جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "embodied subject" در نشریات گروه "علوم انسانی"

A group of professors and philosophers have written a series of articles on the full range of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, introducing the views of this French phenomenological philosopher, a philosopher who tried to overcome the dichotomies between consciousness and the world as well as consciousness and the body by emphasizing the bodily subject. They aim to acquaint academic and non-university audiences with his ideas. This work, which was published by Cambridge University Press in 2005 in the form of a collection of articles entitled “The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-ponty”, was translated by Ms. Hanieh Yaseri and published by Ghognoos Publications in Iran in 2012. In this article, we intended to critically examine the Persian translation of this work. Although the author has chosen a valid book for translation, the existence of many formal and content problems, such as not using uniform terms, non-observance of Persian grammar rules, and many inaccuracies, has made the translation of this work have not worthy of its original text and its content don’t understand properly.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is a 20th century French phenomenologist. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology is a phenomenology of sensory perception and he is trying to describe the essence of human sensory perception as an embodied subject. In this interdisciplinary study, we use Merleau-Ponty's pheno- menology to describe the sensory perception of contemporary human beings in cyberspace. In addition to establishing physical relationships with other people, the current embodied subject creates extensive virtual relationships with other subjects on a virtual platform on the Internet. According to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, the embodied subject in virtual relationships faces multiple relations in cyberspace and percept too many objects. The meanings that the embodied subject receives through his modern life in cyberspace from the objects and other embodied subjects in this space are ambiguous and opaque, despite their great extent.

The notion of space is one of the most interesting and attractive topics in Merleau-Ponty̕ s phenomenology of perception. Unlike Husserl who looks for certain facts in the field of pure consciousness, i.e., in the field devoid of natural assumptions such as time and place, but more like Heidegger’s idea of Being- in- the- world as the essential state of human beings; Merleau-Ponty believes that cognition of space is an a priori condition for our knowledge of objects and events. In addition, through more reflection on the psycho-physiological findings in contemporary psychology, Merleau-Ponty argues that our body is the ground or horizon by which objects take spatial features, and therefore it is the source of a dual relation between the subject and the world. He reiterates the point that all of our experiences followed by creation of new spatial levels that formed successively, and that our experiences are the result of the formation of new spatial levels of embodiment subject. A significant result of this view is that the individual subject is a historical one whose moments are formed by successive experiences in which the body’s spatial levels are aggregated to form a more complete special level compared with the previous ones.