جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « برنامه هسته ای ایران » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

According to the non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, enjoyment of nuclear energy for the peaceful purposes is the right of the independent countries. But the pursuit and effort of the Republic of Islamic of Iran to gain this right has become the greatest challenge in the foreign policy of this country and clearly a contrast between Iran and the unites States of America and will continue in the indefinite future. The main question is what is the relationship between elites and nation of Iran and America with the formation of the confrontational foreign policy and the disagreement in the nuclear program of Iran? Scientific findings of this research shows, while the main competition between the American presidents is how to curb Iran's nuclear program, Iran's leader's emphasis on promoting nuclear knowledge and the policy of the presidents of Iran is in how to promote it. According to the writers of this research, using James Roseau’s national and international theory is a suitable approach for addressing this subject. They have also tried to provide an appropriate answer to this question using explanatory method, library resource documents and a few statistical resources.

In the Begin Guide, no adversary of Israel in the Middle East should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. Therefore, Israel has used various strategies since the beginning of facing Iran's nuclear case, the common denominator of which is stopping the nuclear program and preventing it from acquiring nuclear weapons. The current research answered the question: What was Israel's strategy in the face of Iran's nuclear program during the era of Trump and Biden? The hypothesis of the research in the framework of nuclear deterrence and with an emphasis on Begin's doctrine states that: Israel's strategy in facing Iran's nuclear program in the Trump era, pressure on the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA, and in the Biden era to try to Iran's nuclear case was referred to the Security Council under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. From this point of view, Israel, which considered the JCPOA ineffective in curbing Iran's nuclear program; In line with Trump, he reached his main goal, that is, the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA. During the period of Biden, Israel, while consulting with the Western negotiating parties to persuade them not to revive the JCPOA, by repeating claims about the activity of secret nuclear sites and fueling Iran's and IAEA's safeguard disputes, followed by the referral of the case. It is a nucleus from the Council of Governors to the Security Council.The descriptive-analytical research method and the data collection tool are authentic domestic and foreign library sources.

In recent years, the United States has defined its foreign policy toward Iran on a variety of issues. Iran's nuclear program, Iran's defense program in the development of missile activities and the regional approach are among the topics of interest to the United States towards Iran, which has pursued various policies to counter them. Imposition of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, maximum pressure and disruption of Iran's regional and international interactions and relations can be considered as pressure to change Iran's approach. Among the issues raised was Iran's nuclear program, which led to the JCPOA, which was on the verge of collapse with the withdrawal of the United States and the subsequent reduction of Iran's commitments. The Biden administration came to power with the slogan of returning to the nuclear deal at a time when curbing Iran's regional approach and missile program remains an important issue for the United States. Using functionalist theory and descriptive-analytical method, the present study seeks to answer the question that what approach will the United States take to confront regional policies and develop Iran's missile program? In response, the United States will re-accede to the nuclear deal in order to extend it to other Iranian policies, including missile and regional activities, and to change Iran's position

Iran's nuclear program, in the eyes of the West, has the potential to lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Therefore, this program, along with the anti-Westernism of the Islamic Republic, is considered a security threat to the West and especially to the United States.The West has two general approaches to limiting Iran's nuclear capability: a peaceful solution or punitive measures and military action.US President Barack Obama has accepted a peaceful solution, which is in line with the UN Charter. This view emphasized multilateralism and the role of international organizations. Negotiations between Iran and the six world powers eventually led to the signing of a "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action " or "JCPOA" agreement. Under the agreement, Iran accepted extensive restrictions of its nuclear program, and instead lifted all UN sanctions, as well as unilateral US and European sanctions. Because the agreement was about international security, the same agreement was passed by the UN Security Council.Trump, the next president of the United States, called "JCPOA" against the national interest and unilaterally withdrew.The question is, what has the Security Council done to violate the UN Security Council? The hypothesis is that the violation of the UN Security Council by the United States is the most serious and clear example of the ineffectiveness of the Security Council in maintaining an agreement on the maintenance of international peace and security.

