جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « indonesia » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

The idea of Indonesia joining BRICS came up more than a decade ago. Since 2011, analysts have proposed Indonesia as one of the candidates to join BRICS. Since 2011, Indonesia has participated in some BRICS meetings, and in the past two years, the issue of Indonesia's formal accession to BRICS has been revived and raised with the support of actors such as China. With the possibility of Indonesia joining BRICS increasing again in July 2023, Indonesia accepted the invitation to participate in the 2023 BRICS Summit. The President of this country. Joko Widodo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and other Indonesian officials went to Johannesburg to participate in this summit. But, Indonesia did not show a serious desire to join BRICS. The question of this article is: Why Indonesia has no desire to join BRICS, despite its extensive economic, political and institutional capacities? The hypothesis is that Indonesia intends to become the fifth best economy in the world based on the 2045 plan. In order to achieve this goal, it should be in the framework of multilateralism and accept the principles and norms of the international system. To investigate this issue, which is done with the qualitative research method, first, the relationship between BRICS, Global South and Indonesia and the capacities that exist in BRICS for Indonesia will be discussed, and then the reasons for Indonesia not joining BRICS will be investigated.

The destructive effects of climate change on the vital resources of countries have caused countries and international organizations to make dealing with it as one of the main agendas of their policies. However, the success rate of countries in this area has been different. Focusing on the Indonesian case study and using the descriptive-analytical method and data analysis of international organizations, this article answers the question of how increasing cooperation at different levels can reduce climate change in a country. The findings of the article show that although Indonesia is in the list of the top 10 carbon producing countries in the world, since 2015, there has been a noticeable change in dealing with climate change in this country. Focusing on the state of domestic and international cooperation in Indonesia, the research shows that this country has been able to create a network of cooperation at different internal and external levels and improve climate change management.

This article investigates the feasibility of Malaysia and Indonesia, as two Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, joining the Abraham Accords. Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, is also one of the emerging economies of the world and expected to become one of the five largest economic powers in the future. Malaysia, a Muslim country with a flourishing economy, industry, and academic circles, is also among the most important Muslim countries in the world. Their location in Southeast Asia, hosting 240 million Muslims, and lying at the forefront of the geopolitical battle between the United States of America and China, adds to their importance.
On September 15, 2020, President Donald Trump, along with Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel, and the foreign ministers of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, unveiled the Abraham Accords. Bahrain and the UAE became the first countries in the Persian Gulf to recognize Israel. Since then, Sudan and Morocco have also normalized their relations with Israel, and the United Arab Emirates has signed a trade agreement with Israel.
From August to December 2020, Israel normalized its relations with the four countries of the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco. It is said that the Abraham Accords could potentially expand to include up to ten countries.
Using the descriptive-analytical method and library sources, this article seeks to determine the feasibility of Malaysia and Indonesia normalizing relations with Israel and joining the Abraham Accords. Forging a relationship with Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country, has always been of paramount importance for Israel. Before the start of the so-called Abraham peace process, there was an idea among some that establishing relations with Indonesia could be a turning point in Israel's relations with Muslim countries. If other Muslim countries witnessed the normalization of Israel's relations with the largest and most populous Muslim country, it would be possible for Jakarta to become a model for them to follow. However, it has not been possible for Israel to establish relations with Indonesia, and Jakarta is one of the 28 countries that have not officially recognized Israel. In addition, according to a BBC survey conducted in 2017, only 9% of the people in Indonesia have a positive view of the foreign policy of Israel. Even in the Pew Institute survey in 2007, Indonesia ranked first in terms of solidarity with Palestine and opposition to Israel after five Middle Eastern countries.
Regarding Malaysia, the anti-Israel sentiment among Malaysians is also high. According to a survey conducted by the Anti-Defamation League, 61% of the country's population have anti-Semitic sentiments. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Institute, only 11% of Malaysians support Israel in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and 82% are pro-Palestine.
When analyzing the feasibility of normalizing relations between Malaysia and Indonesia, several factors must be considered. One of the influencing factors is the United States of America. Both Malaysia and Indonesia are not among the so-called revisionist governments in the international order, and they may join the Abraham Accords if they are encouraged, insisted or forced by the United States. This is especially true for Indonesia, as we have seen the efforts of the Trump and Biden administrations to have Indonesia join the Jirga of Abraham Pact member states.
Another important point that can affect the normalization of relations between Malaysia and Indonesia with Israel is Saudi Arabia's joining the Abraham Accords. Indonesia and Malaysia have warm relations with Saudi Arabia, which is the second Middle East partner of Malaysia, and relations between Indonesia and Saudi Arabia are also warm. According to the 2021 survey by Australia's Lowy Institute, Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, is the most popular foreign leader in Indonesia. Therefore, it can be argued that Saudi Arabia's joining the process of normalizing relations between Muslim countries and Israel can also influence Indonesia and Malaysia and encourage them to do so.
In conclusion, while the hypothesis of this research was based on the proposition that Indonesia and Malaysia joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing relations with Israel is not likely, the findings of the research confirm this hypothesis. Due to various reasons, especially the strong anti-Israel sentiments of the people of these two countries, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur's joining the Abraham Accords is not likely, at least in the current time frame. However, factors such as the role-playing of the United States may make the atmosphere for the normalization of Indonesia's relations with Israel more favorable than that of Malaysia.

