جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Georgia » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

Ottomans, each claiming leadership of a part of the Islamic world, over the Caucasus (mainly Georgia and Iran) lasted from the 16th to the 18th centuries. Finally, in the 19th century, another rival in the disputes over the region was added to the list of countries involved, namely Russia. The importance of the Caucasus was not only due to the fertility and prosperity of its rangelands in the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains but also due to its transit position on the eastern shores of the Black Sea. And they were trying to achieve their economic, social, political and cultural independence, and at the time we are discussing, they were again under the control of the Iranian government. In line with this fact, our research aims to show the incompetence of the Safavid court and the social, cultural and economic beliefs and political performance of the Safavid kings did not conform to the ideals and aspirations of Armenians and other Christians and greatly influenced their tendency towards the Ottomans. For many years, it was superior to the Safavids in terms of political power in the region and was a significant rival to European powers in world politics.

The process of neighborliness between Iran and Russia began in the middle of the sixteenth century and was implemented until the end of the same century. In the meantime, the two sides pursued diplomacy backed by common enemies and business incentives. Potentials for tensions emerged during the first half of the seventeenth century with the restoration of Iranian sovereignty over its Caucasian territory from Ottomans and the Russian efforts to break into Georgia and Dagestan. However, the balance of forces prevented the situation from becoming worse. This situation continued until Peter’s reign in the late seventeenth century. This article attempts to examine the evolution of Iranian-Russian relations from the attempt to military cooperation to the direct and indirect conflicts in the 17th century. The method of writing is descriptive-analytical based on the analysis of data extracted from primitive sources and authentic research. This study seeks to answer the question of why in the process of developing bilateral relations, despite potentials for cooperation, potentials for tension led to conflicts between the two sides. The result of this study shows that Russia was not able to face Iran directly in the 17th century, so it benefited from the nurturing activities of its citizens, especially Don Cossacks, along the Iranian Caspian coast, and on Caucasian issues, it was also advancing with the recruitment of local rulers and fortifications in the buffer zones between its territory and Iran. Russia’s key goal was to dominate the strategic segments of the North-South Corridor both at sea and on land. Iran’s historical relation with Russia dates back to about a thousand years, and in addition to trade, it includes the Varangians’ invasion to Iran via both land and the Caspian Sea during the 9th to 11th centuries. The history of official relations between Iran and Russia goes back to the reign of Ivan III of Russia. Realizing the importance of the Aq Qoyunlu, he sought to establish relations with them. Although Uzun Hasan responded to the embassy initiatives, he did not prioritize relations with distant neighbors. The turning point in Iran-Russia relations was the fall of Kazan in 1552 AD and Astrakhan in 1556 at the hands of Ivan “the fourth” and beginning of neighborliness between Iran and Russia through the Caspian Sea. The official relations between Iran and Russia were formed in the second half of the sixteenth century on three axes: trade, political-military cooperation, and geographical conflict, consequently, tensions between the two countries were not unexpected in such a situation. During the period between the two countries’ maritime neighborliness in 1556 and their land contacts in 1591 and 1604, the first capacities of tensions arose in relations between the two countries, indicating further complications. The desire of Tsarist Russia to receive the ownership of west coast of the Caspian Sea from Iran was revealed in the case of the