast to the laws and regulations of society, and the governing systems of societies have provided punishments for such individuals to avoid society from deviating and to uphold its laws and morals. On one side, one of these practices and tools is to punish, and on the other side, to return criminals to the normal life in society. Prisons were in the early days of Islam, either in Hejaz or in Iraq. At that time, the Holy Prophet and the first caliph did not have a particular prison or place to imprison criminals. Prison was applied as a harsh punishment with very difficult conditions, more specifically against those who acted against the regime. With the advent of the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic law on Iranian prisons was implemented. Primarily the purpose of classifying prisoners is to avoid and prohibit possible harm to the prisoner, as well as to make it easier to keep prisoners, so as to make the least issues for themselves and prison officials, and to enhance the classification and education and rehabilitation of the prisoners, as well

The definition is a primary means that connects the concept with the term. On the one hand, the definition may link this process and clarify the relationships within the network of perceptions. On the other hand, it may fail to achieve its goal or may be unable to attain it on its own. Therefore, the lexicographer resorts to auxiliary means that link the concept with the term. Among these auxiliary means are: synonymy or antonymy that shows relationships within a terminological system, as well as representation, drawing, diagram, image, and reference. The research studies a number of Arabic linguistic dictionaries, as well as linguistic dictionaries translated into Arabic to show their position on the use of auxiliary means, and the role, which these auxiliary means play in clarifying terminological definitions. The results of the research show that the dictionaries that employ auxiliary means for terminological definitions provide a clear and precise explanation of the concept. As well, these dictionaries outline the terminological system within a specific scientific field.

This paper tries to analyze the important term "Attraction" in the mystical and literal texts based on the theory of definition in logic and philosophy to achieve quiddity features of the attraction that old texts overlooked to define. The present paper tries to analyze the definitions and words of mystics about the mystical term "Attraction" in the main Persian and Arabic mystical texts up to the end of 8th century by using analytical descriptive approach. None of the texts has defined Attraction features comprehensively. This study is done based on the original texts and the information attributed to Attraction and related expressions are gathered and could achieve quiddity features of attraction from these texts and gave a more complete definition. This principle can be applied in the other fields of mystical expressions.

In criminal law specially and in other law disciplines generally the definition has high importance. Because it shows either the scope or realm of related discipline and avoid scattering them and also ensure the respect to the individual rights on the society. From 300 years ago with initiation of modern criminal law, the necessity of “nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege” as a fundamental rights of human beings entered in constitutional laws and charters, even taught many years before traditionally in Islamic or Christians orders this has been seen. In civil law countries like Iran, fulfillment of these rights in criminal law primarily necessitates “the definition of crime” in penal code. As the Iranian new penal code enacted recently and is effective from June 2013, in this paper the author analyses the “definition of crime” cited in article 2 and its innovations and challenges.

The systematic logic is a framework of thought that doesn't have the breaks of Aristotelian logic of definition. Considering the problems of the logic of definition, this research tries to investigate the systematic logic in the matter of definition. The real definition must be found in a network of various approaches and this research has dealt with the circumstance of systematic attitude to the logic of definition using library method and descriptive-analytic approach. The main question is'' what is the way of the systematic definition"? The result is that the definition is a network of necessary approaches for the knowledge in connected aspects. Each of the approaches clarifies one aspect of unknown conceptual and based on this attitude the real definition is examined in the three verbal, conceptual, and instance levels which in fact is considered as a new model for identification.

In Kant’s view, there is no proof in the proper sense of the term as far as philosophical knowledge is concerned; proof applies only to mathematical knowledge, indeed. This is because, Kant believes, mathematical proofs are intuitive and a certainty-conferring argument counts as a proof insofar as it is intuitive. We should therefore see what intuition is for Kant and what the relation is between intuitions and proofs in his philosophy. Drawing on a descriptive-analytic method, this paper seeks first to clarify what Kant means by the intuition in virtue of which a certainty-conferring argument becomes a proof, and then what relation holds between such an intuition and proofs. Is the intuition in question associated with the structure of the proof or is it just associated with preliminaries of the proof? In this paper, I argue that, first of all, the intuition Kant has in mind in his discussion of argument is pure intuition, which, he believes, is exemplified in space and time that are connecting factors of empirical intuitions in understanding—indeed, it is in these two intuitions that all demonstrative and necessary mathematical knowledge is grounded. Secondly, in Kant’s view, the only axioms and preliminaries of proofs are intuitive, which implies that the distinction between proofs and philosophical arguments does not lie in their natures or structures; it lies, instead, in the fact that the premises of a syllogistical arguments are intuitive.

Many Muslim theologians have examined the nature of moral goodness and badness when discussing divine actions. In the meantime, most of them have defined moral goodness and badness on the basis of other concepts that considered more basic. The most frequent definitions of good and bad in their works can be divided into three general groups: negative definitions, positive definitions and definitions containing elements of divine reward or punishment. On "negative definitions" moral good action is defined using the means of negation (not merited vituperation); but this is not the case in positive definitions. An examination of the historical developments of the definitions by Imamiyyah shows that Nasir al-Din al-Tusi is a turning point in this regard in three respects. The first is that the theologians before him, with the exception of Abu al-Salah al-Halabi, defined the good and the bad negatively, while most theologians after al-Tusi have turned away from negative definitions in an attempt to provide a positive definition or a definition containing reward and punishment. Second, among the Mu'tazilites and the Imamī mutakallimun, al-Tusi was the first theologian to use the elements of divine reward or punishment in one of his definitions; and this definition has given rise to new theoretical discussions among theologians after him. And thirdly, before al-Tusi, the most Mu'tazilī and Imamī theologians used the element of "entitlement", while al-Tusi is the first one who removed the element of "merit" (Istihqaq) in one of his definitions and used the element of "necessity" instead.

Much of the classical and contemporary Persian poetry is composed of short poems such as couplet and quatrain. Also, contemporary poets have shown increasing interest in short poetry. Although researchers have attempted to identify the components of short poetry and to this end have mentioned the brevitas features, the limited usage of the verb, the ending stroke, the image-orientation, the limited use of the rhyme, and naturalism; these features mostly refer to the description of the short poem, and no unanimous definition is available yet. For example, the outer limit is sometimes referred to as one page, sometimes up to seven rows and sometimes up to five portions. As for its internal and semantic limits, they enumerate the function of the fundamental scheme and effect of the moment. This article critically analyzes the descriptions and definitions of researchers on short poetry and attempts to provide a more accurate definition of the short poem using an analytical method. As a result, this article considers short poetry based on its fundamental technique, to be with limited lines or hemistiches, and finally, "independent monolithic limited poetry with a greater tendency for the discourse of wisedom."