The existence of piracy, especially in connection with the attempted robbery that occurs in water areas, has long been recognized. The latest incidents of Somali piracy on an Indonesian ship with the hostage taking of the crew in exchange for large-scale ransom from the Indonesian government and the piracy of the Straits of Malacca (in western Malaysia) have attracted the attention of the World Association for the Recognition of Pirates. There were no restrictions on circulation and their functions. The problem of piracy requires many aspects. Most pirate attacks occur in the Anambas, Natuna and Marundang Islands, areas where pirates use the darkness of night to attack ships. The punitive response of Indonesian authorities to the arrested pirates is also very mild and superficial, and this issue has raised the concern of the international community. In Indonesia, the punishment for pirates is two to four years in prison. It is therefore appropriate for the international community to establish a tribunal and to restore international criminal justice by determining the amount of a fixed penalty in its rules of procedure for the crime of piracy.

In today's world, education is the fourth dimension of foreign policy. Educational cooperation is a kind of investment for the future of diplomatic relations among nations. Since the most political elites are selected from academia, the expansion of international scholarships and the admission of international students are two ways of introduction of their cultures and communities to the future political leaders and the senior executives around the world. Academic relations can also develop political and economic relations between the governments. It is argued that from an economic point of view, science and technology diplomacy can save countries’ national economies, because, first, it accelerates countries’ scientific development; second, it creates a wealth of economic experience and connections, and third, it expands trade, industry, science, and national gross income as an economic resource. From a cultural point of view, the most important function of science and technology diplomacy is to spread and export the values, principles, norms, and meanings of the national culture of countries to the international arena. One of the pillars of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran since the ninth government onward has been to expand the relations with Asian countries in the form of Look East Policy. This article tries to analyze and evaluate a part of Look East Policy, namely science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the countries of the Southeast Asia region, especially the Islamic countries of this region. On this basis, we first address the issue of what is science and technology diplomacy and what are its components, features, and dimensions. Secondly, what are the goals and manifestations of this type of diplomacy? Third, what is the place of science and technology diplomacy in the Look East Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and finally, how is Iran's science and technology diplomacy evaluated in relation to the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, namely Malaysia and Indonesia?

If we want to study the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, this study has to be done based on documented data. Unfortunately, there was no data on the country of Brunei in the research process, and therefore, this country was removed from the list of countries which were surveyed. There were also scattered data on scientific and technological cooperation of Iran on the one hand and Malaysia and Indonesia on the other hand, based on which the data of this topic has been adjusted. However, the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia is significant in some indicators, including joint scientific productions with researchers from Malaysia, the establishment of a Persian language department at Putra University Malaysia and the conclusion of memorandums and academic agreements, but in some respects it still needs further strengthening. It seems that before addressing other indicators of the science and technology diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran toward the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, the issue of reviewing the Look East Policy should be on the agenda of the country's policymakers. Accordingly, the Look East Policy should move away from the initial reactionary and reflective status and become a strategic and long-term plan of Iran's foreign policy. The Islamic Republic of Iran can easily expand its cooperation with the mentioned countries in various fields, including science and technology, by belonging to the civilization of the Orient and having some cultural and religious commonalities and historical relations with the inhabitants of the Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, it must take a strategic and long-term approach to the great society of the East and devise a suitable strategy to make optimal use of the maximum capacity of Asian countries and promote its national interests.

In this regard, due to some cultural and religious commonalities, and historical relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, it is possible to come up with proposals focusing on different dimensions of diplomacy, which can be viewed as strategies for expanding science and technology diplomacy under the Look East Policy:• Holding joint scientific conferences and meetings in various areas;
• Identifying the scientific capabilities of the Islamic countries of the region and trying to strengthen relations in those fields;
• Compilation of a science and technology diplomacy document and determining the position of Islamic countries in the Southeast Asian region;
• Making efforts at further expansion of the exchange of professors and students between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic countries of the region;
• Promoting cooperation of national scientific and technological institutions with their counterparts in the Islamic countries of the region;
• Establishig Persian language departments in Malaysian and Indonesian universities;
• Using the capacity of regional institutions and organizations to expand scientific and technological relations;
• Holding training courses for Iranian ambassadors and diplomats in the countries of the region to get acquainted with science and technology diplomacy as well as the scientific developments in the country of mission.

National authorities regulating currency generally do not have direct jurisdiction over virtual currencies, to date, as they are not national fiat currencies. However, currency regulators are influencing development of digital currency in several key indirect ways. Through their authority to protect the value and integrity of national fiat currencies, they take actions affecting digital currencies claiming that such actions are necessary to protect their national currency. Additionally, as these regulators generally have the authority to control the activities of banks and other key financial institutions, they influence digital currency development and use by restricting the ability of those institutions to use or accept virtual currency. Currency regulators commonly have jurisdiction over conversion of foreign currency, and through this role, they now routinely restrict the ability of parties to conduct conversions between digital currencies and traditional national currencies. National currency regulators have also issued substantial warnings to consumers of the risks associated with digital currency use. Currency regulators often have authority over funds transmission and money transfers, and they frequently exercise that jurisdiction in the context of virtual currency use. Some government are now exploring the possibility of government controlled digital currency and of government participation in the blockchain of existing virtual currency platforms.