Vasilchikov embassy in 1587. Of course, Iran's firm stance against Russian movements on its borders became apparent in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. In the meantime, the internal engagements of the two sides and their priorities in the face of their enemies led both sides to try to rely on the positive and constructive aspects of relations and contain the capacities of tension. As during the First Russo-Persian War (1651-1653), Tsar Alexei, the father of Peter, and the architect of many of Russia’s foundations of power, quickly sent an ambassador to make peace, or even during Razin’s invasion to Iranian ports of the Caspian Sea from Darband (Derbent) to Astarabad, Russia kept its diplomatic wing very active in its relations with Iran. If in the late sixteenth century the confrontation with the Ottomans and the Shaybanids was a serious incentive for the parties to cooperate, but with the fall of the Shaybanids at the end of the sixteenth century and the end of the Iran-Ottoman conflict, especially with the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639, Trade and neighborhood requirements became the main drawbacks of relations; while the Russian side pursued a dual game in its relations with Iran based on its activities on the coasts of the Caspian Sea and established Caucasian communications. Iran’s action to destroy Russian castles on the banks of the Sunzha River and expelling the Russian trade delegation with diplomatic cover, followed by the plundering of Iranian shores by Russian Cossacks, were three Pieces of evidences of the severity of relations that did not tend to be obvious. In 1653, following the success of the Sunzha River operation, Khosrow Khan Shervani was ready to march to Tersky, but Shah Abbas II preferred the path of diplomacy. On the issue of the Cossack’s attack, Iran also preferred to respond to Russian diplomacy. Russia’s proliferation on the Caspian Sea coasts and its infiltration into Dagestan and Georgia were the main roots of tensions in relations between the two sides, which were managed due to Iran’s balance of power and relative superiority. Although the benefits of trade with Iran for Russia and the interests of Russia from being the route for Iran’s trade with Europe was very important to Moscow, but in a model reminiscent of the conflict between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans in the Caucasus, the Kremlin sought to dominate both the sea and the land route, pursuing indirect destructive actions in its relations with Iran in the cases of Caspian sea shores and the Caucasus that overshadowed at least its own short-term interests. The Russian governors of Astrakhan and Tersky had been cooperating with the Cossack bandits at many times, similar to the Khazar Khaganate’s action in 913 AD, which allowed the Varangians to cross their territory and move from Don River to Volga river and to the Caspian Sea to access Iranian shores for plundering the civilians. With so much evidence, these governors' coordination with Moscow cannot be questioned. Therefore, duplicitous behavior and indirect persecution should be considered part of Moscow's policy towards Isfahan. In the seventeenth century, Russia, in the balance of power with Iran, was gradually trying to change the balance in its favor. The Tsars’ continued efforts to establish relations with the Dagestani and Georgian elites, especially with those who were dissatisfied with Iran. Russia’s failed attempts to make its relations with several Georgian elites to a bargaining tool with Iran and interference in Georgia’s affairs, were examples of Moscow’s soft political approach in its rivalry with Iran during seventeenth century. However, the invasion of Iran by Peter the Great in 1723 marked another aspect of a macro-politics, a policy that continued from the Ivan the “fourth”, Boris Godunov, and the Romanovs in three dynasties. It can be said that the developments of Iran-Russia Relations during seventeenth century showed that the relations between the two sides should have been considered as an equation in which the key effective factors were geopolitical conflict, commercial and political interests , rivalries , cooperation and competition in foreign policy, which over time, the results were different.