The present research aims at examining the role of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) organization, which is known as a political thin tank and lobby in the U.S. foreign policy. Think tanks and political lobbies, as informal actors, have influenced the U.S. foreign policy since their emergence. UANI have focused on Iran’s nuclear program. The think tank established by former U.S. ambassador to the UN during Bush’s tenure, Mark Wallace, the U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan and the U.S. ambassador to the UN during Clinton’s tenure, Richard Holbrooke, former CIA director, Jim Woolsey, and expert on Middle East, Dennis Ross, has launched various domestic and international activities against Iran. This research seeks to answer the following question using system theory in decision-making theory: What are UANI’s tools for influencing the U.S. foreign policy and what is its role in the U.S. foreign policy towards Iran’s nuclear program? Connection with the main power centers and formal actors in the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process, interaction with high-ranking officials in the U.S. foreign policy realm, and relationship with main lobbies in the U.S., are some of UANI’s activities that demonstrate its active role in the U.S. foreign policy.

Iran’s immediate response to the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal was not a full resumption of its nuclear activities. Instead, Tehran tried to salvage the deal. This behavior is quite different from Iran’s nuclear policy in the time span from 2005 to 2013 when Iran tried to advance its nuclear program despite the sanctions. In this paper, the question is: why Iran was insisting on its maximum advancement of its nuclear program during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but sought reconciliation under Ruhani and tried to salvage the nuclear deal after the US withdrawal? To answer this question, using the analytical-descriptive method, some cognitive theories are applied. The cognitive view demonstrates that Iran’s policy makers perception of being in the win domain during Ahmadinejad presidency, led them to consider a nuclear reconciliation a loss that cannot be made for by the received advantages. The change in the Iranian policy makers’ perception about the costs of the nuclear deal and the placement of the country in the loss domain, led to the gradual readiness for an agreement and then salvaging it. In the same vein, the justice seeking attitude of Ahmadinejad on one hand and the unjust quality of the great powers’ proposals on the other hand, resulted in the rejection of such proposals; in contrast, the interactive attitude of Ruhani in addition to the readiness of the great powers to hold a balance in securing Iran’s interests facilitated his administration bids to reach an agreement and preserve it.

Before the Comprehensive Joint Action Plan in July 2015, over a decade, the nuclear program of Iran left many influences on mental and behavioral atmosphere of the Middle East. Considering the different dimensions of the nuclear program, especially in terms of its relevance and its impact on the regional order of the Middle East, is important in two directions. First, in terms of the place and significance of the nuclear agreement in foreign policy - especially in the Middle East regional order - comparable to the period before BARJAM. Second, attention to the regional actors’ mindset on the path of shaping foreign policy and understanding the linkage and systemic relationship between foreign policy issues and the regional environment and exploiting it as an important experience in the diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, in the recent article, in response to this central  question, we ظseek to  answer the question that “what are the Iranian nuclear program impacts on the Middle East regional order (2005-2013)?” In response, this hypothesis has been analyzed that Iran’s nuclear program and diplomacy (before the agreement) has led to threatening and reinforcing the hostile mentality of regional actors and contradictions in the regional Middle East order which can be seen in various instances, including arms races, the prevention of the issuance of Iranian revolutionary thoughts as a threat to the interests of the West and the Arabs, the consensus of the units to isolate Iran, the security queue to confront the all aspects of interests and the sanctions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The research method is descriptive-analytical and data collection method is also the library, the use of journals and valid articles.

Russia has been one of the most influential actors in the technical and political process of Iran's nuclear. But there are no similar views on its approach. In order to evaluate these views, the question of this research is whether the factors affecting the formation of Russia's technical and political approaches and behaviors to Iran’s nuclear program? In response to this question, This is a hypothesis the authors believe that Moscow's approach should be assessed in the context of its global foreign policy, in relation to the global, regional and nuclear role of Russian foreign policy, as a result of its identity discourses. Moscow's quest for global and regional roles and Russian nuclear rituals along with economic and international factors at different time points together have a different impact over time and the level of technical and political cooperation with it. So emphasis on one of these factors not only leads to reductions, but also does not explain the change in Russia's attitudes and behaviors. This research has used a descriptive-analytical method to study its hypothesis as well as use of library resources and interviews.

The nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran has become one of the major international conflicts and disputes over the past decade as the main theme of our country's foreign policy. It is also noteworthy that the same viewpoint did not exist in Iran's nuclear program in domestic and foreign spheres, and different approaches and perspectives have been raised about the nature of this issue. The Russian Federation is one of those actors that play a direct and indirect role in this matter.
This country has always had an important role in the continuity and extent of Iran's nuclear activities and its role cannot be compared with any other country. Conditions such as Russia's nuclear-technical cooperation with Iran, its interests in how our country's nuclear activities are operating and its specific conditions, such as its permanent membership in the Security Council and the geographic situation of Russia and Iran, caused to increase the importance of its role. But there are different views on the role and approach. One of the reasons for the divergent views on this issue is the adoption of different and two-way behaviors from Russia over various dimensions of Iran's nuclear file over the past two decades. Considering the importance of Russian role in Iran's nuclear case this article trying to answer the question why Russia's ambivalent and ambiguous approach towards Iran's nuclear program is adopted?
To answer this question, it is necessary to pay attention to the material and identity dimensions shaping the principles of Russia's foreign policy. In response to the research question, the hypotheses generated that Eurasianism identity discourse assumes roles such as "great power", "regional superpower" and "nuclear superpower" for Russia. As a result, Russia has been cooperating with Iran to develop its nuclear energy program on the one hand, and on the other hand, it has been preventing a remarkable progress of Iran's nuclear technology, while opposing to measures such as military action to avoid severe weakening of Iran, since a nuclear Iran will be a powerful regional rival for Russia. Any military strike against Iran or undermine its goals could possibly result in turning this country into a base for U.S.'s in the southern borders of Russia. Each of these situations is in conflict with Russia's foreign policy main roles. The research to advance his hypothesis uses the analytical method and the library resources and benefited interview.
Since the beginning of the disagreement over Iran's nuclear program, Russia has been pushing for an effective role in this issue as an international conflict under the influence of the effort to acquire the role of a great global power. But the two other roles of Moscow, namely, superpower and regional superpower, have imposed a framework on Russia's role in Russia and its mechanisms for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue. This is how the Russians strongly oppose the militarization of Iran's nuclear program and do not want their nuclear monopoly broken up in the region. It has also opposed any possible increase in Iran's power as a potential competitor in the region. The two other concerns of the Russians, which shaped the two-way approach of the activist, were the beginning of a war against Iran or Iran's proximity to the west. Since each of these two situations also has consequences for Russia, so too to avoid these two situations, mechanisms such as accompanying sanctions against the use of a military option or creating conditions for the reciprocity of the negotiating solution have priority.
It can be stated that Russia's approach to Iran's nuclear program can be explained by considering these mechanisms: Russian nuclear doctrine and Iran's nuclear program, the potential increase in Iran's capability and Russia's superpower role in the region, preventing any military strike against Iran and preventing its friendship with the west. The elite of the foreign policy apparatus of Russia has been trying to make the most of the interest in the subject of Iran's nuclear negotiations as one of its foreign policy issues, which has been linked to other issues, and follow their desired roles in a better way. In this regard, in recent years, it has used this as a means of engagement, confrontation or chaos to the West, even in relation to other issues, and while continuing its nuclear cooperation with Iran, they agreed to adopt sanctions against Iran. In assessing Russia's compliance with the sanctions against Iran for these reasons, it should be noted: Rejecting the Russian proposal by Iran to resolve nuclear disputes during the 2011 negotiations, Moscow's motivation to show its legitimate image in the international community, stop the progress of the Iranian nuclear program.
With regard to the nuclear deal, conditions such as concerns about unilateral action by the United States against Iran and the benefits of lifting sanctions against Iran have led Russia to be enthusiastic in the resumption of talks, despite the initial escalation of sanctions against Iran, with the United States, over the past few years. Of course, Russia continued to strive for its priorities, such as extensive oversight of Iran's activities, along with the removal of trade restrictions. Despite Russia's disputes with the west, Both Russia and the United States have directed their policy on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, working with Washington to achieve this goal is still meaningful for Moscow. So, to achieve this goal, Russia was inclined to advance negotiations. Another issue is the restoration of Russia's image in the nuclear talks. It should also be noted that Russia's real ability to create a barrier to a nuclear deal was not enough strong. The nuclear deal's implications have also been a major issue for Moscow, which provided Russia with Iran with much more nuclear and commercial cooperation.

