جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Model of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma » در نشریات گروه « علوم سیاسی »

In the post- JCPOA period, Economic and trade interactions did not take shape between Iran and the and the US, and the lack of pressure from economic actors facilitated Trump's withdrawal from JCPOA. In this article, we analyze the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal(JCPOA) from this perspective. The question arises: what effect did the non-formation of economic and trade cooperation between Iran and US have on the US withdrawal from JCPOA? We hypothesize that the lack of economic and trade interaction has facilitated the withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA. In this research, we modeled it with descriptive-analytical method (documentary sources) and using game theory, model of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Iran-US relations in three times: Oman secret negotiations to JCPOA (2015), post-JCPOA and post-US withdrawal JCPOA (2018) and came to the conclusion that in the first stage of the game in the political field, change approach of the Iran-Us governments caused the parties to choose cooperation as the basis of the first game. The second stage of the game despite the economic background in the post- JCPOA period, no cooperation was formed between Iran and the US, unlike European countries and this lack of economic cooperation and interdependence led to the prevail of the political atmosphere in the third stage of the game, and with the withdrawal of the US from the JCPOA and the gradual reduction of nuclear commitments by Iran, non-cooperation according to the Prisoners Dilemma game returned relations to before JCPOA.