Crimea's separation from Ukraine and its annexation to Russian territory, Russian war with Georgia, and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as linguistic syndromes suggest that Russia seeks to expand its sphere of influence close to near abroad. On the other hand, the purpose of the article is to induce that, given that the will of Russian policymakers in the post-historical world is still drawn on two elements of historical and ideological subjectivity, implementing a regional solution contrary to Russian interests is not possible. The question here is what are the consequences of the deconstructive policies and contrary to Russia's foreign interests, for Ukraine and Georgia? With the help of linguistic propositions, the efforts of these countries to separate from the Russian-led centralist security complex have had no effect other than the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and the Kremlin's support of Georgia's autonomous regions such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Georgia is the connecting point of the South Caucasus region to the North on the one hand and Russia and the Caucasus to Eastern and Central Europe, on the other. The Black Sea is located in western Georgia, which plays an important role in geopolitical matters in the region. Georgia has three important ports in this sea; the most important one is the port of Poti. In terms of geo-space, Georgia is the main source of access to the Black Sea, being in equations of the east corridor to the west and from the south to the north, also acting as a balance of power between  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkey and Iran and the strategic stratagem of Russia, Europe and the United States. Contrary to what is shown in the media, Iran hasn’t had significant economic achievements in Georgia.
After the signing of JCPOA (joint comprehensive plan of action) or Iran nuclear deal, a new era of economic relations between Iran and Georgia began. One of the motivating factors for investing in Georgia was the close relationship between Georgia and the European Union. In 2014, “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” was signed between the European Union and Georgia and since then, Georgia has benefited from concessions in economic relations with the European Union. According to some of the provisions of this agreement, Europeans considered concessions for another government in Georgia.
The question is how conclusion of this agreement will provide opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran to advance its economic policies in Georgia and whether it could lead to a greater proximity to Iran and Europe. There are many capacities to expand Iran-Georgia ties in economic spheres. In the meantime the European Union seems to be able to bring about closer regional cooperation.
In response to the above-mentioned question, it can be said that the clauses on free tariffs export, the rules of origin and the visa liberalization with Europe included in this agreement provide great opportunities for Iran and could increase the level of relations between Iran and Georgia on the one hand and improve relations between Iran and the European Union on the other. This cooperation has occurred in energy and transportation sectors.
In the first case, it can be said that Iran and Georgia have a special geopolitical position. The geographical location of Iran between the Caspian Sea and Oman Sea, the location of Georgia along the Black Sea and the fact that both of these states are transit routes for Europe and have great potential to develop three-way partnerships, are of paramount importance. Iran is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of oil and gas reserves, and the EU as one of the largest industrial poles in the world is strongly dependent on imports of energy resources. Georgia also is in need of new energy resources to complete its independency from Russia. On the other hand, oil, gas and other derivatives account for the bulk of the Iranian export market which has led the country to depend heavily on foreign exchange earnings from the sale of these products. Despite the huge reserves of Iran and its geographical proximity to the European Union, energy exchanges are not at the right level. Therefore, there is three-way sensitivity in the field of energy and transit between Iran, Georgia and the European Union.
According to liberal-political theories, regional agreements can open the way for the further expansion of economic cooperation. This is the policy pursued by the EU in its economic diplomacy. European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership Program were important steps in active participation of Europe in the South Caucasus region and particularly in Georgia, which led to the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with the country. This paper has used interdependency theory for the hypothesis examination.
Currently good relations between Iran and Europe has provided the ground for effective Iranian presence in Georgia and can act as a major barrier (contributor) to the pressures of the United States and Russia and give Georgia a backing for deepening its ties with Iran. The concept of sensitivity in three-way relationship between Iran, Georgia and the European Union can be useful for all three sides. The concept of susceptibility is a healthy relationship in Georgia and the capacity for this three-sided sensitivity is fortunate. The reading of theory of interdependence means that among the countries with a high degree of bilateral trades, if trade value is not sensitive to price and income developments in the two countries, they will have limited economic dependence.
After the signing of JCPOA, EU confirmed Iran’s key role in the Caucasus. There is no doubt that cultural ties between Iran and Georgia can contribute to further development of relations but this will not be achieved without more dynamic economic relations between the two countries. Europe is the catalyst that provides more dynamism. Friendship with the EU is a key factor in increasing Iran’s presence in Georgia. Iran has the capacity to play a key role in geopolitics of the Caucasus including Georgia. With Europe’s support, Iran will look more as a reliable player. The historical and cultural commonalities between Iran and Georgia, the decline of Russia’s influence in Georgia, the involvement of Europeans in issues related to Georgia and Iran as a dynamic actor are the most important means for promoting bilateral and trilateral relations. In addition, Iran could benefit from the dynamics of the deep-rooted bilateral engagement with Georgia and EU.