Each revolution has more or less regional and international influences and offers a message to create its own strategic depth. The more the message of the revolution is, the more humankind will come to accept and model it. The Iranian revolution presents the message to the world that the most mobilizable ideologies are Islam, and based on this message, the victory of the Iranian revolution has been the basis for the widespread transformation among Muslims in the world, and many political systems, factions and parties in the neighboring countries And far away, they have been influenced by it. Indeed, the Iranian revolution is considered to be one of the important events of the 20th century by restoring the thought of Islam and political Islam. The purpose of this article is to explain the limited reflection of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in Indonesia based on the theory of broadcasting and using the descriptive-analytical method and librarian method for information gathering. Therefore, this paper attempts to answer this question using the theory of broadcasting "why the reflection of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in Indonesia has been limited" and the hypothesis of "the existence of problems such as the existence of different perspectives on the flow of the issuance of revolution and The power of the military at the source and destination of the game, namely, Iran and Indonesia, has prevented the spread of thoughts and ideas of the revolution ". The findings of this study were that, given the problems that existed in the two Islamic countries at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Republic gradually abandoned the policy of exporting the revolution to Indonesia and began to expand its economic relations with the country

The Islamic religious movements of Indonesia's Muslims are diversified in their interaction with the Middle East's intellectual currents. Muslim groups have experienced epistemological religious polarization and live in a culturally religious pluralist system. The country has the largest Muslim population among Islamic countries and is considered one of the largest archipelago of East Asia. Most Muslims in the country have Shafi'i religion in jurisprudence, and in theology are Matoridye. They turned to the formation of a new political system to emancipate colonial oppression. This Muslim country came to independence in 1945, and the revolutionary leaders of these islands experienced many epistemological religious movements. In this paper, we are going to take this question, what are Indonesian religious movements and will express their influence on the Islamic religious movements of the Middle East, in a similar way with the approach of historical sociology and analytical-descriptive methods.  

 The role of Sufism and Mysticism in Islamization process in Southeast Asia is of great importance, and solid proofs and undeniable evidence also implies this role. Islam entered Southeast Asia at a time when Hinduism and Buddhism dominated widespread parts of the region, and through the understanding of the commonalities that existed between the semantics of Islamic Sufism and Hinduism, the Muslim promoters made it easy to communicate and introduce Islam. The Sufis traveled to the lands of Southeast Asia with merchant ships and were able to play a key role in the civilization of this region. An important point in the importance of understanding the role of the Sufi flow in the Malay culture is that the most of Sufi works remained in this region are inspired by Persian and Hindu Sufism and the religious beliefs of the early promoters who introduced Islam to the communities of this region had been influenced by the spiritual and mystical teachings of the Sufis and prominent Iranian and Shiite figures.

There are many intellectual and epistemic foundations for Indonesian Muslims. They are politically influenced by overseas cultures. With respect to their different tendencies in the intellectual and social discussions, and their interactions with the Middle East, especially by attending the Hajj and familiarity with the propaganda of Wahhabism, they have turned to different streams and various cultural orientations. Two axes of power called Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama with more than thirty million followers have a great role among Indonesian Muslims. Using both the historical research method and the analysis of the leaders' words, the intellectual and epistemic foundations of each are alluded in this essay. The central question of the research is to know the differences and commonalities of the intellectual and epistemic foundations of both Muhammadiyah movement and Nahdlatul Ulama movement. The new achievements of the research include formulation of these two intellectual axes, identification of their commonalities with other Islamic denominations, as well as explanation of their historical context.

Today, it seems that the growth of violent instances of Islamic extremism is not limited to Middle East, West Asia and Africa. Other regions of the world such as Southeast Asia –where Islam has been always known as “smiling” and where the nature of historical consciousness of nations has been replete with tolerance due to the long presence of spiritual and ethical religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism and Islamic Sufism – have inclined toward religious violence and extremism. This is proved by the rise of tens of radical Islamic organizations in this region, the growth of religious intolerance especially between Sunnis and Shias as well as joining of hundreds of Indonesian and Malaysian Muslim youth to ISIS. More importantly, the wave of extremism in this region has affected many traditionalist and Sufi movements – which always had an anti-Wahabi nature – encouraging them to change their approach from Sufism and moderate Islam to Salafi and extremist ones. While explaining the cultural challenges of extremism in Indonesia, this paper examines and analyses domestic and foreign elements of the rise and growth of extremism among Muslim traditionalists in this country.

Indonesia as the largest muslin country, have Islamic and religious parties and organizations, the largest of these organizations may be referred to as the Forum Mohammedia and Ulema Movement. These organizations have contributed in shaping and Consistency of faiths and Muslim’s beliefs in a Specific format. This article examines aims of the organizations and Islamic parties in Indonesia and theories, leaders and their pioneers.