US foreign policy toward Iran after the Islamic Revolution has had an adversarial approach and has been under the influence of centers of power against the normalization of ties between the two countries. Pro-Israel lobbies, without doubt, play an important role in adversely affecting US-Iran relations. Yet, Arab lobbies supported by some countries in the Middle East try to intensify the hostility between the US and Iran. The main question this paper tries to answer is “How Arab lobbies influence US foreign policy against Iran?” It’s assumed that portraying Iran’s power to be destructive to Middle East stability in order to intensify Iran-phobia and influence US foreign policy against Iran is the strategy these lobbies pursue. Arab lobbies have partly succeeded in achieving their goals, but the development in the Middle East and the future of energy (especially oil) cause the long-term outlook of these lobbies to be unclear. Using descriptive-interpretive this paper tries to analyze the main components in Arab lobbying and the reasons for the weakening of their role based on current developments and strategic foresight.

Iran's nuclear programme is one of the most important issues that bears upon Iran-Russia relations. Understanding how Russia behaves towards Iran's nuclear programme can play a significant role in decision-making on the part of Iranin this regard. It seems that Russia, in the case of Iran's nuclear programme has pursued dual-positions. Sometimes, Russia has cooperated with Iran in the field of itsnuclearprogramme, and sometimes in line with the West, Russia has obstructed it. the article aims to explain this duality in behavior of Russia. The authors believe that one significant factor in keeping Russia with Iran is Russia's attempts to revive Russian identity that has been marred by Western policies. This factor is understandable within constructivism.Also Russia's obstructions against Iran's nuclear programme due to geopolitical rivalries, and Russia's concern over Iran becoming a serious rival within southern borders, can be perceived within geopolitics theory. The research method of the article is descriptive-analytical.

Americas foreign policy during the rule of the neo-conservatives in dealing with Iran's nuclear program was based on hard power, which was not successful and led to an increase in Irans nuclear power. Obama, who rose to power with the slogan of “change” and solving Irans nuclear challenge with diplomacy, chose a smart approach which can be labeled as smart power (as opposed to hard power), a combination of hard and soft power. The main question of this article is how Obama could demonstrate Iran’s nuclear issue as a threat against the international peace and security, and gain Russian and European powers cooperation and approval as Iran’s partners to increase pressures on Iran.We argue that Obamas smart-power approach and his emphasis on multilateralism and political cooperation with European countries and Russia has increased political and economic pressures on Iran and their cooperation withThe United States policies. This paper will explain the definition of smart power and The United States reasons for implementing this policy, while emphasizing on approaches forThe United States policies to be associated with the great powers. The research methods used in this paper areanalytic and descriptive.

The JACPOA has set some limitations and restriction on Iran’s nuclear activities while specifying some rights and privileges for Iran in nuclear, economic, financial, monetary and insurance fields for Iran. Putting an end on “possible Military dimensions”, removal of the threat of a coercive action under chapter VII of the UN Charter against Iran, termination of the nuclear related sanctions imposed by the EU and the USA, establishing the right of Iran to enjoy nuclear enrichment and heavy water technology and facilitation of its cooperation with other international partners in the field of nuclear activities are some the legal achievements that the author is discussing at this paper.

An in depth review of US policies on Iran reveals that Congress, the Israeli lobbies, the White House, think tanks and the media are the key players in the country''s foreign policy and a kind of intellectual alignment - there are procedural and interaction. So that the concept of think tanks and processing scenarios justify public functions and role of architects’ sanctions are responsible for the implementation and operation of the sanctions and give them feedback or expert advice about draft bills. In this article we''re going to role of think tanks in America to impose nuclear sanctions against Iran.

In the conflict of Iran's nuclear case, Russian has always tried to adopt buffer stance to protect its interests at the same time on both sides of the conflict say Tehran and the West. Despite Moscow's claims on the normality of this approach – independent game in a complex environment, excessive dependence of Moscow's game on "SU" variable and assuming that the other end of the equation namely Iran has minor importance, can be regarded as the concrete manifest of the flaws in this policy. In overall estimation and regardless of some tactical variations, the nature of Moscow's role on Iran's nuclear case was not more than a passive action in the frame constructed by US. Due to this consequential performance, Kremlin's theoretical knowledge on the objectives of the pressure on Tehran – which is aimed to accommodate it to Washington's Long-term excesses in the Middle East –has not entered in the context of the "practical" policy of Russia. This behavior is inconsistent with the alleged principles of Moscow in opposing US expansionism and incompatible with its being as a "great independent power".