Science diplomacy is a concept that has attracted much attention in twenty-first century more than ever before and the need for understanding it is growing. Because of many factors, the South Caucasus is an important region for Iran, including its geographical proximity and historical ties. The region is located between Iran, Russia and Turkey and Iran is the only bordering country with this region that has official political relations with all South Caucasus countries, including Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, but this does not mean that relations between Iran and the above-mentioned countries are in a favorable position. Considering the capacities for using science diplomacy in relations between Iran and the South Caucasus countries, to achieve an assessment of Iran's performance in this field is essential. This paper mainly seeks to examine the opportunities and challenges of applying science diplomacy as a tool in Iran’s relations with the South Caucasus countries and also tries to examine the roles of other foreign players in the field of science diplomacy in the region.

All three Republics Azerbaijan , Armenia and Georgia after the Independence Passed their First Constitution in 1995 and in the Consequent Years Amended the Constitutions at least two or three Times. The Amendments Coincided with the Power Transition and Election Period made their Effects Vast and Considerable. Given this background, the main Question of this Research is that what has been the most Important Factor Contributing to Constitutional Amendments in the three South Caucasian Republics? Comparative Evaluation of the Issue Shows Specific Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Between these three Countries which may be Experienced in other Developing Countries. to Answer the Question, we should Pay Attention to the Context specially Political Environment, Major Actors and Benefiting Elements and also Judicial and Political Consequences of Each Amendment. The main Hypothesis of this Research is that Maintaining Power in the Hands of Ruling Elites has been the main cause of Constitutional Amendments in all three Republics. The method of Research is Descriptive – Analytical.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, same as many other countries, recognized the sovereignty and independence of Georgia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of its republics including Georgia. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Georgia's declaration of independence, the relations between Tehran and Tbilisi have generally been at a favorable level. Indeed, in spite of some opportunities for improving the level of relations between the two countries, the challenging factors have actually increased the restriction on the relations between Tehran and Tbilisi. The present study while briefly referring to the history of Iran-Georgia relations, discusses the opportunities and challenges in two countries relation. Therefore, the main question in this study is that what are the most significant factors in creation of the challenges and opportunities in the relations between Iran and Georgia? The hypothesis and the possible answer is that the security-oriented approach of Iran's foreign policy and the western-oriented approach of Georgia's foreign policy is a major challenge for relations between the two countries. The results of the research show that the factors such as having historical and cultural connectivity and the existing potential for the economic cooperation are considered as a stimulus for the expansion of relations between the two countries. However, at the same time, there are obstacles and factors such as the West-oriented approach of Georgia, the NATO-Georgia relationship, Georgia's relations with the Israeli and America's regime and joining NATO and so on in front of these relations. The present study was done by using library and descriptive-analytical method.

Georgia has faced challenges since the independence from the Soviet Union. Some of were inherited from the Soviet era and some of them like political instability, disintegration, separation and insecurity that was worn during the Soviet Union, in the era of independence emerged. Outside Georgia's borders in the South Caucasus, the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also made the region unstable and insecure. Among the internal and external threats that Georgia has faced since 1991, it can be said that Russia as one of the most important threats to Georgia's security, so that Russia is in Georgia's new security doctrine which was adopted in 2012, has been mentioned as the main threat for Georgia. Also in the National Military Strategy document which was released in 2014 by the Georgian Ministry of Defense, Russia has been introduced as the occupying country of Georgia, and as a factor in the rise of terrorist acts in the country.
The seriousness of Russia's threat to Georgia raises this question that how much this threat is rooted in the mentality and history of the Georgians about the Russians and to what extent is this threat from objective facts? In the other words, what indicators made Russia a threat to Georgia? Ultimately the main question is what impact Russia has had on Georgia's security policy from 1991 to 2013 and Georgia has adopted what policies to respond to the Russian threats? To answer these questions a descriptive-analytical method and the defensive realism approach, Stephan Walt's balance-of-threat theory is used.
According to balance of threat theory, states' alliance behavior is determined by the threat they perceive from other states. Walt contends that states will generally balance by allying against a perceived threat, although very weak states are more likely to bandwagon with the rising threat in order to protect their own security. Walt identifies four criteria states use to evaluate the threat posed by another state: its aggregate strength (size, population, and economic capabilities), its geographic proximity, its offensive capabilities, and its offensive intentions. Walt argues that the more other states view a rising state as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to view it as a threat and balance against it.
Balance of threat theory modified realism (as well as the neorealism of Kenneth Waltz) by separating power from threat. In balance of power theory, which had previously dominated realist analyses, states balance against others whose power (i.e., military capabilities) was rising—greater power was assumed to reflect offensive intentions. Walt argues that this is not borne out by empirical evidence, and that balance of threat theory—in which states will not balance against those who are rising in power but do not display offensive intentions—gives a better account of the evidence.
Using the indicators of Walt's balance of threat theory, it can be concluded that Russia is a serious threat to Georgia, and Georgia has adopted balancing acts to counteract this threat. Georgia's withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States, the use of alternative organizations such as Guam and NATO and the promotion of relations with the EU and the United States are the indicators of this counterbalance against Russia.
The GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development is a regional organization of four post-Soviet states: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova started with the GUAM consultative forum, established on 10 October 1997, in Strasbourg and named after the initial letters of each of those countries. In 1999, the organization adopted the name GUUAM due to the membership of Uzbekistan. A summit in Yalta on 6 to 7 June 2001 was accompanied by the signing of GUUAM's charter which formalized the organization. However, in 2002, Uzbekistan announced that it planned to withdraw from the organization, and following this announcement started to ignore GUUAM summits and meetings. On 24 May 2005, shortly after the Andijan massacre, Uzbekistan finally gave an official notice of withdrawal from the organization to the Moldovan presidency, thus changing the group's name back to GUAM.
Georgia and NATO relations officially began in 1994 when Georgia joined the NATO-run Partnership for Peace. Georgia has moved quickly following the Rose Revolution in 2003 to seek closer ties and eventual membership with NATO. Georgia's powerful northern neighbor, Russia, has opposed the closer ties, including those expressed at the 2008 Bucharest summit where NATO members promised that Georgia would eventually join the organization. In the 7 December 2011 statement of the North Atlantic Council Georgia was designated as an "aspirant country”.
Georgian–American relations continue to be very close and encompass multiple areas of bilateral cooperation. The United States for its part is actively assisting Georgia in strengthening its state institutions in face of increasing pressure from its northern neighbor Russia and has provided the country with financial assistance in excess of 3 billion dollars since 1991.Since 2009, Georgian–American relations are streamlined by the U.S.–Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, which created four bilateral working groups on priority areas of democracy; defense and security; economic, trade, and energy issues; and people-to-people and cultural exchanges.
Georgia in 2004-2008 sought to become a member of NATO, but did not succeed in the face of strong Russian opposition. In February 2012, it was agreed that the U.S. and Georgia will start working on a Free Trade Agreement which, if materialized, will make Georgia the only European country to have such treaty with the United States. Georgia and the European Union have maintained relations since 1996 and in 2006 a five-year "Action Plan" of rapprochement was implemented in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). A more comprehensive Association Agreement entered into force on 1 July 2016. A European Union Monitoring Mission was sent to Georgia in the wake of the 2008 South Ossetia war. Georgia does not have any official status as a candidate for future enlargement of the European Union, but in 2011 Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili expressed a desire for his country to become a member state of the EU. This view has been explicitly expressed on several occasions as links to the United States, EU and NATO have been strengthened in an attempt to move away from the Russian sphere of influence.

The article examines the limits of Iranian foreign policy toward Georgia, outlines the threats from the US and other regional players such as Russia, Turkey and Israeli, and also attempts to identify the main causes and motivations for Tehran’s affiliation with Tbilisi. After disregarding the Caucasus for decades and being excluded from its geopolitical chess game, Iran decided to cultivate a new relationship with the South Caucasus, including Georgia, hoping to regain its once-potent role as a regional power. Georgia is the only South Caucasian country, which has no border with Iran; and this geographical factor has affected relations between the two countries.
This paper has been performed as a field and analytical-descriptive study and has also been analyzed by “Realism theory” in Persian and English resources. The authors of the analysis studies in detail the opportunities for economic and other forms of partnership with Iran, which will help diversify Georgia's neighborhood policy, while balancing the interests of regional players of the South Caucasus. At the end of the research, the possible opportunity for Iran and Georgia that might accompany such a political strategy are discussed as well. The final goal of this document is maximum detection of the potential for improving Georgia-Iran relations and its in-depth analysis, as well as opening a space for discussion and debate on Georgia-Iran relations.

The strategic location of Georgia, have been placed it for a long time in the profits constellation of interests of major powers of Iran, the Ottomans and the Russians, each acting based on their own interests, military and diplomatic policies, which, sometimes in long term caused tensions and disputes between them. As the realization of economic and political ideas of the Tsars of Russia and the Safavid Shahs in the Caucasus was in contrast to the Ottomans, and confronting their advance and influence could only be made possible through the geographical continuity between conquered regions in the Caucasus, especially Georgia as one of their conformable and envisage states. In the meantime, some of the Georgian princes’ actions in disconnection and hostility to the Safavid court, and trending toward Russia, according to religious and political tendencies, rejection of coalition with Safavids to fight the Ottomans, and Russians policy to realize the idea of Peter the Great, using political and military weaknesses in the structure of Safavid government, loss of their control over Georgia and Georgians governors’ disobedience toward Safavid kings, resulted in the cold and eventually strained relationship between Safavid and the Tsars, ultimately leading to Russian immersive domination over Georgia. This paper intends to answer the following questions, using the review of documents method and based on historical data: What was the Georgia’s role in conflict between Ottomans and Safavids? And what was the role of Georgian princes in intensifying this conflict?

The Bagratian clan was the oldest and the most legitimate in Georgia and Safavid was confident about them. During the reign of Shah Safi, the credit of Bagrati clan was increased due to their valuable service to the monarch and fining his reign. In the beginning of the accession, he wanted set up the tent of her reign based on the new columb and overthrow old elements that was independent on Shah Abbas. To overthrov these old elements, he required to a vigorous, skilled and efficient agent for replacement. Bagrati clan has necessary elements and dependent on the old elites. Shah Safi could make conquests on the all interior plots, with assistance and recourse to Bagrati clan. The main purpose of this study is to find the answer of the following questions: Why Shah Safi rely on the Bagrati clan? Which are the reasons the Bagrati clan reached to the maximum power of their authority? What are the attempts of the Bagrati clan to conduct the affairs? What is the influence of Bagrati clan attempts on the disordering the balance of power? what the first Shah Abbas developed among three opponent groups (Turk, Tajik and Ghollar)?

Building a single national identity has been one of the most difficult phases in the process of nation-building in various societies. Common definition of itself and the formation of inter-minds understanding of a single nation beyond the existing ethnic identities, has led to building an inclusive national identity and this issue provides the required ground for the advancement of nation-building process. Realization of this issue depends on the performance of the elites in creating consensus among ethnic groups and the willingness of diverse ethnic identities to participate in the process of building national identity. This is particularly very significant in the areas, where other multiple ethnic identities live in constant tension with each other. South Caucasus region is one of the regions, which due to the existence of hostile ethnic groups, is considered as a unique example in studying the national identity building of the “post-Soviet”. In this region, Georgia is considered as a failed example in the arena of building national identity and nation-building.
In this regard, the question of this article is: What were the main obstacles in building national identity in Georgia and what was the impact of these factors on the process of nation-building in this country? The hypothesis of the article is also elaborated as follows: the interaction of two factors; the reluctance of the diverse ethnic groups in a common definition of themselves as a single nation and also the Georgian elites’ performance, in order to marginalize the ethnic minorities in the process of building national identity, along with the impact of the Soviet Union’s legacy, has been the most important factors in the lack of national identity formation in Georgia and subsequently, its failure in the country's nation-building process. The method used in this article, is descriptive-analytical method, through using the library tools.

According to Russia's membership in the “UN Security Council”, nuclear power, proximity and involvement in a wide arena of the world’s geography (Japan, China, Central Asia, the Middle East, the Black Sea, East Europe to the Baltic region), as well as the possibility of military support and reinforcement of different groups and governments; the influence of Russia’s remoteness and proximity in various parts of the world, especially in the “South Caucasus”, is still undeniable. A series of security and strategic interests (in relation to Armenia and Georgia), as well as economic interests (mainly relevant to Azerbaijan) have made “South Caucasus” important for Russia; thus, in expanding the relations, “Eurasia region” has been the priority of the country in all foreign policy documents until 2016. The main objective of this article is, to respond to this question: How Russia has turned into a security activist in the “South Caucasus”? The hypothesis, which is raised in response to this main question, is as follows: A series of strategic, security, military, economic and energy resources have turned Russia into a security activist in the South Caucasus.
In this article, it is tried to answer to the main question through studying Russia’s foreign policy documents and then different approaches of the country; as well as studying its interests in various fields by a descriptive – explanatory method.

“South Caucasus” has always been part of the most challenging regions of the world and it is considered very crucial for Europe to maintain its security.“Eastern Partnership Plan” (EAP), which is part of neighborhood policy of EU (European Union) started in the country a short time after the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, in fact, it was interpreted as the Europe’s response to Russia's military action. In the framework of the neighborhood policy of Europe, Georgia and Europe signed a “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement”, which is the most advanced mechanism of European cooperation. “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” (PCA) between Georgia and Europe is a benchmark for the cooperation between Europe and Georgia, and it has had great achievements for both parties so far. Practically, signing “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” has had certain impacts. The most important achievements have been the reform of the judiciary structure as well as the reform of the governmental institutions, human rights, economic cooperation, protection of the environment and the cultural sector.
In this regard, the authors discuss the questions of the article as follows: Whether Georgia is well prepared to start extensive cooperation with “European Union” (EU)? What kind of impacts does creating a regime of cooperation in the framework of the “Eastern Partnership Plan” leave, on the political economy of the country? On which aspects is this policy more successful? Is there any possibility of further developments? This hypothesis is raised in response to these questions that creating a regime of cooperation between “European Union” (EU) and Georgia has two political and economic dimensions, in national and regional levels. The method used in this article, is descriptive-analytical method, through using the library tools.

The application of concepts of other sciences can be beneficial for researcher’s understanding of political and international arrangements. One of the concepts that have been used in Geopolitics is the concept of "Code" and "Genome". Geopolitical Genome is the political genetic map of countries that influence the behavior of countries in the domestic and particularly foreign arena. Countries consider the genomes of other actors as geopolitical codes. Interaction or confrontation of countrie's code/ genome create an atmosphere that may be in line or inconsistent with national and regional interests. While aiming to identify the geopolitical components affecting Russia and Georgia, the paper attempts to answer the following question: what are the effects of Geopolitical tools on Russian and Georgian Foreign Policy? The hypothesis of this paper is that the gene of ‘great power’ ideology, as well as geo-economic position of Russian Federation versus national minorities, separatism, geostrategic and crossing codes as well as the geo-economic dependence of Georgia, has paved a way for the political exploitation of Georgia by Russian Federation. The results show that there are active and dominant genes with regards to Georgia including: national minorities, separatism, tendency for anti-Russian and trans-regional institutionalism and Atlantisism, geostrategic and crossing situation and geo-economic dependence. With regards to Russia, dominant and active genes such as geo-economy, great power idea, NATO and EU eastward expansion, Russian compatriots in soviet era and geographical greatness that affect both countrie's foreign policy.

Israel''s presence and influence in some regional and international conflicts are clearly observable. The Jewish state uses various instruments to intervene in sensitive and strategic regions. The most important of these instruments are security-information infiltration and military technology superiority. Georgia conflict، in addition to its regional effects، quickly took on an international dimension because of the post-Cold War geopolitical importance of the Caucasus and its transformation into a zone of extra-regional power competition. Israel''s intervention in Georgia had varying economic، cultural and political dimensions and was for specific goals. However، the most important aspect of Israel''s activities in Georgia has to do with its military-security intelligence and espionage undertakings. Reportedly، the role of the Zionist regime in Georgia is not limited to the sale of advanced weapons. Israeli officers also participated in the training of the Georgian troops; and Israeli companies were active in arms production in this country. Using the balance of power theory، the author analyzes Israel’s role in the Caucasian crises in order to show how it has penetrated Iran’s geopolitical periphery.